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Abstract 
This thesis discusses the struggle for independence in Rhodesia, from the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence in 1965 to internationally recognised independence in 1980. 
Whilst there are many existing accounts and discussions of the Rhodesia crisis, there is very 
little work that considers the role of advocacy organisations and the pressure they exerted on 
successive Governments and the broader left in Britain, and little consideration of the African 
nationalist movement outside of Rhodesia or the nationalist bases in neighbouring countries. 
The thesis builds on existing literature by considering how interest in the Rhodesia issue 
amongst advocacy organisations and the labour movement in Britain fluctuated over this 15 
year period, according to key events in the timeline of the transition from Rhodesia to 
Zimbabwe. It examines the methods used by advocacy organisations in campaigning on the 
Rhodesia issue, arguing that they were constrained by pragmatism and adherence to familiar 
methods of campaigning, as well as a lack of will to break with these methods, one of which 
was to involve the labour movement and utilise their established networks to publicise the 
cause. This tactic was met with limited success because, for the majority of the period under 
consideration, the British labour movement was broadly disengaged with the Rhodesia issue, 
with other primarily domestic concerns taking precedence, although certain individuals gave 
ardent support to the cause. The rhetoric of the more middle class led advocacy organisations 
generally failed to find traction with much of the labour movement. Meanwhile, the African 
nationalist movement focused its attentions on the British Labour Party in the belief that they 
were the real power brokers, and maintained a polite relationship with its representatives, 
whilst espousing a strong anti-British rhetoric back in Rhodesia. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 “Africa retained a capacity for arousing passions among the politically conscious in 
Britain to an extent which few, if any, of those other, far more important areas did. 
Even the war in the Middle East, with all the implications this had for the many Jews 
or Zionist sympathisers in Britain, did not touch the raw nerve of British political 
controversy quite so directly as did the problem of Rhodesia.” 
M. Hudson1 
 
Whilst Hudson’s phrasing is objectionable, this quote captures the provocative and 
divisive nature of Rhodesia and its history, as debated amongst those sectors of 
British society that were interested in its development. 
 
The ‘Rhodesia crisis’ spanned 15 years, claimed the lives of over 30 000 people,2 
brought the Commonwealth to the brink of collapse,3 and saw the ascendancy of 
Robert Gabriel Mugabe to the reins of power. Despite the tumultuous and dramatic 
nature of this period, many aspects remain under or un-explored in existing academic 
literature, leaving a gap in the telling of this important story. 
 
Zimbabwe, formerly Southern Rhodesia, was a self-governing British colony,4 and 
from 1953 formed part of the Central African Federation (CAF) with Nyasaland and 
Northern Rhodesia. The CAF lasted until 1963, but was then broken up to allow for 
the creation of the independent states of Zambia and Malawi under constitutions that 
fairly enfranchised the African population.5 Rhodesia remained a British colony with a 
strong settler regime whose newly elected right wing government, under Ian Smith, 
rejected Britain’s call to bring forward constitutional reform in line with its northern 
neighbours. Rejecting this policy, Smith’s government, illegally and unilaterally, 
declared independence in 1965, generally referred to as the unilateral declaration of 
                                                          
1 M. Hudson, Triumph or Tragedy? Rhodesia to Zimbabwe (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1981): 52. 
2 P. Moorcraft ‘Rhodesia’s War of Independence’ History Today 40:9 (1990), online edition.  
3 Windrich, Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1978): 88-90. 
4 Self-governing meaning that it had an elected Government with control of most internal affairs, but there will still 
some colonial strictures in place.  
5 M. Steele (2010) ‘Labour and the Central African Federation: Paternalism, partnership and black nationalism 1951–
1960’ The British Labour Movement and Imperialism Billy Frank, Craig Horner and David Stewart (eds.) (Cambridge 
Scholars Press, 2010): 131 – 147. 
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independence (UDI). Britain, from this point until the official independence of 
Zimbabwe in 1980, tried to negotiate a return to legality with a framework in place for 
achieving majority rule. Meanwhile the African nationalist movement in Rhodesia, 
tired of fruitless campaigning through constitutional channels, began a guerrilla war 
against the illegal regime, also in a bid for majority rule. During the period between 
UDI and the official independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, there were various 
diplomatic attempts to resolve the impasse and bring an end to the war, eventually 
culminating in the Lancaster House talks in 1979 and the election of the Zimbabwe 
African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) led by Robert Mugabe.6 This brief 
introduction highlights two key aspects of the story, which is manifested as two 
largely separate bodies of existing academic literature: one that deals with the 
diplomatic unfolding of the Rhodesia crisis, and another that addresses the guerrilla 
war.  
 
Whilst there are many existing accounts and discussions of the Rhodesia crisis, there 
is very little work that considers the role of advocacy organisations and the pressure 
they exerted on successive Governments and the broader left in Britain, not simply to 
settle, but to find an acceptable solution to the crisis that did not sell-out Rhodesia’s 
black majority. There is also little consideration of the African nationalist movement 
outside of Rhodesia or the nationalist bases in neighbouring countries. The following 
literature review highlights the key arguments and debates in existing studies of the 
period, and through this, sets out the background to the exploration, in later chapters, 
of the role of advocacy organisations, the British labour movement and the African 
nationalist movement, and the role of pragmatism in the struggle for independence in 
Rhodesia. This introductory chapter will then move on to discuss how the thesis 
builds on the existing literature; the research questions guiding the study; the 
methodology applied to carry out the research, and then set out the structure for the 
following five substantive chapters. 
                                                          
6 R. Coggins ‘Wilson and Rhodesia: UDI and British Policy Towards Africa’ Contemporary British History 20: 3 (2006) pp. 
363-381 
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Literature Review 
The intended scope of this literature review is to consider the main texts on the 
subject of the Rhodesia crisis, including those considering the African nationalist 
movement, events in Britain, and texts on advocacy organisations. After considering 
existing literature focusing respectively on Britain and Rhodesia, sources providing 
context to the topic will be considered, followed by relevant theoretical work. The 
literature review will begin with the final years of the CAF, and its breakup in 1963 
precipitating UDI, up to the official independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, although the 
substantive chapters of the thesis will focus on the period of 1965-1980. This 
extension is simply to provide context to the discussions that will follow later. The 
period of the CAF was important in two regards; its demise set in motion events that 
led to UDI, and it provided a forum that nurtured the proto-African nationalist 
movement in Rhodesia.7 
British Policy in Existing Literature 
The literature focusing on British policy towards Rhodesia during the period under 
consideration generally takes a governmental approach, and to a large extent fails to 
engage with the literature on the guerrilla war or nationalist movement. Events are 
predominantly covered from an elite perspective, focusing on the way in which the 
Rhodesia situation played out diplomatically, and in Parliament. 
 
Windrich provides a detailed chronological account of British policy on Rhodesia, 
beginning with the Constitutional Conference of 1961, surrounding the dissolution of 
the CAF.8 The text considers policy on Rhodesia from both Labour and Conservative 
perspectives. This provides a useful inter-party context that enriches the British-
oriented narrative of this historical chapter. Windrich also discusses various UN and 
Commonwealth meetings, which help to put events in context in terms of 
international opinion, which was generally one of frustration with Britain. Whilst 
Smith’s attempts to maintain unity in his Rhodesian Front party and campaigning 
around Rhodesian elections are covered, there is no substantive engagement with the 
                                                          
7 J. Day International Nationalism: The extra-territorial relations of Southern Rhodesian African nationalists (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1967): 61. 
8 Windrich, Rhodesian Independence: 12-17. 
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history of the nationalist movement or guerrilla war. However, it is an invaluable 
historical text on British policy on Rhodesia from 1961 until 1977, focusing on the 
governmental and international-organisational level. Whilst some discussion of the 
annual party conferences (in Britain) is included, and occasional acknowledgement of 
specific constituency motions put forward, the account largely focuses on party elites. 
So, whilst drawing no overarching conclusions on the subject of British involvement in 
Rhodesia, Windrich offers a very detailed and precise account of the diplomacy of the 
time, and of British policy on the issue.  
 
Published at a similar time as Windrich’s book, and dealing with events in a similar 
governmental approach, Maxey compares Labour’s strategy to that of the 
Conservatives, and concludes that in essence it was simply a continuation.9 Windrich 
differentiates the two parties’ policies at various points, but this is usually a difference 
of extent, rather than fundamental character. For example the Conservative Party, or 
at least its mainstream, was not fundamentally opposed to the idea of sanctions, but 
did not share Labour’s vision of the extent to which they should be applied. She also 
points out that African nationalist leaders heralded the election of Labour in 1964 as 
they were seen to more closely represent nationalist interests, although this optimism 
did not last.10 
 
Prior to UDI, in an attempt to prevent Smith from making such a move, Wilson had 
threatened the imposition of sanctions if independence were to be illegally declared. 
When UDI was announced, Britain did implement sanctions, but it did so in stages. 
Maxey offers an important critique of the sanctions regime, which was also made by 
other states at UN Security Council and Commonwealth leaders’ meetings and 
resulted in frustration with Britain. Sanctions were applied over an extended period 
of time, allowing Rhodesia to adapt and greatly reducing the potential efficacy of this 
strategy.11 
 
                                                          
9 K. Maxey, ‘Labour and the Rhodesian Situation’ African Affairs 75: 299 (1976), 152-162. 
10 Windrich, Rhodesian Independence: Chapter 2.  
11 K. Maxey, ‘Labour and the Rhodesian Situation’ 157-8. 
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Coggins provides a more recent account of Britain and Rhodesia, again focusing on the 
British government, and particularly on Wilson. He explores in some detail Britain’s 
efforts to forestall UDI, and when this failed, attempts to negotiate a settlement.12 It is 
a less detailed account than is offered by Windrich, but with the benefit of hindsight, 
Coggins draws more insightful conclusions about Wilson’s overall strategy. It is stated 
that the aim of sanctions was to try to affect the Rhodesian government without 
alienating white opposition to Smith. No real indication of the socioeconomic realities 
behind such a strategy is given, although Coggins states that Rhodesian Front 
propaganda was successful in placing blame for any economic hardship firmly on 
Britain. This is supported by Windrich who details the way in which the Smith regime 
gradually brought Rhodesian media under state control, and continually used it for 
pro-Rhodesian Front propaganda against both the British and the African 
nationalists.13 
 
A key conclusion that Coggins draws, which is not made explicit in Windrich’s book 
despite the extra detail in her account, is that the ‘Rhodesian issue’ demonstrated that 
realpolitik prevailed over any previously stated commitment to multi-racial 
democracy.14 However, Coggins is not entirely unsympathetic towards Wilson’s 
efforts. He argues that Wilson successfully kept the Rhodesia question from becoming 
a divisive issue in domestic British politics. This gives a preliminary indication of the 
influence of pragmatism in decision making on Rhodesia, in this instance with 
successive Labour Governments. Where Windrich merely chronicles the negotiations 
and ever increasing concessions offered to the Smith regime by Britain, Coggins 
argues that “Wilson’s basic political aim of offering enough constitutional concessions 
to induce divisions between moderates and hard-liners in the party, so as to form an 
interim government of blacks and whites, was not so unrealistic”.15 This idea of an 
overriding strategy is not suggested in other accounts of negotiations, but offers an 
interesting potential meta-narrative to Britain’s role in the Rhodesia situation. 
                                                          
12 R. Coggins, ‘Wilson and Rhodesia: UDI and British Policy Towards Africa’, Contemporary British History 20: 3 (2006), 
363-381. 
13 E. Windrich, ‘Rhodesian Censorship: The Role of the Media in the Making of a One-Party State’ African Affairs 78: 313 
(1979), 523-534. 
14 Coggins, ‘Wilson and Rhodesia’: 376. 
15 Ibid. 
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There are two important articles that explicitly deal with debates surrounding the 
potential use of force in resolving the ‘Rhodesian issue’. Coggins also addresses this 
issue, but it is not dealt with in detail and the conclusion is drawn that it was ruled out 
because of military factors and Labour’s slim majority at the time of the initial 
decision. Murphy provides by far the most thorough exploration of the possible use of 
force, and argues that the decision that the military option would not be available was 
actually made far earlier than is generally assumed. When military intervention in the 
Federation was being considered, the planning process and conclusions on the subject 
informed all subsequent thinking on the subject of intervention in Rhodesia.16 
Pessimism about the chances of success of a military intervention became ingrained in 
political thinking, which affected all successive debates. Contrary to this view, Watts 
argues that obstacles to the use of force were exaggerated, and that force could have 
been used in Rhodesia.17 The reasons cited against the use of force, such as the 
strength of the Rhodesian Air Force, are systematically discredited, including those 
given by Coggins for why force was not used. On technical points, Watts may well be 
correct, but Murphy’s argument on the trajectory of political and military thinking on 
the subject seems far more relevant and compelling in assessing the actions of the 
British government. It also serves to highlight the pragmatic approach to policy 
making on the use of force specifically, as well as in relation the Rhodesia issue more 
generally; if chances of success of military intervention were deemed low, it was 
pragmatic to avoid this option. 
 
As mentioned above, Coggins’ analysis is weighted towards Wilson in particular, 
rather than the government as a whole. It is important to consider Wilson as a leader 
in exploring Labour Party and government policy on Rhodesia. Wrigley discusses 
Wilson’s unique strategic methods, using the analogy of a chess player engaged in 
multiple games. In this sense, he argues, Wilson’s decisions have to be seen in broader 
                                                          
16 P. Murphy, ‘‘An intricate and distasteful subject’: British Planning for the Use of Force  Against the European Settlers 
of Central Africa’ English Historical Review 492 (2006), 746-777. 
17 C. Watts, ‘Killing Kith and Kin: The Viability of British Military Intervention in Rhodesia, 1964-5’ Twentieth Century 
British History 16: 4 (2005), 382-415; C. Watts, ‘The Rhodesian Crisis in British and International Politics, 1964-1965’ (PhD 
thesis, University of Birmingham, 2006). 
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context.18 He also argues that Wilson was preoccupied both with image, and with 
making sure the Tories were always on the defensive. This sometimes resulted in 
moral principles taking a backseat in the creation of foreign policy. This is supported 
by Windrich’s discussion of the outcome of the Fearless proposals, whereby Wilson 
faced considerable opposition from within the Labour Party, but “he appeared to be 
more concerned with the fact that the Opposition were not disposed to criticise the 
proposals or attack the Government for their conduct in the negotiations”.19 
 
Shifting discussion briefly from the overriding focus on government, Maxey argues 
that the anti-UDI protest movement had none of the passion of the anti-Vietnam war 
movement. This can be explained by the fact that there was less press coverage of 
Rhodesia, there was an underlying anti-Americanism to the anti-Vietnam war 
movement, and finally the perception that Britain was responsible for the Rhodesian 
situation, coupled with loyalty to Labour made protesters less vocal.20 In discussing 
the debates and events surrounding Rhodesia House, Brownell argues that, for what 
popular protest movement there was, the building provided a “galvanising function” 
because of its physical representation of the illegal regime.21 The building itself, and 
debates around its use, mirrored broader policy on Rhodesia, just as waves of popular 
protest reflected periods where the Rhodesian situation was more prominent 
politically. 
 
More generally, though of particular significance in discussing the breadth of focus of 
the thesis, is Howe’s account of the British left and anticolonialism. Whilst Howe 
focuses on a period before Rhodesia hit the headlines, ending in 1964, the scope of the 
book and Howe’s justifications for its remit provide a wealth of material useful to the 
thesis. There are two main aims of this study; to “survey the attitudes and activities on 
colonial issues of those groups in British politics who defined themselves, or were 
defined, as distinctively anti-imperialist and sympathetic to the aims of colonial 
                                                          
18 C. Wrigely ‘Now you see it, now you don’t: Harold Wilson and Labour’s foreign policy 1964-70), in The Wilson 
Governments 1964-1970, ed.s  R. Coopey, S. Fielding and N. Tiratsoo (London: Pinter Publishers, 1993), 123-135. 
19 Windrich, Rhodesian Independence: 147.  
20 Maxey, ‘Labour and Rhodesian Situation’: 160-161. 
21 J. Brownell, ‘‘A Sordid Tussle on the Strand’: Rhodesia House during the UDI Rebellion (1965-80)’, The Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History 38: 3 (2010),  471-499. 
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nationalism” and to “evaluate the changing ways in which, arising out of the 
experience of Empire and decolonisation, more general ideas about imperialism, 
nationalism, and underdevelopment were expressed among British radicals during 
these years”.22 The first of these, building up a picture of the activities and beliefs of 
various groups on the political left in Britain working on anticolonial issues is quite 
similar to some of the focus of this study, particularly chapter 3. The second aim 
differs by virtue of Howe’s study discussing a much longer period than is considered 
in the thesis (1918-1964). Nonetheless, the book provides some very useful ideas 
about the merits of having such a broad analytical focus, and about the interaction of 
different groups. Such ideas will be discussed later in the introduction, in exploring in 
more detail the focus of the thesis, and in later chapters looking at the interaction of 
the various groups under consideration, particularly chapter 4. 
 
Also of use, although not dealing with the Rhodesia issue is literature about the British 
Labour Party and broader labour movement during the 1960s and 70s. Young’s 
volume on international policy of the 1964-1970 Labour Governments describes the 
disappointment with Labour’s record on foreign affairs during this period, citing the 
“halfhearted sanctions policy against Rhodesia”.23 Whilst acknowledging Wilson’s skill 
at holding the Party together and winning elections, Young highlights his dominance 
in decision-making when it came to foreign affairs, a point supported by Vickers.24 
This point is useful in beginning to understand how the Party Leadership, and Wilson 
in particular, dominated policy creation on Rhodesia, and often failed to listen to the 
views of the wider Party. Relating the Rhodesia issue to the Wilson Governments 
more generally, Young argues that it “underlined the way Labour compromised its 
original promises and principles” and that Wilson’s “government tried to escape 
contradictory pressures by finding a middle way between high principle and the loss 
of its soul”.25 Whilst acknowledging that Wilson managed to avoid a fundamental rift 
                                                          
22 S. Howe, Anticolonialism in British Politics: The Left and the End of Empire 1918-1964   (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993). 
23 J. young, The Labour Governments 1964-1970, Volume 2: International Policy (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2003): 2. 
24 R. Vickers, The Labour Party and the World: - Volume 2 Labour's Foreign Policy since 1951 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2011): 4. 
25 Ibid: 186. 
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with any of his ‘constituencies’ (the Party, public opinion, the Commonwealth, the 
UN), his overall record on foreign policy was not a success: “the left in particular felt 
dismayed, believing that Wilson abandoned any socialist idealism in favour of 
pragmatism and an obsession with wrong-footing the Conservatives.”26 This again 
illustrates the pressures towards pragmatism surrounding the Rhodesia crisis: there 
were many competing constituencies to please or at least appease, and the attempt to 
find a middle, cautious way inevitably left many disappointed but nonetheless 
succeeded in maintaining Party unity throughout what was a challenging period. 
 
John Callaghan also highlights Wilson’s reversal on “the rhetoric of moral 
improvement in foreign policy which the incoming Government had made in 1964”, 
giving Rhodesia and Vietnam as specific examples of unethical foreign policy.27 
Further to this, he captures the divisions within the Labour Party and the broader 
labour movement, which is important to note here, in order to understand in later 
discussion that there was no single entity when dealing with Rhodesia, and that the 
issue was frequently characterised by disagreement. Callaghan notes the first foreign 
policy defeats in 1968 at the Party Conference, one of which was over Rhodesia, which 
symbolised the beginning of a “widening rift in the party”, particularly between the 
PLP and the trade unions over industrial relations.28 
 
Vickers highlights the importance of considering foreign policy in understanding the 
successes and failures of the Labour Party. She argues that while foreign policy issues 
may not have played a decisive role in elections, preceded by domestic concerns, they 
were of vital importance to the Labour Party itself in terms of maintaining a healthy 
base of grass roots support. This was because the Party’s support base had a far 
higher proportion of people who were strongly concerned with foreign affairs, than 
were found amongst the general electorate.29 Such an argument elucidates why it is 
important to consider the Rhodesia issue and grass roots activism in Britain, and why 
the Labour Party was pragmatic in not dismissing the arguments of the advocacy 
                                                          
26 Ibid: 218. 
27 J. Callaghan, The Labour Party and Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 2007): 280-1. 
28 Ibid: 282. 
29 Vickers, Labour Party and the World: 11. 
14 
 
movement too forcefully, because to do so would have been to further alienate the 
New Left of the party who were more actively engaged with the issue. 
Rhodesia 
Literature focusing on Rhodesia during the time period under consideration broadly 
falls into two categories; that which considers the guerrilla war and nationalist 
movements, and that which is sympathetic to the Smith regime. Clearly it is important 
to consider the Rhodesian Front government, but it frequently appears in the 
literature that focuses more on diplomacy from a British perspective, and also into 
discussions of the nationalist struggle. For these reasons, this review of existing 
literature will make reference to texts written from a viewpoint sympathetic to the 
Rhodesian Front, but will concentrate for the most part on literature on the nationalist 
struggle, and the way in which this interacted with the Rhodesian government, 
Britain, and other international players. Literature on Rhodesia and the nationalist 
struggle encompasses a broad range of themes and a complex interplay of 
socioeconomic and political dynamics. For this reason, it is difficult to divide the 
literature into clear groupings or themes. For the sake of simplicity, literature around 
this subject will be divided roughly into that which covers guerrilla armies, the 
international relations of the nationalist groups and finally divisions within the 
nationalist movement. 
The Guerrilla War 
A particularly informative text on the subject of the armed struggle is Bhebe and 
Ranger’s Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War. The introduction to this volume sets 
out its aim of providing an alternative study of the guerrilla war that does not glorify 
ZANU-PF or overlook the role of ordinary soldiers.30 Several chapters within this 
volume offer insight into the strategies of guerrilla armies, both in terms of 
recruitment and military strategy against the state. Two chapters focusing on ZAPU in 
this volume take an important step towards redressing the previous politicised bias in 
writing on the guerrilla war.31 
                                                          
30 N. Bhebe and T. Ranger, ‘Volume Introduction: Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War’, in Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s 
Liberation War, eds. N. Bhebe and T. Ranger, (London: James Currey, 1995): 6-23. 
31 J. Alexander, J. McGregor and T. Ranger, Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in the “Dark Forests” of 
Matabeleland (Oxford: James Currey, 2000): 140. 
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Brickhill’s chapter focuses on the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) between 
1976 and 1979, the development of military strategy in this period and provides a 
detailed description of the technical structure and relationship between the political 
wing and the armed wing, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). He 
outlines the Zero Hour operation, which aimed to end the war through a major 
military offensive, for which they were also training regular forces to act alongside 
guerrillas, and to assist in the running of the state if the plan were to be successful. 
However, agreement at Lancaster House was reached prior to this plan being 
implemented. An important component of the argument set out by Brickhill is that 
ZIPRA was more proletarian than the Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA), 
ZANU’s armed wing, had greater levels of education amongst the ranks of its guerrillas 
and that this explains their ability to mobilise more effectively without so much 
reliance on coercion, and also on the planned transition from guerrilla to regular 
forces.32 However, Bhebe and Ranger note that other authors in the volume argue that 
the distinction is fuzzier than Brickhill suggests.33 
 
Chapters by Dabengwa and Tungamirai consider ZIPRA and ZANLA respectively. 
Tungamirai focuses on recruitment techniques used by ZANLA, and states that early 
on in the struggle they had to resort to press- ganging, which he states was the 
method regularly used by ZIPRA.34 It is worth noting that this kind of assertion tends 
to vary according the affiliation of the author. As pressures on land and resources 
created problems for much of the rural population, Tungamirai suggests that some 
people became more amenable to recruitment. Furthermore, in the north east of the 
country, recruitment was facilitated by the support of spirit mediums, a point echoed 
by Lan.35 In contrast, Dabengwa focuses more on ZIPRA’s external relations,36 which 
will be returned to later, and discussions between the two armed wings. One such 
                                                          
32 . Brickhill, ‘Daring to Storm the Heavens: The Military Strategy of ZAPU 1976 to 1979’, in Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s 
Liberation War, eds. N. Bhebe and T. Ranger (London: James Currey, 1995): 48-72. 
33 Bhebe and Ranger, ‘Volume Introduction’: 7-11. 
34 J. Tungamirai, ‘Recruitment to ZANLA: Building up a War Machine’, in Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War, eds N. 
Bhebe, and T. Ranger (London: James Currey, 1995): 36. 
35 D. Lan, Guns and Rain: Guerrillas and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe (Oxford: James Currey, 1985), 147-9. 
36 D. Dabengwa, ‘ZIPRA in the Zimbabwe War of National Liberation’, in Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War, eds. N. 
Bhebe and T. Ranger (London: James Currey, 1995), 24-35. 
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discussion led to the formation of the Zimbabwe People’s Army, or ZIPA. Moore 
argues that ZIPA represents a more significant strategic innovation than is usually 
acknowledged, and discusses the strategy of this organisation in some detail.37 
However, Dabengwa argues that ZIPA broke down over disagreements about 
strategy.38 This literature on recruitment strategies used by the African nationalist 
movement will be referred to in the final substantive chapter. It explores, tangentially, 
the successes of the African National Council (ANC) in mobilising support against the 
settlement proposals negotiated between Ian Smith and the British Conservative 
Government in 1971. This organisation was established specifically because of the 
neutrality offered by avoiding the names of ZANU or ZAPU, which hints at the 
reputations of their sometimes less-than-democratic recruitment strategies.39 
 
The nationalist struggle and Rhodesian society 
When considering the struggle for independence and the way in which the nationalist 
movement(s) operated, it is important to consider the peasantry, and socioeconomic 
dynamics that may have affected patterns of support. A central text on this subject is 
Kriger’s Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices. Kriger considers the dynamics of 
peasant support, using personal oral testimony from people involved. This relates to 
her main critique of many existing studies on similar topics; that they ignore peasant 
voices, and rely on secondary sources to infer peasant opinions. One central argument 
is that grievances amongst the peasantry, as it cannot be viewed as a homogenous 
socioeconomic grouping, are often more important as motivation for participating in 
the war, than a desire for racial equality. She argues that often supporting a guerrilla 
group or participating in the war was seen as an opportunity to avenge a personal or 
community grievance, and that wealthier peasants were often more despised than the 
ruling regime, as intra-peasantry grievances were more immediate, and therefore 
more tangible.40 
 
                                                          
37 D. Moore, ‘The Zimbabwe People’s Army: Strategic Innovation or More of the Same?’ in Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s 
Liberation War, eds. N. Bhebe and T. Ranger (London: James Currey, 1995), 73-86. 
38 D. Dabengwa, ‘ZIPRA’, 34. 
39 L. White ‘‘Normal Political Activities’: Rhodesia, The Pearce Commission, and the African National Council’ Journal of 
African History 52 (2011), 321-340. 
40 N. Kriger, Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
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Related to this argument, Kriger critiques existing studies, for example by Ranger and 
Lan, for their failure to acknowledge these inter-peasantry grievances. Ranger does 
acknowledge a multiplicity of identities and traditions within peasant 
consciousness,41 yet does not extrapolate this to explore grievances. When 
considering participation in the nationalist struggle, this is an important motivational 
factor. This debate can be seen to follow on from an earlier critique of Ranger’s work 
on peasant consciousness,42 in which Kriger argues that his conception of this identity 
is too limited to issues of class resistance, and overlooks the influence of intra-class 
relations and guerrilla and state violence.43 Another key text on the subject of society 
and the development of the guerrilla war is Bhebe and Ranger’s counterpart volume 
to Soldiers, cited above. It deals with broad ranging issues such as religion, education 
and the legacies of the war.44 However, none of the chapters in the volume are directly 
relevant to the research questions set out below. 
Divisions in the Nationalist Movement 
One of the biggest problems faced by the nationalist struggle, and those trying to aid 
negotiations for majority rule, was that of divisions within the movement. The 
nationalist groups and their guerrilla armies never managed to convincingly present a 
united front, despite the best efforts of the Front-line States, which was a hindrance 
both in terms of the dynamic of the war, and in seeking a settlement. On this subject, 
Alexander, McGregor and Ranger argue that “in significant ways, the history of 
Zimbabwe’s liberation movements is one of failed attempts at unity and of military 
innovation in the face of an intransigent and powerful enemy.”45 There are numerous 
and competing explanations for the divisive nature of the nationalist movement in 
Rhodesia. 
 
Sithole provides a review of some existing literature that explores class as an 
explanatory factor for divisions within the nationalist movement. He critiques this 
                                                          
41 Ranger, T. (1987) ‘Peasant Consciousness: Culture and Conflict in Zimbabwe’ In Peasants and Peasant Societies, 
Shanin, T. (ed) Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 311-328. 
42 T. Ranger, Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe: A Comparative Study, (London: James Currey, 
1985). 
43 N. Kriger, ‘The Zimbabwean War of Liberation: Struggles Within the Struggle’ Journal of Southern African Studies 14: 2 
(1988), 304-321. 
44 N. Bhebe and T. Ranger, Society in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War (London: Villiers Publications, 1996). 
45 Alexander et al, Violence and Memory: 140. 
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body of work for selecting the wrong tool of analysis, since the whole movement is a 
struggle for power, and that this is mirrored in its leadership is par for the course.46 In 
an earlier article Sithole argues that ethnicity is a viable, albeit only partial, 
explanation for factionalism,47 a point which is reiterated in the critique of class based 
analyses, although he never goes so far as to offer a complementary framework for 
considering factionalism. Sithole argues that the formation of the Front for the 
Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) in 1971 was the first indication of the ethnic 
dimension entering into the nationalist struggle as it was the first time that “vitriolic 
accusations and counter-accusations of ‘tribalism’ were levelled at each other by the 
principal political gladiators in various factions”.48 This got progressively more 
divisive and by 1979 there were 7 nationalist groups “all haunted by the ethnic 
factor”.49  
 
Whilst ethnicity may have a part to play in explaining splits in the nationalist 
movement, it seems problematic and ultimately futile to attempt to argue that any 
single factor provides the most compelling explanation for factionalism. Mubako 
explores division and various attempts at unity within the nationalist movement.50 
Ethnicity is not absent from the discussion, but the focus is more on power struggles 
and leadership styles, in other words, practical issues that affected the trajectory of 
division within the movement. Similarly, Bhebe and Ranger argue that “contrasts 
which remain between ZIPRA and ZANLA…were not the result of deliberate policy, 
nor of class or ethnic preferences, but rather the results of specific historical and 
geographical factors”.51 
The advent of UDI 
One of the most important historical considerations, when looking at the reasons 
behind UDI, is the break-up of the CAF, and the way in which this occurred. As Sills 
                                                          
46 M. Sithole, ‘Class and Factionalism in the Zimbabwe Nationalist Movement’ African Studies Review 27: 1 (1984), 117-
124. 
47 M. Sithole, ‘Ethnicity and Factionalism in Zimbabwe Nationalist Politics 1957-79’ Ethnic and Racial Studies, 3: 1 (1980), 
17-39. 
48 Ibid: 27. 
49 Ibid: 33. 
50 S. Mubako, ‘The Quest for Unity in the Zimbabwe Liberation Movement’ Issue: A Journal of Opinion 5: 1 (1975), 5-17. 
51 Bhebe and Ranger, ‘Volume Introduction’: 11. 
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argues, albeit from an overtly pro-Rhodesian Front stance, the break-up of the 
Federation and the circumstances resulting from this meant that UDI was almost 
inevitable.52 Sills suggests that Rhodesians were led to believe that the Federation 
could not be dismantled without their consent, and Winston Field, then Prime 
Minister of Southern Rhodesia, maintained that he had been promised independence 
were Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia to be granted theirs. Britain maintained that 
it had never offered this. It was this disagreement over the terms of the Federation 
break up that precipitated, or at least was the cited reason for, greater hostility in 
Southern Rhodesia and a hunger for independence. The Federation was also 
important in terms of fostering interaction between African nationalists from the 
three territories, as they met to oppose integration from a fear that it would facilitate 
the extension of power of the white supremacist government in Southern Rhodesia. 
Day points out that the “Federation failed to provide a politically integrated Central 
Africa, but ironically it acted as a symbol of European domination which united 
Africans in the three territories”.53 
 
Scarnecchia offers a detailed exploration of the urban roots of nationalist agitation, 
and how these early patterns of contention gradually shifted and began to shape the 
nationalist movement of the 1960s and beyond.54 More particularly, he looks at the 
development of the arguments behind nationalist demands for rights, highlighting 
that in the 1940s and 50s these were based around “the rhetoric of imperial 
citizenship and workers rights to gain state recognition for better living conditions, or 
better wages”,55 later giving way to a focus on seeking state power over and above the 
rights of the individual.56 Scarnecchia also highlights the development of a tradition of 
violence within the nationalist movement, as early nationalist leaders such as George 
Nyandoro and James Chikerema sought to transform local urban forms of nationalist 
organisation into a nationwide movement. As the Rhodesian state began to respond to 
                                                          
52 H. D. Sills, ‘The Break-up of the Central African Federation: Notes on the Validity of Assurances’ African Affairs 73: 290 
(1974), 50-62. 
53 Day, International Nationalism: 62. 
54 T Scarnecchia The Urban Roots of Democracy and Political Violence in Zimbabwe: Harare and Highfield, 1940-1964 
(Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2008). 
55 Ibid: 6. 
56 Ibid: 159. 
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these forms of protest and political organisation more repressively, “nationalist 
politics became less about expanding ideas of reciprocal nationalism and more about 
defending a core leadership against state repression and against rival leadership 
factions and their followers.”57 
 
In contrast to Scarnecchia, chapters in Alexander, McGregor and Ranger’s Violence and 
Memory highlight the rural beginnings of nationalism. In his contribution to this 
volume, Raftopoulos notes that: 
The shift in the terrain of struggle to guerrilla war in the rural area in the 
1970s further minimised the importance of a strong and critical labour 
movement, in nationalist political thinking. The emphasis and accent on 
rural struggle led to a neglect of urban struggles and, more importantly, the 
link between the two areas of contestation remained weak.58 
 
A quote from Moore, drawing on a point made by Ken Flower (former Head of 
Rhodesia’s Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) and supposed MI6 mole59), goes 
some way to explaining these different foci in the literature looking at the Rhodesia 
situation: 
The Rhodesians believed that there were two separate conflicts (Flower 
1987), whereas the Zimbabwe nationalists and, to a lesser extent, the 
British believed that there was only one. The Rhodesians viewed their 
"internal situation" as a matter that they could control and focused their 
concern on independence from Britain.60 
This is illustrative of the strength of different opinions on the Rhodesia issue amongst, 
and sometimes even within, the different groups who were involved. It is no surprise 
that this proliferation of views on the reality of the situation, let alone what should be 
done, is reflected in in its historiography. 
Grand Narratives 
Also worth discussing in this introductory literature review are the ‘grand narrative’ 
accounts of the Rhodesia crisis, a phrase borrowed from White’s erudite discussion of 
                                                          
57 Ibid: 158. 
58 B. Raftopoulos, ‘Labour Internationalism and Problems of Autonomy and Democratisation in the Trade Union 
Movement in Southern Rhodesia, 1951-1975’, in Historical Dimensions of Democracy and Human Rights in Zimbabwe, 
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the Pearce Commission.61 Several studies could be considered to fall into this 
category. Martin Meredith’s, catchy yet accurately titled, The Past is Another Country 
considers the same period of time as the thesis; UDI to independence. In this he 
considers the formation of the nationalist organisations, the ascendency of Ian Smith, 
guerrilla activities, factionalism, the Pearce Commission, the détente period, the 
Smith-Nkomo talks, the Kissinger initiative, the failings of the Geneva conference, the 
Anglo-American initiative, the internal settlement and the Lancaster House 
conference. It is an exhaustive, and exhausting, list, but ultimately it is a work that falls 
prey to the same division outlined above: there is no dialogue between Britain and 
Rhodesia, except the accounts of official negotiations.62  
 
Another account of Rhodesia history that comes under this heading is Verrier’s The 
Road to Zimbabwe, which considers an extended period beginning in 1890. Any book 
of such scope cannot address the issues involved in significant detail, and Verrier’s 
account again adopts the presiding biases found in much of the existing work on the 
topic. He does, however, offer the argument that successive British Governments were 
biased in favour of the white settler regime, in contrast with some of the more 
favourable accounts described above.63 A key shortcoming of these ‘grand narrative’ 
accounts is that they obfuscate the way in which the Rhodesia issue in Britain 
fluctuated in terms of its prominence. This is a key gap that the thesis aims to address. 
 
Finally, there are various published primary sources that will be consulted in the 
thesis. This material differs to the secondary literature outlined above, in that it is 
useful to the thesis, but does not directly contribute to the debates surrounding the 
topic. For example, there is the thorough and convenient Who’s Who of African 
Nationalism,64 the (auto)biographies of Barbara Castle,65 Bishop Muzorewa66 and 
Joshua Nkomo,67 and documentary anthologies such as Nyandoro and Nyangoni’s  
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64 R. Cary and D. Mitchell, African Nationalist Leaders in Rhodesia: Who's Who  (Bulawayo: Africana Book Society, 1977). 
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collection of material relating to the African nationalist movement.68 These will be 
drawn on at points throughout the thesis, but do not require further introduction. 
Gaps in literature 
From exploring the literature it can be seen that there is little dialogue between texts 
dealing with the ‘Rhodesian question’ from a British perspective, which tend to use a 
solely governmental approach, and those exploring the situation on the ground in 
Rhodesia, which, broadly speaking, focus on the grass roots and explore the issues of 
the guerrilla war. Those texts in the former category also seem to concentrate on the 
earlier diplomatic efforts of the British, initially to prevent UDI and then to seek some 
sort of negotiated settlement. Whereas the texts in the latter grouping focus more on 
the later efforts of the guerrillas, as the war gathered momentum and scale, and 
became increasingly untenable for the illegal Rhodesian regime. There is very little 
literature dealing with advocacy activity on Rhodesia, almost none that considers the 
activities of the British labour movement, and none that considers how the Rhodesia 
issue moved on and off the political agenda in Britain. This thesis addresses these 
three points, coupled with a consideration of the activities of the nationalist 
movement outside of Rhodesia and the behaviour of elements of the British 
Government outside of settlement negotiations. These various narrative threads will 
be drawn together through the overarching argument that all of the groups under 
consideration were guided by a pragmatic approach which was at times, ostensibly, at 
odds with their stated aims. This argument will unfold throughout the substantive 
chapters of the thesis, and bring into consideration new sources dealing with the 
activities of advocacy organisations, the labour movement and the African nationalist 
movement. 
 
Howe argues that existing scholarship on decolonisation falls into three main 
paradigms: descriptive accounts of the official transfer of power from metropole to 
colony (narrow empiricism); decolonisation as revolution (revolutionary 
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romanticism), and those accounts that see a continuation of a less official neo-
colonialism instead of genuine independence (transition to neo-colonialism).69 He 
goes on to state that: 
Much recent work on British decolonisation had taken this form: detailed 
scrutiny of Colonial Office and other governmental papers in order to 
evaluate the processes of policy-making that led up to withdrawal. The 
central focus has thus been on what was influentially baptised, for an 
earlier period, as the ‘official mind of imperialism’.70 
 
His study aims to counteract this somewhat myopic view that characterises much of 
the other scholarship on the subject by broadening the focus of analysis to include 
“parties, pressure groups, business interests, and the currents of public opinion”.71 He 
argues that existing accounts of decolonisation have sometimes been guilty of trying 
to filter out dissenting voices to provide a clearer narrative, to the detriment of 
historical detail and accuracy. These arguments for a broader focus, and shift away 
from the official discourses of decolonisation, can be appropriated from Howe to 
justify the focus of this study. Howe’s ideas about how to address the shortcomings of 
the broader field of study offers support to the multi-organisational focus of the thesis. 
By including these different voices, it is hoped that a fuller picture of this chapter of 
history will emerge. 
Structure and Research questions 
During the collection of archival data it became increasingly apparent that it would be 
impractical to attempt to break the thesis down according to the different 
organisations, or groups of organisations, involved. It also became clear that a 
chronological approach, running throughout the thesis, would not work. At each point 
in time there was so much happening: settlement negotiations, constitutional changes, 
general elections, protests, armed struggle and so on, as well as the layer of events 
underneath this, such as organisational meetings and communications, which 
facilitated the broader events and processes. Various individuals, groups, and groups 
of organisations became involved at different times and with different aspects of the 
Rhodesia situation, such that either a chronological or an organisational approach 
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would have been unwieldy and ultimately uninformative. This essentially left the 
option of a thematic approach to the topic, which felt far more suitable, given the 
complexity of the situation. 
 
Through the process of collecting archival material, several key themes and questions 
began to assert themselves, which eventually gave rise to the central research 
questions: 
 
1. What was the relationship between events in Rhodesia and the political climate of 
the UK in affecting patterns of support for the African nationalist movement amongst 
UK based advocacy organisations and the British labour movement? 
 
2. What methods were used by UK based advocacy organisations in supporting the 
struggle for independence in Rhodesia? Were advocacy organisations constrained by 
pragmatism and existing ideas about how to campaign, and if so, what effect did this 
have on organisations’ chosen methods? 
 
3. How did the Labour Party and the trade union movement interact with the other 
organisations and each other in trying to bring about a solution to the Rhodesia crisis? 
Were these interactions characterised by cooperation or disagreement? 
 
4. How did the African nationalist movement interact with representatives of the 
British Government in trying to pursue its aims? Were there differences in opinion or 
rhetoric between nationalists based at home and those based in the UK? 
 
These four questions then became the basic structure of the thesis, with one chapter 
based around each question, and a final case study chapter considering all of the 
research questions simultaneously. The purpose of this final substantive chapter is to 
consider the answers to the research questions explored in earlier chapters in a more 
narrative and unified way. A case study seemed the best way of achieving this difficult 
task, as it provided the opportunity to exploit the narrative virtue of a chronological 
approach, whilst simultaneously focusing on a small enough historical segment to 
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allow for sufficiently detailed analysis (as the ‘grand narratives’ of earlier were 
critiqued for failing to do). 
 
Whilst the structure has been alluded to briefly, as being derived from the central 
research questions, it is necessary to elaborate on the content of each chapter, taking 
into account their specific scopes, and how they go about addressing the questions. 
  
Chapter 2 will address the question of whether there was a connection between key 
events in Britain and Rhodesia, and the levels of support for the African nationalist 
movement amongst advocacy and labour movement organisations in Britain. This 
topic dictated a chronological focus, which also served the purpose of providing a 
more detailed outline of the whole Rhodesia situation to help contextualise later 
discussion. The chapter explores the events as they unfolded, alongside analysis of 
what advocacy organisations and the British left were doing at particular times, in 
order to ascertain whether or not there was a correlation between key events and 
campaigning in Britain on Rhodesia. 
 
Chapter 3 focuses specifically on advocacy organisations, and explores what methods 
such groups were using in order to achieve their aims in relation to Rhodesia. There is 
very little existing literature looking at advocacy organisation campaigns on Rhodesia, 
and what there is rarely considers the methods used in such campaigns. It is these 
shortcomings that this chapter seeks to address. Chapter 3 also draws on a subset of 
the theoretical study of social movements, resource mobilisation theory, to explore 
through a comparative lens why advocacy organisations chose the methods that they 
did and how these related to methods used by other social movements working on 
comparable issues. Drawing on this theoretical work raised the question of whether 
advocacy organisations were constrained by existing ideas about ‘how to campaign’, 
and if so how these affected their chosen methods. This chapter discusses the 
argument that advocacy organisations were guided by pragmatism, and goes into 
detail about the aims of different organisations, campaigning methods and apparent 
divergences between the two. It also considers different constituencies of opinion 
between and within advocacy organisations. 
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Chapter 4 focuses on the Labour Party and the British trade union movement, looking 
comparatively at how they interacted with advocacy organisations and the African 
nationalist movement, as well as with each other. Whilst this Chapter does consider 
the Labour Party, it continues to move away from the elite-dominated accounts of the 
existing literature by looking at relationships with other organisations, and the grass 
roots of the Party in responding to the situation in Rhodesia. It explores how the 
Labour Party leadership enacted classic balancing behaviour in the way that it 
interacted with advocacy organisations, the nationalist movement and the broader 
labour movement, in that it tried to maintain civil relationships whilst resisting the 
pressures placed on it to give ground over the Rhodesia issue. This argument builds 
on the discussion in previous chapters around the role of pragmatism as a guiding 
force behind action over Rhodesia. 
 
From this, the thesis considers the African nationalist organisations. Chapter 5 
addresses the question of whether there was a difference between nationalist 
representatives based in the UK and those based at home (which for the purposes of 
this analysis includes regional bases, since the organisations were proscribed from 
operating within Rhodesia for much of the struggle). This question arose when British 
diplomatic communications were discovered postulating that the differing rhetoric of 
various nationalist representatives highlighted the difference between local 
nationalists and their more moderate counterparts in Britain. This posed a question 
about whether this diplomatic assumption was correct; were nationalists based in 
Britain more moderate than their colleagues in Rhodesia and if so why? The ensuing 
discussion considers how the nationalist organisations pragmatically tailored their 
rhetoric and actions according to audience, with the aim of more effectively furthering 
their aims and bolstering support for the cause both in Britain and Rhodeisa. This 
chapter challenges the focus in the existing literature on the activities of the 
nationalist organisations within Rhodesia, and between ZANU and ZAPU. There is 
very little work, as will be explored in the chapter-specific literature review at the 
outset of Chapter 4, that considers the international relations of the African nationalist 
movement, and this chapter seeks to make a contribution to this area of study. 
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The final substantive chapter seeks to draw together the related but separate analyses 
of the previous four chapters. Whilst Chapter 1 works chronologically and endeavours 
to provide a basic narrative thread on which the other chapters can hang, it seemed 
beneficial to draw them together with a final case study chapter. To this end, a case 
study was required that provided a sufficient volume of archival material to allow for 
discussion of the topics raised in all of the other chapters, so it had to be something 
that spanned a reasonable period of time and sparked interest from all of the different 
groups under consideration in the thesis. Once these parameters had been 
established, the choice of case study was simple; the Pearce Commission recurred so 
frequently in archival material and fulfilled the necessary criteria to allow for this 
chapter to explore issues discussed in each of the previous ones. 
 
The core contribution to knowledge this thesis makes is a historiographical one. 
Exploring the Rhodesia issue through a very different range of sources to the oft-cited 
National Archives ‘official’ papers (albeit in conjunction with these) a more rounded 
picture of Rhodesia into Zimbabwe emerges. The thesis highlights that among all of 
the different groups under consideration, there was a common characteristic of being 
guided by pragmatism which at times lead to actions that appeared to be at odds with 
stated aims and values. This theme will be explored throughout the substantive 
chapters of the thesis. 
Methodology 
The central methodological approach of this project is qualitative analysis of primary 
sources gathered from extensive archival research in multiple UK archives. Included 
here are the abbreviations of the archives as they occur in footnoted sources. The 
Labour History Archive and Study Centre (LHASC) in the People’s History Museum 
provided the bulk of the initial research, and included NEC minutes, Labour Party 
conference reports, Judith Hart’s personal papers, and a large collection of 
uncatalogued Labour Party International Department material relating to the 
Rhodesia issue. Rhodes House Library (RH) in Oxford holds the archive of the AAM, as 
well as the Africa Bureau papers. Research in The National Archives (TNA) was 
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focused largely on the papers of the Rhodesia Department, a sub-Department of the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (more will be said on this in the next section of the 
Chapter). There was also a specific collection on the Pearce Commission utilised for 
Chapter 6. The LSE archives (LSE) were used to consult the papers of George 
Cunningham and Andrew Faulds as well as the papers of the Fabian Society. Research 
was conducted at the London Metropolitan TUC Library (TUCL) that holds various 
TUC policy papers, followed by work in the Modern Records Centre (MRC) at the 
University of Warwick, which holds a more extensive collection of TUC papers. A small 
amount of research was conducted in the Lambeth Palace Library (LPL) and the 
Church of England Records Centre (CERC) to consult church papers on Rhodesia, 
though neither of these represented a substantial part of the primary research. 
 
At the outset of the PhD project it was planned that research would be conducted in 
the National Archives of Zimbabwe (NAZ). Eventually the decision was made that such 
a trip would not help to further the aims of the thesis. Through speaking to a contact 
in Zimbabwe, it was established that much of what was available in NAZ, of relevance 
to the project, such as nationalist publications, was also available in UK archives. 
Furthermore the ZANU Archive, which does hold papers of relevance to the study, 
does not currently permit British researchers access to its holdings. However, much of 
the thesis concerns organisations in Britain, and there are many relevant archival 
holdings on the nationalist movement in the various archives mentioned above. 
Ultimately, it would have been an unnecessary and unproductive trip to Zimbabwe, 
given the volume of material available in this country, and the severe limitations 
placed on conducting research there. 
 
One of the key methodological concerns that had to be addressed during the thesis 
was the lack of consistency in archival documentation. This was not in terms of the 
qualitative content of the documents, but in the preservation of material itself. For 
example, there might be a several month period in which the minutes of an advocacy 
organisation seem to have been meticulously kept, followed by a significant gap. For 
much of the thesis this was not too problematic. However, for chapter 2, which 
partially relies on the analysis of the volume of sources at each stage of the Rhodesia 
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issue, such inconsistencies have a greater significance. Since historical work is, by its 
nature, largely unscientific, this problem was solved by drawing on what sources were 
present for Chapter 2, and inferring that, had there been a flurry of activity around a 
certain date, some trace of this was likely to have remained. There seemed to be 
enough material at each stage that consistency of record keeping was not too 
apparent a problem.  
 
The sources available for different organisations are not always comparable; different 
types of documents have been preserved relating to different organisations, and some 
of the smaller organisations that had less administrative capacity at the time of 
operation have commensurably smaller archival material. In Chapter 3, a range of 
different documents will be used in exploring the methods used by advocacy 
organisations. A lot of archive space is taken up with meeting minutes, but these are 
supplemented by letters to members and other organisations, adverts for public 
events and research papers, all of which speak to the methods used by organisations 
in pursuit of their aims. 
 
Whilst attempting to thoroughly explore the catalogue of each archive visited, and 
consult the extremely knowledgeable archivists for further guidance on the topic, 
there will unavoidably be sources of use that have been missed. There will always be 
documents on a particular subject that end up catalogued in an unusual place, and 
therefore end up being overlooked. This problem is highlighted in the “Report on the 
records of the Africa Bureau and related organisations 1952-1978”, which states that: 
The Bureau’s archive consists of papers which were constantly used by a 
number of different people for equally diverse purposes. Therefore, the 
arrangement of files and data and correspondence and the order of the 
papers within those files was constantly changing. To cite a hypothetical 
example, papers apparently referring to a specifically Kenyan problem 
might be found in a file labelled Bechuanaland because the last person to 
consult that file had needed to use them in connection with a similar 
problem occurring in the latter country. The main principle adopted in 
sorting these papers was to arrange them according to the reasons for 
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which they had originally arrived at the Bureau’s office or been produced 
there.72 
 
In early stages of research, valuable advice was given: “you can never ‘finish’ an 
archive”. Short of doing exactly that, missed documents remain an inevitability, but 
not one of significance to the research, in that there was no shortage of primary 
documentation to draw on. 
 
As mentioned in the chapter outline, a subset of social movement theory has been 
drawn on to assist with the analysis of primary data in the second substantive 
chapter. This theoretical framework, known as resource mobilisation theory, was 
chosen, as it offers the possibility of introducing a comparative dimension to the 
research, which is particular use in considering why organisations chose to use the 
particular methods of campaigning that they did. There were many different 
organisations campaigning on the Rhodesia issue, all of which had a slightly different 
focus or campaign aim, and through applying the lens of resource mobilisation theory, 
the logics behind their choices in terms of campaign methods become not only more 
comparable, but also much clearer. None of the other chapters draw on theoretical 
work to the same extent, as these topics were better explored through more 
traditional methods of historical enquiry. 
 
A word should be said about the specific period of time selected. Why not begin, for 
instance, with the break-up of the CAF? Or with the beginning of the guerrilla war? 
UDI was selected for the starting point of the thesis, in terms of the analysis of primary 
material, because it provides a clear demarcation between legality and illegality, and 
the point at which the situation fundamentally changed, not just for the population of 
Rhodesia, but for Britain as well. No other single date provides as clear a statement of 
what the Rhodesia crisis entailed than UDI, as it defined the parameters of debate for 
the following 15 years. Furthermore, it defined the political reality on the ground in 
Rhodesia, and Hudson states “it was at that time of UDI that the Rhodesian problem 
really began to make an impact on British politics at grass roots level”, arguing that 
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prior to this point the issue was characterised by disinterest and lack of awareness.73 
The end date requires no explanation, though a caveat is required. Whilst the thesis 
technically deals with the period up to formal independence, in reality very little is 
said about the formative Lancaster House conference, and even less of its aftermath. 
This is because these events have already been quite thoroughly documented,74 and 
by this point the nationalist struggle had reached a tentative, followed by a definitive, 
conclusion. 
Terminology 
It is necessary to set out exactly what is meant by some of the central terms used in 
the thesis. Many terms used are self-evident in meaning, and go largely uncontested, 
and these are not discussed here. Others are less clear and require justification for 
their use over other ostensibly synonymous terms, or clarification of their meaning 
where this is broadly contested in existing scholarship. 
 
Perhaps the most contentious term in the thesis is ‘labour movement’. For the 
purposes of the thesis, this term will be used to refer to the Labour Party, the Trade 
Union Congress (TUC) and individual unions. It also includes left wing and labour 
movement publications such as Labour Weekly and Socialist Commentary. In order to 
redress the bias of the existing literature, the thesis focuses on local and Constituency 
Labour Party (CLP) opinion, the National Executive Committee (NEC), the 
Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) discussions at party conferences and on Labour 
Party interaction with the other organisations considered. The policies and actions of 
the Party leadership will at times be referred to in order to contextualise discussion, 
but this will be in relation to the other groups involved rather than in isolation as has 
been the case in previous literature on the topic. The thesis considers many other 
organisations outside of the labour movement, so it was necessary on a practical level 
to limit the definition of the latter to a workable unit. This is why the Socialist 
International and international labour bodies (such as the International Labour 
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Organisation (ILO) and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)) 
are excluded from the definition. The thesis does not explicitly consider Militant 
Tendency (MT), despite its growing activity within the Labour Party during this 
period. As Crick argues, it was an era which marked “the rise of the single-issue 
pressure group”, but such campaigns “did not interest Militant, which saw the new 
culture as a distraction from the real issues”.75 This is point is strengthened when he 
argues that “Militant’s growing influence within the LPYS [Labour Party Young 
Socialists] went largely unremarked...The Young Liberals, protesting about Vietnam 
and apartheid, were far more of an embarrassment to Jeremy Thorpe at this time than 
the LPYS was to Harold Wilson.”76 Furthermore, MT had a very nationally-focused 
agenda, and was not even particularly concerned with issues of race until it was 
criticised for this in the early to mid 1980s, and consequently expanded its list of 
public demands. 
 
A more notable exclusion from the above definition of the labour movement is the 
Communist Party (CPGB). This decision was taken because the CPGB differentiated 
itself from the labour movement: “the British labour movement must be won to ally 
itself with the movement at present campaigning for a reversal of these policies of 
betrayal and for support of the Zimbabwe peoples”.77 In terms of responding to the 
Rhodesia crisis it played a very similar role to the AAM, and indeed it can be argued 
that the CPGB acted more as an advocacy organisation than a political party in this 
context, and yet was by no means at the forefront of campaigning on the issue. In light 
of these points, the CPGB is referred to at times in Chapter 3, but is not framed as part 
of the labour movement, nor considered at length as part of the advocacy response to 
the situation in Rhodesia. 
 
Whilst less contentious than ‘labour movement’, some explanation should be given for 
the choice of the term ‘advocacy organisation’ to describe the AAM and its 
contemporaries. The main alternatives to this phrase were ‘charity’ or ‘non-
Governmental organisation’ (NGO), the latter being much in vogue in current 
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parlance. These phrases are both generic and as such do not describe the particular 
type of organisation with which this thesis is concerned. The term ‘advocacy 
organisation’ speaks more directly to the specific type of organisation that this study 
deals with. The Chambers Dictionary defines ‘advocacy’ as the “recommendation or 
active support of an idea”. This succinctly captures the aims and activities of the 
organisations that were active on the Rhodesia issue. Sat Obiyan discusses in detail 
different taxonomies of NGOs and their various merits, making the case that it is 
useful to have definitions that capture the essence of what an organisation does, 
beyond simply being an NGO, but to be too prescriptive is ultimately harmful, in that a 
precise definition will never be able to describe every organisation.78 This argument 
supports the case made here for using the term ‘advocacy organisation’. It is more 
meaningful than the main alternatives, without creating difficulty by being too 
prescriptive. 
 
During the thesis, the narrative switches between referring to the five principles and 
the Six Principles. The five principles were set out to the Rhodesian regime by the 
British Government, a few months prior to UDI. These were principles that would 
need to be satisfied “before agreeing to the grant of independence”, and continued to 
be used throughout the period of UDI up to formal independence.79 The sixth principle 
was added in January 1966 when Wilson made a statement in the House of Commons 
about Rhodesia.80 The Six Principles read: 
1. The principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule, 
already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, would have to be maintained 
and guaranteed. 
2. There would also have to be guarantees against retrogressive 
amendment of the Constitution. 
3. There would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of 
the African population. 
4. There would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination. 
5. The British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis 
proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a 
whole. 
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6. Regardless of race there must be no oppression of majority by minority 
or of minority by majority.81 
 
The thesis refers to both five and Six Principles, depending on the source being 
discussed, because, despite the addition of the sixth principle, this was not always 
referred to. 
 
The idea of pragmatism and its influence on the actions of various groups under 
discussion is mentioned throughout the thesis. In this context, pragmatism is used to 
mean its typical dictionary definition of a practical, logical approach to situations and 
problems rather than one driven by principles or theories. It is not referring to the 
American philosophical movement. It is for this reason that academic literature on 
political pragmatisms has not been considered. 
 
Finally: ‘Rhodesia’. For the sake of simplicity and brevity, pre-independence 
Zimbabwe will be referred to exclusively as ‘Rhodesia’. This was the term used for the 
majority of the period with which the thesis is concerned. Whilst many members of 
the nationalist movement used the term Zimbabwe, as a reflection of the change they 
were struggling for, this was not generally taken up by other states or groups 
interested in the issue until much closer to independence. The use of the term 
‘Rhodesia’ in no way represents any sympathy with the agenda of the Smith regime. It 
is simply a more historically accurate term, without complicating the situation by 
switching between the technically correct terms for each period (Southern Rhodesia, 
Rhodesia, Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe). Especially since much of the thesis does 
not follow a chronological trajectory, this would serve only to obfuscate the narrative. 
Organisational Biographies 
This section of the introduction will present some of the key organisations that the 
thesis discusses in later chapters. The aim here is to provide a reasonably brief outline 
of how each organisation started; what its aims were, particularly with regard to 
Rhodesia; who the key figures were; and how, if this was the case, it was related to 
other organisations. This section will begin with advocacy organisations, before 
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looking at African nationalist organisations and then political parties and the labour 
movement in Britain. A notable organisation that the thesis does not consider is 
Amnesty International, which clearly did campaign on the Rhodesia issue. The reason 
for this omission is that the unit of focus of all Amnesty’s campaigns is human rights. 
The thesis is more interested in the political unfolding of the Rhodesia situation, and 
how the grass roots both in Rhodesia and the UK interacted with this, as well as with 
each other. The focus of Amnesty’s campaigns does not fit well into this exploration. 
 
The origins of the AAM lie in the boycott movement. In June 1959, a meeting was held 
in London to organise a boycott of goods imported from South Africa. Christabel 
Gurney, herself actively involved in the AAM, editing the movement’s official 
publication, Anti-Apartheid News, from 1969-198082 wrote about this meeting: 
The main speaker was Julius Nyerere, then President of the Tanganyikan 
African National Union (TANU), joined by Kanyama Chiume of the banned 
Nyasaland African National Congress, Tennyson Makiwane and Vella Pillay 
from South Africa's African and Indian Congresses, Michael Scott and 
Trevor Huddleston.83 
 
She notes that none of these figures were involved in British politics, but came to be 
involved through other channels. Also important to note is that the date of the 
meeting, and its proposed method of campaigning were influenced by anti-apartheid 
action happening in South Africa. Gurney argues that the anti-apartheid cause was 
taken up in Britain “by a network of organisations and individuals involved in a 
ferment of activity on three interlinked issues: the anti-colonial struggle; peace and 
nuclear disarmament; and opposition to endemic, and growing, racism in Britain”,84 all 
of which were supported by the New Left. 
 
In the decade leading up to 1959, action in Britain against apartheid had been growing 
amongst a number of different groups and organisations. Gurney characterises this 
list as “a network of organisations across the political spectrum, though mainly on the 
Left, including MCF [Movement for Colonial Freedom], Christian Action, CAO 
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[Committee of African Organisations], the National Council of Civil Liberties, student 
bodies, some trade unions, the Communist Party and sections of the Labour Party”.85  
It is apparent how wide-reaching the early boycott movement in Britain sought to be; 
trying to get sponsorship amongst the labour movement, the arts, academia and from 
all political parties. 
 
It is sometimes suggested that it was the Sharpeville massacre in South African that 
galvanised the British public around the apartheid cause and prompted the formation 
of the AAM out of the existing Boycott Movement, but Gurney argues that in fact the 
Boycott Movement Committee was already planning for how to ensure the 
continuation of the movement beyond the planned boycott in March 1960. The roots 
in the Boycott Movement had a lasting impact on the character of the AAM: 
It built a structure which involved other organisations working in related 
areas, but which made the future of South Africa its main concern. It 
established itself as a non-partisan organisation which set out to appeal to 
people of any or no Party affiliation. Most significantly it was an 
organisation which aspired to be an autonomous and democratically run 
British mass movement.86 
 
The above summary, drawn largely from Gurney’s seminal article on the formation of 
the AAM, gives a clear impression of the character of the AAM from the outset, and of 
the range of organisations involved. Also mentioned above; one of the early meetings 
that gave rise to the Boycott Movement in the UK involved various representatives of 
southern African countries and the Reverend Michael Scott; who was one of the 
founding members of the Africa Bureau a few years prior to this meeting. He had 
“decided that there was a need for an organisation to advise and support Africans who 
wished to oppose by constitutional means political decisions affecting their lives and 
futures imposed by alien governments.”87 It worked on many different issues relating 
to decolonisation in Africa. Originally its activities were focused on “advising Africans 
on their problems, obtaining the advice of experts, representing them on international 
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bodies and encouraging them to exert pressure on governments”,88 but this changed 
in the early-mid 1960s as the situation in Africa developed, with many states 
becoming independent. 
 
In response to the changing political realities on the continent, the Bureau focused 
more of its time on research, producing detailed publications on various issues, such 
as the efficacy of sanctions in Rhodesia. With this change, came a shift in the way the 
organisation was funded, from an early reliance on independent donations to more 
professional fundraising methods. The Bureau made use of various grants from 
“British, American and Swedish foundations for specific projects or publications”.89 
Pugh and Mackesy sum up this shift in the nature of the organisation; they state that 
“the general impression created was that in the last decade of its existence the Bureau 
was becoming less of a philanthropic body in the old, amateur fashion and adopting 
the style and professional techniques of a modern charitable agency.”90 There was an 
overlap between the AAM and the Africa Bureau in terms of some of the key figures 
involved, or at least those names that were on the boards to give weight to the cause 
of the organisations. As mentioned above, Michael Scott had been involved in what 
can be considered to be the proto-AAM, the Boycott Movement. The Reverend Trevor 
Huddleston had also been involved at this time in the AAM. 
 
In response to the settlement proposals negotiated between the Smith regime and the 
Conservative Government in 1971 (discussed briefly in Chapter 2 and at length in 
Chapter 6) the AAM called a meeting to discuss tactics. It was decided that an 
organisation should be established specifically to campaign on this issue, to resist any 
potential sell-out from occurring. It was called the Rhodesia Emergency Campaign 
Committee (RECC). Since it was set up by the AAM, there was a significant overlap in 
terms of the people involved. This idea was revived later in the decade, again in 
response to fear of a sell-out, with the sister organisation being called the Zimbabwe 
Emergency Campaign Committee (ZECC). Again this was called into action by the 
AAM, and involved many of the same people. Both the RECC and the ZECC involved a 
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broad church of other organisations, including church groups, African nationalist 
representatives, other advocacy organisations, left wing groups, and representatives 
from the media.91 
 
Established at a similar time to the RECC was the Justice for Rhodesia campaign. It 
was “formed by British churchmen to press for the defeat of the Salisbury proposals. It 
was sponsored by Bishop Trevor Huddleston (earlier referred to as Reverend, as he 
was when participating in the Boycott Movement), Bishop Butler, Lord Caradon and 
Lord Ritchie-Calder.92 Mr J Camilleri, of the Catholic Institute for International 
Relations, was the president of the campaign, and in a letter to Harold Wilson stated 
that “the purpose of the campaign will be to oppose the settlement, to call for the 
continuation and intensification of sanctions and to insist on the right of African self-
determination.”93  
 
There are several organisations that are perhaps better known than some of those 
outlined above, but for reasons of source availability do not feature significantly in the 
thesis. These organisations will be outlined briefly here, so that where they might 
appear at sparse intervals in the substantive chapters some context has been 
provided, but these introductions will be kept brief, as the focus has to be on those 
organisations about which more is written later. 
 
The Movement for Colonial Freedom (MCF) was founded in 1954 to campaign for an 
end to colonialism, led by Fenner Brockway.94 It amalgamated several smaller 
organisations working on related issues. Up to the mid-1960s, the MCF focused on 
campaigning for political freedoms. After this point it focused more on international 
economic self-determination.95 This shift of focus coincides with the point at which 
this thesis picks up, and therefore means there is less on Rhodesia than might be 
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expected from the MCF. The organisation was renamed Liberation in 1970, and 
continues to this day. 
 
Arising from the earlier Treason Trial Defence Fund, the Defence and Aid Fund was 
set up in 1956 to support victims of apartheid law in South Africa. Most significantly 
the organisation raised funds to pay the legal fees of people accused of treason for 
campaigning against apartheid. It also had a research component to its work, 
producing accessible tracts on South Africa and other associated regional issues for 
the general public and other campaigning organisations. It saw the involvement of 
figures such as Ambrose Reeves and, most famously, Canon Collins.96 This 
organisation is not prominent within the thesis because the vast majority of its 
campaigning was focused on South Africa, far more so than the AAM, and much of its 
documentation is archived in South Africa. 
 
The Fabian Society should be mentioned for the people involved were also 
instrumental in other organisations or publications mentioned in the thesis, and for 
some papers it published on Rhodesia. Prior to 1950 Rita Hinden was Secretary of the 
Fabian Colonial Bureau (FCB), the special department of the Bureau that was set up 
“to facilitate research, information gathering and the development of constructive 
ideas on colonial policy”.97 She later went on to edit Socialist Commentary, a left-wing 
publication that is drawn on in subsequent chapters. During the period with which the 
thesis is primarily concerned, the Fabian Society was not particularly active on 
colonial issues, the FCB having been amalgamated back into the main society a decade 
earlier, and many countries having already achieved independence. It did, however, 
publish tracts on Rhodesia, which will be referred to later in the thesis. 
 
As well as highlighting the establishment of the above organisations, it is useful here 
to outline a few of the key figures involved in advocacy activity specifically during the 
period of 1965-80. The Ennals brothers, John, David and Martin (from oldest to 
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youngest) were all involved in different capacities in the Rhodesia issue. John was 
Chairman of the AAM from 1968-76.98 David was a Labour politician and served as 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs from 1974-76,99 and Martin 
was Secretary-General of Amnesty International from 1968-1980.100 Guy Arnold, 
Director of the Africa Bureau from 1968 until 1972, interacted with Ethel de Keyser 
and Abdul Minty, both heavily involved with the AAM. Ethel de Keyser was a Jewish 
South African, deported to Britain in 1963 for involvement in anti-apartheid struggle. 
She became the AAM’s senior full time staff member in 1967, in the position of 
Executive Secretary.101 Abdul Minty moved to Britain from South Africa in 1958 to 
continue his studies. He initially became involved in anti-apartheid work through 
lobbying the International Olympic Committee to suspend South Africa in 1963. Minty 
was the Honorary Secretary of the British arm of the AAM from 1962 until 1995.102 
Colin Legum, another Jewish South African exile, hailed from a background in political 
journalism, working on the Observer as “Fleet Street’s first Africa correspondent” and 
became a committee member of the Africa Bureau during Guy Arnold’s 
directorship.103 Mike Terry led the AAM from 1975, his interest in African politics 
stemming from a visit to Rhodesia after his A-Levels, and then sustained involvement 
in student union campaigning. Following time as national secretary of the NUS, he 
spent two years working at the research department of the International Defence and 
Aid Fund. With the exception of David Ennals, who was not a member of an advocacy 
organisation, all of the figures discussed here were university educated. 
 
This demographic, in contrast to that of the leadership of the more traditional trade 
unions around this time, is indicative of tensions more broadly between the old and 
new left, and the respective areas of concern of each. As a result of the growth of a 
new generation of radicals who were generally university educated and frequently 
employed by the public sector, tensions arose with the more traditional union leaders, 
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who tended to be manual workers.104 This can be seen in Chapter 3, during the 
discussion of the preoccupation of much advocacy work with trying to further engage 
the labour movement on the Rhodesia issue, which was met with limited success for 
much of the period under discussion. This class divide between the more traditional 
elements of the labour movement and the middle class advocacy movement emerges 
strongly throughout the substantive chapters. On the subject of labour involvement in 
anticolonial issues, with a focus on South Africa, Skinner writes that “the attitude of 
the TUC towards apartheid until the 1970s tended to be influenced by anti-
Communist instincts…Moreover, British labour leaders had little experience of race as 
a workers’ issue”.105  
 
The subject of nationalist organisations in Rhodesia is not a simple one. Pages of 
scholarship have been devoted to exploring the fault-lines and divisions that emerged 
between and within the different groups, a very brief overview of which was provided 
in the literature review above. Given the proliferation of nationalist groups during the 
15 year period with which the thesis is concerned, it is necessary to stipulate a 
narrower focus on a particular set of organisations. This focus was largely dictated by 
the availability of primary documentation: the vast majority of archival sources 
focused exclusively on ZANU and ZAPU, which in turn was predominantly a product of 
organisational size and importance during the nationalist struggle. 
 
Whilst organisations in Britain, and the British Government, were willing to accept 
newer organisations should they develop into convincing opposition parties, this 
condition never really materialised. An exception to this focus on ZANU and ZAPU is 
found in Chapter 6, in which the African National Council (ANC) is discussed at length. 
This chapter, as stated above, is a case study focusing on the Pearce Commission. At 
this time ZANU and ZAPU were both still banned under Rhodesian law from operating 
within Rhodesia, which made mobilising against the settlement proposals impossible. 
In this context it was necessary for another organisation to arise, and in this instance 
there is no limitation of available sources preventing the inclusion of the ANC. Quite 
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the contrary; there are very few sources relating to ZANU and ZAPU during the Pearce 
Commission, since the ANC so fully stepped into the political vacuum during this 
period. The formation and character of this organisation will be elaborated on in 
Chapter 6.  
 
As indicated by the title and the general literature review above, the main British 
political party discussed in the thesis is the Labour Party. There are several reasons 
for this focus. First, the Labour Party was in power for the majority of period under 
consideration; 1964-1970 and 1974-1979,106 meaning that many of the key 
developments in the Rhodesia situation took place under a Labour Government. 
However, this argument in itself is not sufficient, since the Conservatives also oversaw 
certain key developments, such as the Pearce Commission and the all-important 
Lancaster House Conference, and the Liberal Party saw greater numbers of its 
members actively engaged with advocacy work. However, it can be argued that the 
Conservative Party had a very different relationship with the processes of 
decolonisation than Labour, and that the latter had a far closer, although not to say 
easy, relationship with various nationalist organisations. Comments from the African 
nationalist movement in Rhodesia help to elucidate this point, highlighting the Party’s 
anticolonial stance prior to winning the general election in October 1964.107 That they 
were rapidly disappointed in the Party’s actions once in power does not detract from 
the closer relationship the Labour Party had with the ideals of anticolonialism. 
 
Equally, a large proportion of the campaigning on the Rhodesia issue carried out by 
various advocacy organisations focused on the Labour Party leadership and trying to 
alter the policy and actions of the Party. This was true for periods when Labour was in 
power and in opposition. In power the justification for this focus is evident; the 
advocacy movement wished to alter, or at least place a check on, successive Labour 
Governments’ handling of the situation. In opposition, advocacy organisations did 
focus attention on the Conservative Governments, but maintained a dialogue with the 
Labour Party as a more receptive entity. The reason for this continued preoccupation 
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with Labour is two-fold. First, in opposition, the Labour Party became far more liberal 
in its rhetoric on Rhodesia, as it was freer to do so without the obligation to act. 
Therefore during such periods the Party provided a source of support to, and more 
aligned thinking with, advocacy organisations working on the Rhodesia issue. Second, 
Labour still had a more powerful voice in parliament than the Liberals and as such, 
maintaining a dialogue with them provided advocacy organisations with a stronger 
political ally then if they had solely focussed on lobbying the Conservatives.  
 
The Rhodesia issue was also more divisive for the Labour Party than the 
Conservatives, as Labour were more closely related to the advocacy movement and 
broader labour movement. That is not to suggest that the Conservative Party was a 
homogenous entity on Rhodesia; it was divided between rebels more supportive of 
the African nationalist movement at one end of the spectrum, all the way through to 
the pro-Smith right-wing Monday club at the other.108 However, the issue did not 
cause the same intra-party turbulence as it did for Labour. The diaries of Barbara 
Castle, who had formerly been Minister of Overseas Development, recount how she 
threatened Harold Wilson with resignation several times over Rhodesia, were a 
settlement to be made along unacceptable lines.109 Judith Hart, then Minister of State 
for Commonwealth Affairs, also came close to resigning over Rhodesia, and the two at 
times conspired over how to exert pressure on Harold Wilson not to sell-out to 
Smith.110 
 
As much of the thesis is concerned with the Labour Party, it is important to outline its 
structure to contextualise later discussion. Following the Party’s 1918 constitution, 
individuals were allowed to join Labour for the first time. This development led to the 
formation of Constituency Labour Parties (CLP). CLPs collectively were given some 
representation on the National Executive Party (NEC), which was elected each year at 
the annual Party Conference. However, unions retained control of 90% of conference 
votes. In terms of the interplay of the different sections of the labour movement, 
Minkin argues that: 
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The economic, incomes and industrial policies of the Wilson Government 
slowly undermined its base of support in the unions so the Left drew 
sustenance from a new political alignment in some of the unions. By 1968 
the Left had attained a new basis of strength at the Party Conference, the 
political complexion of the NEC was slowly shifting to the Left, the NEC was 
becoming more independent of Ministerial influence and the Party office 
was becoming more liberal in its relationship with the Party in the 
country.111 
 
As the Wilson Government’s policy shifted farther from the will of the Party around 
1968, it suffered increasing defeats at Conference, and as a result of this pressure from 
the grass roots of the Party, the NEC “slowly shed the role of public apologist for 
Labour Government policy and took on a new, more active role as the government of 
the Party.”112  
 
The thesis draws on many sources from the Rhodesia Department. This nomenclature 
is not entirely historically accurate however. The department was originally the 
Rhodesia Political Department, and merged with its sister organisation, the Rhodesia 
Economic Department, in 1972. These were both established in the Commonwealth 
Office (CO) following the announcement of UDI, then transferred to the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) when this was established in 1968.113 For the sake of 
brevity, reference is simply made to the ‘Rhodesia Department’ throughout the thesis. 
The main subjects the Department dealt with were “political and constitutional 
questions, including relations between the British Government and the Governor and 
with the illegal regime”, legal and constitutional issues, political developments 
amongst both whites and Africans and Rhodesian external affairs including relations 
with foreign governments and with the FCO, and affiliation to international 
organisations.114 It also dealt with issues such as education, Rhodesian civil servants 
demonstrating loyalty to Britain, consular questions and the status of Rhodesia House 
in London, and the residual mission in Salisbury. From this lengthy list of duties, the 
ones of most significance to the thesis are relations with the African nationalist 
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movement, and keeping up to date with and responding to political developments, 
since these generated the most sources of use to the subject of analysis. 
 
Despite this discussion of the various groups under consideration in the thesis, it is 
important to note that they were clearly not entirely discrete entities. For example, it 
was possible, albeit not necessarily common, for members of local and CLPs interested 
in the Rhodesia issue to have also been active in some of the advocacy organisations 
working on the issue. It is easy to forget this in what is a study focused on the 
organisational level, so it is worth noting from the outset this possible overlap 
between the plurality of groups involved. 
 
This chapter has discussed the core existing literature on the struggle for 
independence in Rhodesia from both a diplomatic and nationalist perspective, as well 
as considering shortcomings in this literature on the role of advocacy campaigns. The 
following chapter begins the substantive analysis of the thesis with a chronological 
consideration of the Rhodesia crisis, considering how interest in the issue fluctuated 
in Britain. 
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Chapter 2 – Topographies of Support 
Introduction 
From UDI to independence, the Rhodesia issue spanned 15 years. During this period, 
there were many other international and domestic issues competing for media and 
political attention. Coggins captures this sentiment precisely: 
Major international problems including the war in Vietnam, the Six Days’ 
War in the Middle East, ‘confrontation’ between Britain, Malaysia and 
Indonesia in the Far East, war between India and Pakistan, and the 
development of nuclear weapons by the Chinese meant that Rhodesia was 
not always of the most immediate importance.115 
 
This chapter therefore takes a chronological look at the entire 15 year period, and 
considers whether, how and why levels of interest in the Rhodesia issue fluctuated 
during this period. Specifically, this chapter addresses the question: What was the 
relationship between events in Rhodesia, the political climate of the UK and waves of 
support for the African nationalist movement amongst UK based advocacy 
organisations and the British labour movement? 
 
Mirroring the parameters of the thesis as a whole, this chapter takes UDI as a starting 
point, and the closing of the Lancaster House conference as an end point. It considers 
levels of support for the African nationalist movement amongst advocacy 
organisations and the labour movement in the UK during this 15 year period. In the 
course of this discussion, reference will be made to key events in the Rhodesia 
timeline, such as settlement negotiations. A brief discussion of such events will be 
provided where relevant. The chapter will by no means provide an exhaustive account 
of the UDI to independence period; such an undertaking would be far beyond the 
available scope of this thesis, let alone of a single chapter. It is also worth noting that 
there are many resources dealing with this subject, which seek to fulfil that function 
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and have been referenced in the preceding literature review, and which will be drawn 
on again in this chapter. 
 
The main section of the chapter, considering support amongst advocacy organisations 
and the broader labour movement for the independence struggle, will draw mainly on 
archival material. There is a wealth of primary material such as meeting minutes of 
advocacy organisations, minutes and resolutions from trade unions, letters between 
different organisations and labour movement oriented publications which help to 
shed light on this issue. This will be supported with an interwoven discussion of the 
key events of the Rhodesian situation as they unfolded.  
 
There is very little secondary literature that is specifically related to the focus of this 
chapter. Fieldhouse takes a similar methodological approach, in that many of his 
chapters work chronologically, looking at events the AAM organised in sequence, and 
making reference to other key political events as necessary. However, he does not 
discuss the possibility of a correlation between this timeline of events led by the AAM, 
and the broader political situation at the time as things played out within Rhodesia, 
and diplomatically between Britain, Rhodesia and various other parties. His section on 
Rhodesia contains very little analysis about why the AAM might have been acted as it 
did at various points, and deals solely with what happened, and when. Windrich’s 
Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence116 will be used during the chapter to 
tie the analysis of primary data into the broader narrative of Rhodesia into 
Zimbabawe. This is because the text gives a detailed chronological coverage of events, 
focusing mainly on the diplomatic interactions between Britain and Rhodesia, and 
highlights aspects of the political situation in each country over time. 
 
There is no other secondary literature of particular salience to this chapter, although 
it is worth noting the absence of some important themes in existing studies. Media 
coverage is omitted from most accounts of Britain and Rhodesia, which can be 
attributed to two mutually exclusive explanations, depending on the source under 
consideration. Many relevant texts were written either during or immediately 
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following the struggle for independence, and as such media sources would have been 
difficult to access. Sources written more recently tend to focus on the diplomatic 
nature of the situation, in which case access to official FCO documents provide a more 
detailed and interesting source of information. It is only when focusing on the grass 
roots engagement with the issue, as this study aims to do, that media sources become 
more valuable, particularly in the context of this chapter as they can provide an 
almost quantitative aspect to the research, being more consistently available than any 
other type of primary material. The idea of fluctuations in interest in the Rhodesia 
issue has not been addressed directly by any secondary literature. 
UDI onwards, 1965-66 
Fieldhouse argues that UDI served a transformative purpose in the AAM’s campaign 
focus, and galvanised the increasing sense that the movement could not ignore what 
was happening in Southern Africa outside of South Africa itself.117 It transformed the 
situation, the political realities and dynamics, but also the sense of urgency that the 
declaration generated. Whilst there was certainly a real sense of tension before UDI, 
and urgency amongst the British political elite in trying to prevent it, UDI itself 
catapulted the issue into the (British) national consciousness with the wave of media 
coverage it generated, and the political situation it left in its wake.118 
 
The Africa Bureau was well placed to respond to UDI because of its organisational 
focus on assisting Africans living under “alien governments”.119 There was a flurry of 
Africa Bureau organised activity in the weeks and months following UDI. In a letter to 
the AAM three weeks after UDI, the Africa Bureau outlined its plans for a meeting on 
Rhodesia to discuss policies and action  
designed to end the Smith rebellion. The purpose is twofold – to ensure that 
the measures taken against the rebel government are effective and to 
provide leadership of public opinion on the questions of the constitutional 
future for Rhodesia after the rebellion has been ended.120 
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The meeting referred to was held at the House of Commons on 06/12/1965, and 
notes from it suggest that discussion covered what British policy on Rhodesia should 
be, and MPs were asked to clarify their position over the potential use of force. Later 
that month, the Africa Bureau organised the Rhodesia Action Conference, the report 
from which recommended that Britain use any means available to end the Smith 
rebellion, encourage South Africa to comply with UN policy on Rhodesia and that 
public awareness in Britain should be raised by focusing attention on “individual 
cases of hardship and injustice”.121 
 
Unlike the Africa Bureau, which acted promptly upon the announcement of UDI, there 
is no trace of any immediate AAM activity in response. This is supported by 
Fieldhouse’s account of the Movement’s actions on Rhodesia, which works 
chronologically, and moves seamlessly from UDI itself to 1966.122 This can be 
attributed to the AAM’s initial focus exclusively on South Africa, before a later shift to 
include other parts of southern Africa, which occurred partly as a result of UDI. This 
meant that the AAM was not in a position organisationally to respond as rapidly as the 
Africa Bureau did to the declaration. However, this lag in response time was not 
mirrored by some constituents of the labour movement. 
 
The TUC was quick to discuss its position with regards to Britain and Rhodesia, 
following the declaration. In an internal correspondence from the International 
Department of the TUC, prior to a Commonwealth Advisory Committee meeting, it is 
made clear that “if a statement is required…it should be in support of the British 
Government”.123 There is, however, an implicit tension in the TUC’s stance at this time. 
ICFTU, of which the TUC was a member, released a statement at a similar time 
proclaiming solidarity with the African workers of Rhodesia “until freedom and 
democracy prevail”.124 ICFTU had also written to Harold Wilson urging the use of 
force and the strengthening of sanctions to end the rebellion. Whilst there is no 
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archival trace of direct correspondence between the ICFTU and the TUC at this point 
in time discussing responses to UDI, there is a clear tension here in the outlooks of the 
two organisations. It also demonstrates a divergence in opinion with the Africa 
Bureau, which took an immediately antagonistic position with regards to the Wilson 
Government’s policy. 
 
There was also a swift response from a number of CLPs following the Smith regime’s 
declaration of independence, taking the form of resolutions sent to the NEC. The vast 
majority of these “congratulate”, “offer support to” or “fully endorse” the actions taken 
by the British Government in responding to UDI, namely instituting sanctions and 
liaising with the UN. However, there were dissenting voices amongst the crowd, 
calling sternly for military intervention in Rhodesia, or the resumption of direct 
control by HMG.125 It is of note that, whilst this set of NEC minutes eponymously deals 
with both trade union and CLP resolutions, there is no trade union presence. Likewise, 
the February 1966 minutes contain resolutions exclusively from CLPs over the 
Rhodesia issue. This set of resolutions, however, demonstrated greater diversity of 
opinion with regards to Government policy. There were far more calls for the 
implementation of full sanctions, regrets at the omission of oil from the sanctions 
implemented so far, and statements supporting the idea of military intervention.126 
Thereafter, CLP interest in the Rhodesia issue started to dip.127 
  
Also in February 1966, there was activity by several student societies at Bangor 
University, who collaborated to organise a ‘Rhodesia Teach-In’. For this event, they 
tried to get speakers to represent a range of different British and Rhodesian views, 
with members of the Labour and Conservative Parties, “a supporter of the Smith 
regime” and an OAU representative, as well as aiming to give a more general historical 
background to the situation.128 The following month, a Movement for Colonial 
Freedom (MCF) area council (the Wirral) organised a collection and leaflet 
distribution session, focussing on Rhodesia, with the tagline “Don’t just talk about 
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Rhodesia or Racial Discrimination – here is a painless way to do something about 
it”.129  
 
It was not until April 1966 that the AAM began responding more actively to the 
unfolding situation by planning a national campaign on Rhodesia. The main aspects of 
this campaign included getting related organisations to assist in lobbying MPs, 
collecting signatures for a petition and distributing an AAM leaflet entitled ‘Crisis in 
Rhodesia’.130 The AAM contacted other organisations that might be interested in the 
campaign, to try to mobilise greater support. The letter gave the impression that the 
AAM did not expect the rebellion to persist for so long, and given media responses as 
the situation unfolded throughout 1966, without signs of abating, it is doubtful they 
were alone in this.131 
 
From this point onwards, the AAM became far more active on the Rhodesia issue, as it 
became apparent that there was to be no immediate solution. In May 1966 they 
produced a document that argued against Britain opening talks with the Smith regime, 
which they believed was the beginning of a British sell-out. It also condemned Britain 
for letting South Africa get away with overtly flouting UN sanctions, and economically 
supporting the illegal regime. It argued that, had the British Government 
recommended that the UN imposed mandatory sanctions on Rhodesia, South Africa 
would have had little choice but to comply.132  
 
Around this time, the Rhodesia Sub-Committee of the Africa Bureau held a meeting to 
review its position with regards to the continuing situation in Rhodesia. Here it was 
argued that the sanctions programme was being drawn out, and was therefore 
unlikely to have any significant impact on the economy and, by extension, the viability 
of the Smith regime. The Bureau suggested that Britain should make a demonstration 
of military strength, for example by employing “provocative reconnaissance” against 
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Rhodesia using air power.133 Such a strong suggestion was never likely to hold much 
sway with Wilson’s Government, but it illustrates the sense amongst some elements of 
the left at this time that the Rhodesia issue could be brought to a swift solution if only 
Britain were prepared to use minimal force. 
 
The British Government had begun to approach the Smith regime about negotiations 
earlier in 1966, and had put these so called “talks about talks” on hold to facilitate a 
Commonwealth Conference in September. The AAM was quick to respond to these 
early suggestions of Britain’s desire to reach a settlement. In July 1966 they produced 
a ‘Manifesto on Rhodesia’ detailing the situation as it stood at the time, in which they 
referred to the talks as an act that served only to strengthen Rhodesia’s authority, and 
“severely weakened the credibility of Britain’s policy in the eyes of the peoples and 
governments of the world”, and restating the importance of a commitment to 
sanctions and the principle of NIBMAR.134 
 
The initiation of the guerrilla war took place around the middle of 1966, although this 
date is contested. Even more heatedly, the question of whether it was ZANU or ZAPU 
who struck the first substantive blow of the guerrilla war attracts debate. Dabengwa 
argues that, whilst it is frequently claimed that ZANU’s incursion into Chinhoyi that 
commenced the war, ZAPU was in fact sending small units into Rhodesia as early as 
1965.135 There was no immediate media or advocacy response to the initiation of 
guerrilla activities, but then it was consistently played down by the Smith regime, and 
would not necessarily have been immediately apparent in the UK.136 
 
In September 1966 the first trade union resolution on Rhodesia appeared in the NEC 
minutes, from the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers (USDAW): 
This ADM believes it is a prime duty of the British Government to prevent 
the creation of an Apartheid state in Rhodesia. It pledges full support for all 
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measures necessary to establish a legal government in Rhodesia which will 
work rapidly towards the achievement of a fully democratic constitution.137 
 
As stated above, by this point the British Government and the Smith regime had begun 
to tentatively consider the possibility of holding talks about settlement, and it had 
become increasingly apparent that sanctions were largely ineffective because of the 
piecemeal way in which they had been implemented. The upcoming Commonwealth 
Conference placed these issues firmly on the agenda. The NEC minutes go on to 
address an invitation from the AAM to a “seminar on British policy in Rhodesia and 
South Africa” and make the decision to “obtain further details” about the AAM before 
consenting to send representatives to the event. At this time USDAW was one of the 
five largest and more established unions, but left-leaning in its leadership.138 Along 
with the NEC, its engagement with the Rhodesia issue corresponds to important 
changes in the situation, particularly the tentative moves towards talks. This shift 
highlights the growing realisation amongst various interested parties in Britain that 
the Rhodesia issue was not going to prove easy to solve. 
 
At the TUC Congress in September 1966, a motion was moved by the Associated 
Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF) condemning UDI and calling on 
the General Council “to do all in their power to reverse such policy and also promote 
the principle of ‘one man one vote’, in order to avoid white supremacy”.139 The 
Chemical Workers Union tabled an amendment to give the motion ‘teeth’, arguing that 
given the ostensible failure of sanctions, the Rhodesia issue should be passed to the 
UN. The General Council advised this to be withdrawn on the grounds that “it is 
premature to talk about sending this matter to the United Nations with all the 
complications of the political structure there, before exploring every possible channel 
to bring about a settlement”.140 The amendment was withdrawn and the motion 
carried, illustrating broad trade union support for a general condemnation of the 
Smith regime’s actions. 
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Also in September, through the MCF, Fenner Brockway sent out a request to advocacy 
organisations and members of the public to write to him at the House of Lords, in 
support of an outlined statement on Rhodesia, so that he could present these views to 
the Government. His statement called for an unequivocal position on NIBMAR.141 The 
MCF also released a press statement on the first anniversary of UDI, which tried to 
publicise the key issues of the Rhodesia situation to the general public, and press for 
any negotiations to be inclusive of representatives of Rhodesian society as a whole.142 
It is surprising that there is no archival evidence of any other advocacy organisations 
utilising the one year anniversary of UDI to press the Rhodesia issue and lobby the 
Government on this basis. However, that is perhaps because of its position following 
the Commonwealth Conference and tumultuous Labour Party Conference, and not 
long before the first round of official talks with the Smith regime. There was limited 
media coverage of the anniversary in the UK,143 though the Smith Government 
certainly capitalised on the event, turning it into a celebratory public holiday in 
Rhodesia.144 This pattern was often repeated throughout the Rhodesia crisis, with 
media sources rarely making reference to the anniversary of UDI, except to refer to 
the actions of the Smith regime, which invariably used the anniversary as a tool to 
galvanise nationalist sentiment.145 
 
Within the labour movement, action on the Rhodesia issue during 1966 followed a 
slightly different pattern to that of advocacy organisations, with a flurry of CLP 
resolutions on Rhodesia in the aftermath of UDI, and a slow decline of interest 
throughout 1966. However, this changed following the September Commonwealth 
Conference, and the difficulties faced by the British Government in justifying its 
policies to other Commonwealth nations who overtly supported the African 
nationalist movement.146 Interest in the issue grew as it became more apparent that 
the British Government was willing to negotiate with the Smith regime, although this 
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will to settle was much clearer within Cabinet itself than amongst the public. Judith 
Hart, then Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs, confided in Tony Benn, a 
fellow Cabinet Minister (then Technology), on the 12th October 1966, fearing that 
there would be a sell-out, and discussing the idea of resignation. He counselled: “to 
say, just before she thought the sell-out would occur, that there would be no breach of 
our solemn pledge – and then get sacked.”147 
 
In November 1966, the ICFTU held an executive board meeting, at which a statement 
on Rhodesia was passed: 
calling on the British Government to apply the strongest possible forms of 
coercion against the regime in Southern Rhodesia in order to secure the 
democratic rights of the Rhodesia people as a whole, stating that sanctions 
so far had failed in their effect… The statement also called on…the 
international free trade union movement to take any action possible to help 
the people of Rhodesia in their struggle.148 
 
 This resolution highlights a discrepancy between the trade union bloc’s support of 
government policy as demonstrated at the Labour Party conference, and the TUC’s 
requirement to agree with ICFTU policy. However this is not important on a practical 
level; the TUC had to nominally agree with ICFTU statements as a member, but in 
reality it was free to behave as it wished with regards to its relationship with the 
Labour Party. 
From Tiger into Fearless, 1966-68 
The eponymous Tiger Talks, held on board HMS Tiger between 2nd and 4th December 
1966, precipitated a wave of attention on the Rhodesia issue from various 
organisations and the media. Peter Calvocoressi, then chairman of the Africa Bureau, 
issued a statement in response to fears surrounding the talks concluding that 
“independence for Rhodesia without complete and enforceable constitutional 
safeguards for the African population would certainly lead to another South Africa”.149 
Fieldhouse writes that 
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even before the Tiger talks were over, a conference organised jointly by 
AAM and UNA [United Nations Association]…called on the British 
Government to initiate a resolution in the Security Council demanding all-
embracing sanctions.”150 
 
Further to this the AAM put out several press releases in an attempt to keep the public 
informed of events surrounding the talks. Socialist Commentary, a prominent labour 
movement publication, was surprisingly quiet on the issue, despite running numerous 
articles on Rhodesia before and after the time of the talks. All of these articles deal in 
quite general, and not unfavourable, terms with the British Government’s response to 
the situation, but not one of them explicitly mentions Tiger.  
 
The momentum from Tiger-related activity carried forward into the early part of the 
following year. In January 1967, the AAM organised a joint letter to Harold Wilson, co-
signed by the MCF and the UNA “urging that the Government cooperate with the UN in 
securing compliance with the Security Council’s sanctions resolution.”151 However, 
such activities did not last long. Windrich makes the point that the economic situation 
in Britain was critical in 1967, “and this preoccupation overshadowed the Rhodesian 
situation for most of the year”.152 This point is reinforced by the lack of TUC 
discussion of the Rhodesia issue at its 1967 Congress, in comparison to the previous 
year. The TUC General Council had discussed the issue in February and decided to 
take no action on Rhodesia, and this position was reinforced at the Congress in 
September.153 Advocacy organisations continued to discuss Rhodesia and what should 
be done about the enduring situation there, but there was a notable lack of decisive 
action.154 
 
The end of 1967 saw the creation of a new pressure group, called the Movement for 
Democracy in Rhodesia, the motivation behind this stemming from an AAM meeting 
on Rhodesia. The organisation described its creation and aims in a letter to the AAM: 
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 The decision to form an organisation specifically concerned with Rhodesia 
is prompted by the need to focus on the activity of individuals with 
personal experience of, or particular interest in the Rhodesian part of the 
Southern African political scene. Representatives of ZAPU and ZANU have 
expressed their approval of our undertaking. We envisage our Movement as 
a pressure group; it will be concerned with the collection of, commentary 
on and dissemination of information on Rhodesia, particularly to members 
of Parliament, civil servants, journalists and broadcasters; it will also serve 
members of the public who respond to our projected announcement of the 
movement through the press.155 
 
It is questionable how active or effective this group was as an organisation. This is 
evidenced through the lack of sources relating to the organisation, illustrating their 
lack of impact in terms of direct action or media awareness. Windrich’s argument 
about the primacy of the economic situation in Britain during this period seems to 
hold true, and its effect in reducing interest in the Rhodesia issue is clear even 
amongst the broader labour movement and advocacy organisations. 
 
The Africa Bureau produced two memoranda on Rhodesia, which heralded a 
resurgence of interest in the topic in the middle of 1968. The first of these condemned 
the incursion of South African forces into Rhodesia, “and their active support of the 
illegal regime”. It also bemoaned the inefficacy of sanctions, what the organisation saw 
as the process of Rhodesia becoming a police state, and argued that although the 
British planned to use force only in the event of a breakdown in law and order, law 
and order should be distinguished from justice. This point, essentially advocating 
some form of military intervention, was supported by the argument that “sanctions 
must fail unless there is to be a confrontation with South Africa. But South Africa 
would not, in the judgement of the Bureau, commit herself to challenging physical 
British intervention, alone or through the UN”.156 
 
The second Africa Bureau memo concerned mounting pressure on Zambia. It 
discussed the South African threats that unless freedom fighters were prevented from 
using Zambian land for incursions into Rhodesia, South Africa would intervene 
militarily. The memo praise the British Government for its Security Council initiative 
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to “extend sanctions and make them more effective”, but calls for the establishment of 
some kind of international policing mechanism.157 Whilst 1967 and the early part of 
1968 were very quiet in terms of advocacy activity, this period saw clearer opinions 
established on key issues such as sanctions. It became increasingly clear to the Africa 
Bureau that this policy alone was ineffective, adding weight to the mounting critique 
of the British Government’s sanctions policy. The second memo was more obviously in 
response to the increasingly precarious situation in which Zambia found itself, and the 
menacing actions of South Africa. 
 
Also in mid-1968, the Labour Party NEC discussed the findings of the Whaley 
Commission, which had been established the previous year to examine the provisions 
of the Rhodesian Constitution, and “to advise the Government of Rhodesia on the 
constitutional framework which is best suited to the sovereign independent status of 
Rhodesia”.158 Windrich characterises this endeavour as a tactic used by Smith to try 
and ward off dissent from within his own party, and states that the report of the 
Whaley commission paradoxically met none of the Six Principles, yet was rejected by 
most of the Rhodesian Front for being too liberal.159 The Whaley Commission seems to 
have gone almost entirely unheeded by advocacy organisations or the labour 
movement. There is no coverage of it amongst labour publications, and very little 
mainstream media coverage. This is because it was viewed as unthreatening in terms 
of its potential to further harm the African population. It did not involve Britain, who 
was viewed by advocacy organisations as a key power broker, and in this sense the 
Whaley Commission was far less obvious as a target than the various rounds of 
settlement talks. 
 
From this point onwards, there was a surge of interest in the Rhodesia issue, 
precipitated by the impending Fearless negotiations. Following the talks themselves, 
held on HMS Fearless from 9th to 13th October, 1968, Smith took the draft proposals 
back to Rhodesia to consult with his cabinet on the issue. George Thomson, then 
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Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, flew out to Salisbury in November for 
further talks with Smith, but these broke down. There were purportedly several 
points on which the Rhodesian Front found the new proposals unacceptable, and 
taken together these amounted to the conclusion that the regime simply was not 
ready to negotiate along the lines of the Six Principles.160 The AAM organised a series 
of meetings across the country in response to the Fearless negotiations, concerned 
that these might lead to a sell-out, and result in Wilson reneging on his earlier pledge 
of no independence before majority rule.161  
 
Conversely, the announcement of the Government’s plans to convene the Fearless 
talks prompted fear amongst the British Council of Churches (BCC) over the 
possibility of involving itself in any potentially controversial statements of opinion. 
The BCC’s President, Maurice Chandler, in writing to its General Secretary, Kenneth 
Sansbury, stated that: 
I hope the BCC will not think it necessary to pass resolutions while 
negotiations may be pending. There is really no need for the BCC to keep up 
a kind of commentary on current political events. The resolution which had 
been suggested concerning African participation in a settlement was an 
entirely good one, though I thought it was silly to include offering the good 
offices of the BCC to help in creating contact between Africans and others. It 
is really ludicrous for the BCC to propose its good offices in that way, and in 
any case such a resolution would be regarded as the Archbishop of 
Canterbury interfering and offering to take part in the negotiations which 
would be pretty silly. I am sure, however, that you are well aware of all 
these considerations.162 
 
Whilst this is the opposite of the phenomena being explored here, it is nonetheless 
demonstrative of the broader point this chapter makes, since it shows an immediate 
and clear response to a key event in the Rhodesia timeline. 
 
The labour movement were also roused into action by Fearless; there was clear 
concern and disagreement at the Labour Party’s October 1968 conference. This 
concern stemmed from a perception that Smith was unlikely to settle without 
unacceptable concessions being offered by the British, since the Tiger proposals had, 
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to many people, already gone too far and still been rejected.163 However, whilst 
concern over Rhodesia was clearly growing, the main potential troublemakers in the 
party had been co-opted into Government: 
It was no longer a case of a few rebels who could be dismissed as 
representatives of the party’s ‘Africa lobby’, such as Mr Alexander Lyon or 
Miss Joan Lestor. But the obvious leadership for a rebellion against Mr 
Wilson’s policy – those members who had fought for African majority rule 
over the previous decade – had been co-opted into the Government, either 
directly responsible for Rhodesian policy (such as Mr Thomson and Mr 
Foley) or preoccupied with their own Ministries and also bound by 
collective responsibility (such as Mrs Castle, Mr Anthony Greenwood, Mr 
Callaghan and Mr Healey, the latter two having served as Opposition 
spokesmen on colonial affairs).164 
 
A resolution adopted at conference restated a commitment to the principle of 
NIBMAR, urged the Government to acknowledge its “continuing responsibility to 
Rhodesia…until majority rule is established”, and instructed the NEC to initiate a 
national campaign to raise funds “to provide educational and financial assistance for 
Rhodesian Africans so that they may be better able to assume positions of 
responsibility in Rhodesia when the illegal Smith regime is replaced”.165 This 
resolution was demonstrative of increased awareness of, and interest in, Rhodesia 
surrounding renewed settlement negotiations. It also illustrated the negative impact 
the Smith regime had on equality of access to education; an obvious tactic for 
maintaining the status quo. 
 
A more visible example of labour movement activity surrounding this latest round of 
negotiations was the notable increase in CLP resolutions submitted to the NEC for the 
months of November and, even more obviously, December. This delay was 
attributable to CLPs wanting to wait for the conference and the negotiations to occur 
before submitting their responses. For November, the resolutions generally set out 
concern over the upcoming talks, and dissatisfaction at the sense that broader Labour 
Party voices were not being listened to by the party elite.166 In December, there were 
six pages of CLP resolutions submitted to the NEC. Many of these were clearly 
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submitted prior to George Thomson’s return, and the formal dismissal of the Fearless 
proposals, as they expressed concern at the Government’s terms of negotiation with 
the Smith regime. Lots of the other resolutions were very similar in content to the 
following, from Tonbridge CLP, which “seeks information on the action being taken by 
the NEC towards implementing the resolution on Rhodesia, adopted at this year’s 
Annual Conference”.167 This burst in CLP activity shows the level of concern 
surrounding the highly publicised second round of official negotiations with the Smith 
regime, and the tensions within the Labour Party between the policy of its leadership 
and the sentiments of the rank and file. This issue will be further explored in Chapter 
4. 
 
The AAM followed up on the Labour Party Conference by writing to local and 
constituency Labour Parties with suggested texts of resolutions to be sent to the 
Prime Minister, the NEC and the press, regarding possible outcomes of the Fearless 
talks. The first resolution, in the event of a settlement as a result of the talks, 
essentially deplored the outcome and the sell-out of the Government in failing to stick 
to the Six Principles. It culminates in the clear statement that “This Labour 
Party…finds itself totally unable to support this repudiation both of principle and 
moral justice”. The other resolution, to be sent out in the event of a failure of Fearless, 
implored the Government not to “undertake any further humiliating and discreditable 
negotiations with the illegal regime in defiance of its obligations to the majority 
people of Rhodesia and its promises to the Commonwealth, the United Nations and 
the people of this country”.168 
 
The United Nations Student Association (UNSA), in conjunction with other 
organisations, such as the London branch of the Zimbabwe Students’ Union (ZSU), 
organised a torchlight vigil to coincide with the three year anniversary of UDI. The 
organizers of this event tried to get broader involvement in this, in order to help raise 
a higher profile for the event and the Rhodesia issue more generally. For example 
Gillian Walker, General Secretary of the UNSA, wrote to Andrew Faulds MP asking him 
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to participate, or failing that to donate to the event in order to light a candle in his 
name, and asking for a prompt reply for “organization and press purposes”.169 It is a 
good example of organizations responding to an emotive date in the Rhodesia 
calendar to draw support for campaigning and further attention to the issue, at a time 
when interest could have waned immediately following the breakdown of the Fearless 
negotiations. 
Post-Fearless, 1969-71 
In early 1969, the AAM organized a torchlight vigil to coincide with the 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers Meeting, held 6-7th January. Evidence of this event is 
found in a letter from the AAM to Idris Cox of the CPGB, but on this basis presumably 
other sympathetic organizations, both advocacy and political would have been invited 
to it.170 It is not clear exactly what the AAM was seeking from this event, but the letter 
does state that the emphasis was to be on NIBMAR. This meant encouraging the 
Government to maintain its often questionable commitment to this principle, and 
demonstrate this to the other Commonwealth countries.  
 
In February 1969, the Smith regime announced that it would hold a constitutional 
referendum in May of the same year. These proposals cemented the Labour 
Government’s claim that its attempts to forge a settlement were perpetually 
frustrated by the obduracy of the Smith regime. When overwhelming support was 
demonstrated in Rhodesia for the new constitution, amongst those allowed a say, 
Smith famously claimed that it would “sound the death knell of majority rule in 
Rhodesia”.171 The Labour Government stated that this new constitution could never 
be the basis of a settlement, and that it was no longer possible to hold any productive 
dialogue with the Smith regime. It is perhaps surprising that there seems to have been 
very little response to the planning and implementation of these constitutional plans 
amongst UK based advocacy organisations or the broader labour movement, but then 
it was not a situation in which the British Government could take any decisive action 
either to please or dissatisfy the pro-African nationalist lobby. 
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As a result of the AAM’s eagerness to involve the British labour movement in its 
campaigning on Rhodesia, which will be discussed at length in the next chapter, it 
organised a “Conference of Trade Unionists on Southern Africa”, held in late April, 
1969. A lengthy resolution was adopted, without opposition, urging trade unions to 
end any investment in South African firms, preventing the emigration of workers to 
southern Africa, pledging support for the AAM and the Defence and Aid Fund and 
generally condemning the ongoing situation of racial oppression. Whilst it seems like 
an odd time for this conference to have been held, as aside from Smith’s constitutional 
machinations, the situation was relatively quiet at this time, it can be understood in 
terms of it having taken time to organise, and therefore being a belated response to 
earlier key events such as the Fearless negotiations. 
 
A resolution was passed at the 1969 Labour Party Conference expressing anger at the 
new constitution ushered in by the Smith regime. It advocated the implementation of 
stronger sanctions “in the knowledge that the use of force is unrealistic”.172 In light of 
this it called on the Government to “bring before the Security Council proposals for 
stronger mandatory sanctions and…asks the ILO and the World Federation of Trade 
Unions to call upon trade unionists to assist in implementing sanctions”.173 Also of 
interest are the drafts of two resolutions not reached, and remitted to the NEC, both 
more extreme in implication. The first of these asked the Government to “seek the 
agreement of the United Nations to take over the territory until a democratically 
elected Government takes over”. The second resolution set forth the view that, due to 
Mozambiquan and South African intransigence, sanctions would never succeed, and 
therefore any means available should be used, including force, “to end the regime and 
to give moral and practical assistance to the African people struggling for their 
freedom.” 174 It is worth clarifying that Mozambique was unwilling to cooperate at this 
point because it was still under the control of the right-wing Salazar regime, 
sympathetic to the Smith regime. 
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These resolutions are instructive of two key points. First, they demonstrated the 
broader labour movement making a response to the Rhodesian situation, not 
immediately as events unfolded, as the new constitution had been declared much 
earlier that year, but rather when there was a clear forum to do so in terms of the 
Party structure. Second, the resolutions demonstrated a division in views amongst the 
Labour Party as a whole, with its leadership ensuring that the more radical views of 
the grass roots were toned down so as not to compromise the Government’s long 
standing stance on Rhodesia.  
 
In early 1970, the Africa Bureau discussed the situation in Rhodesia as follows: 
This is the fifth year of UDI and no solution is in sight. Many western 
business interests have been involved in breaking sanctions and would 
dearly like to be able to resume open trading with Rhodesia….It therefore 
becomes more necessary than ever for those in Britain who wish to see the 
establishment of a more just society in Rhodesia to urge the Government to 
take really effective action against the rebel regime.175 
 
This is another example of an organisation responding to an anniversary, of sorts, in 
the Rhodesia timeline, rather than to some explicit event, which seemed to become a 
tactic when there were no newsworthy events to respond to. Whilst the above 
statement called for continued pressure on the British Government, and suggested 
that this was every bit as important as at any earlier stage in the situation, there is 
little evidence of further advocacy or labour movement led activity for much of this 
year. 
 
At a Security Council session in March 1970, the Labour Party used their first veto on 
the Rhodesian issue, purportedly because the resolution included strong criticism 
against Britain failing to use force, and called for sanctions on South Africa and 
Portugal. The compromise resolution included “a number of practical and effective 
measures to increase the pressure on the illegal regime”.176 After implementation of 
the 1969 constitution, the Labour Party maintained a boycott of the Smith regime, 
which helped it to regain the support of the labour movement by the conference in 
1970. 
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In June 1970, Labour lost a general election to the Conservatives, led by Edward 
Heath. The Rhodesia issue did not feature heavily in the election campaign, as it was of 
low electoral concern, reflective of a general lack of interest around this time, since 
there had been very little activity on it since the rejection of the Fearless negotiations. 
The Conservatives did try to set out an alternative Rhodesia policy, but this was not 
possible as Labour had already tested the boundaries of acceptability in their previous 
attempt at settlement.177  
 
In response to a Labour Party conference resolution of this year, the MCF wrote to the 
Labour Party, in an attempt to extract some specific information on aid to the 
liberation movements: 
I hope that the NEC are to examine what material aid can be given to the 
freedom movements and, bearing in mind that reservations are expressed 
from the platform, I trust that an early opportunity will be taken to decide 
exactly what kind of material aid will be made available. If the NEC are to 
set up a special sub-committee (perhaps involving people co-opted from 
outside the NEC) to make a detailed study, I would be very pleased to offer 
my services.178 
 
This letter received a brief reply, thanking the MCF and saying that the November 
meeting of the NEC would be discussing the implementation of the conference 
resolution.179 
 
In response to fear that the Conservative Government would seek further negotiations 
with the Smith regime, as set out in their pre-election pledge on Rhodesia, the Africa 
Bureau wrote, in January of 1971, that: 
Britain’s best interest will be damaged by any settlement of the Rhodesia 
question based upon a compromise designed to relieve the Government of 
embarrassment. Despite six years of UDI Britain must not opt out of her 
responsibility. No settlement should be contemplated that does not accord 
equal justice to all the people of Rhodesia.180 
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Sure enough, later that same year, the Conservatives announced their plans for further 
talks with Rhodesia, which precipitated a wave of activity on the issue. 
 
The Labour Party was staunchly opposed to any such talks on the grounds that they 
represented a tacit acceptance of the 1969 constitution. The Government also 
encountered opposition from the UN181 and the Commonwealth,182 not least because 
of its decision to resume the sale of arms to South Africa even in light of continued 
South African military support for the Smith regime. The Government played a 
difficult game with the Rhodesia issue at this time. Negotiations were not going 
particularly well and sanctions were up for renewal again in November. In order to 
prolong talks and so put off disagreement within the Tory party over the sanctions 
issue, the Foreign Secretary, Douglas-Home, went to Salisbury himself. This had the 
desired effect, and sanctions renewal went unchallenged.183 The decision to reopen 
negotiations was also condemned by the labour movement. At the 1971 TUC 
conference in Blackpool, resolutions were passed stating that the TUC “deplores the 
Government’s intention to resume talks with the illegal regime in Rhodesia” and that 
“Congress calls upon the General Council to press positive measures to strengthen 
trade union opposition to these regimes”.184 
Renewed negotiations, 1971-72 
Moves towards a settlement, or at least moves towards renewed negotiations, sparked 
a flurry of media attention on Rhodesia, and on the talks themselves. Labour Weekly 
carried various articles tracking the progress of the talks and the Pearce Commission, 
and mainstream newspapers were active in reporting the progress of these as well. In 
‘The Long Search for a Rhodesian Settlement’, an unspecified Labour Weekly reporter 
outlined the lead up to, and progress of, negotiations throughout 1971, and dealt with 
issues such as divisions in the Conservative Party over how to handle the Rhodesian 
situation. There are other articles in the same edition dealing with the Six Principles 
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and their bearing on the present talks, and a comment piece on the incompatibility of 
Britain’s aims in reaching a settlement with those of the Smith regime.185 
 
Agreement between Douglas-Home and Smith was signed on 24/11/1971, with 
provisions in place for a test of opinion. There was an initial wave of optimism 
surrounding this agreement, within the British Government, which “was soon 
dispelled by the mounting opposition, most of all in Rhodesia itself, but also in Britain 
and throughout the world community, as the full implications of the arrangement 
were realised.”186 As the details of the agreement came to light it became apparent 
that in reality it represented “a virtual abandonment of African interests and a victory 
for the racialist dogma embodied in the Rhodesian Front’s 1969 ‘Constitution’”.187 The 
Africa Bureau put out a press release which concluded that the proposals did not 
satisfy the Six Principles, the Smith regime could not be trusted to do as it said, it 
would not be possible to accurately test African opinion, and that only negotiations 
that involved the nationalists could lead to a fair settlement.188 
 
In response to the agreement, the November edition of Labour Weekly reported on the 
intention of the Labour Party to send a four man mission to Rhodesia to informally 
gather opinions on the settlement proposals from a representative section of 
Rhodesian society, including detained nationalist leaders. This visit was to include 
Denis Healey, Joan Lestor, Tom McNally and Joe Gormley.189 The Guardian also 
followed up on this story, including details of an emergency resolution drafted by Joe 
Gormley and passed unanimously by the NEC, reaffirming Party commitment to the 
five principles and expressing “grave foreboding” at the agreement signed between 
Douglas-Home and Smith.190 This flurry of media attention and responses from the 
Labour Party and other organisations demonstrates a clear clustering of interest in 
the Rhodesia issue around a very specific and important event.  
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Of particular interest in considering responses to the proposed Home-Smith 
agreement was the formation of two new advocacy groups; the Rhodesia Emergency 
Campaign Committee (RECC) and the Justice for Rhodesia campaign. The purpose of 
the RECC was initially “to organise a massive, broadly based demonstration” in 
opposition to the Home-Smith settlement proposals.191 A document from the early 
days of the RECC provides a four page list of organisations and individuals to be 
invited to a meeting to encourage involvement in the new organisation (see Appendix 
1). It includes trade unions, MPs, student organisations and various publications.192 In 
a letter to Harold Wilson, the Justice for Rhodesia campaign was described as being 
established to “oppose the settlement, to call for the continuation and intensification 
of sanctions and to insist on the right of African self-determination.”193 The 
establishment of these two organisations, alongside the attention given to Rhodesia in 
the press and left wing publications at this time, strengthens the argument that 
interest in the Rhodesia issue fluctuated over time, and that peaks of interest and 
activity were concurrent with key events such as settlement negotiations. 
 
Towards the end of the year, mounting anger surrounding the settlement proposals 
became increasingly apparent. A UN General Assembly resolution rejected the Home-
Smith proposals, on the grounds that they were “contrary to the 1960 Declaration on 
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples”. In the Security 
Council, there were attempts to pass a resolution calling on “appropriate measures to 
be taken to enable the people of Zimbabwe to exercise self-determination”, but this 
was vetoed by Britain.194 The National Organisation of Labour Students also wrote a 
strongly worded letter to Harry Nicholas, the Labour Party general secretary on an 
emergency resolution passed at their inaugural conference: 
The National Organisation of Labour Students condemns any attempt to 
solve the Rhodesian question except by immediate majority rule upon the 
strictest principle of one man, one vote, together with the repeal of all 
discriminatory legislation and an immediate programme of education for 
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all; therefore, Conference condemns especially the terms negotiated by the 
Tory Government, and calls upon the Labour Movement to support in every 
way the armed struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe.195 
 
Titles of articles on Rhodesia in Labour Weekly also became increasingly dramatic: 
‘Rhodesia sell-out’; ‘Now the threat of bloodshed’; ‘Anger mounts against Rhodesia 
commission’ and ‘Rhodesian deal a ‘transparent farrago’.196 
 
In January 1972, the meeting minutes of various organisations detail the fervent 
discussion of the ongoing situation in Rhodesia. The RECC, the TUAG of the AAM and 
Justice for Rhodesia were all active in the early part of 1972 in response to the 
ongoing potential for a sell-out to the Smith regime.197 The Justice for Rhodesia 
campaign was particularly active, sending out a leaflet about the settlement proposals, 
and the problems with these, as the organisation saw them. They also held a meeting 
at Westminster Hall, addressed by representatives of various interests in the Rhodesia 
issue, including Lord Caradon who set out the case for a negotiated solution to the 
situation, as per the Government’s plan with the current settlement proposals. The 
Justice for Rhodesia campaign also produced a second leaflet outlining what policy on 
Rhodesia should be going forward. The aim was to “have the leaflet widely distributed 
before the Pearce Report is published, so as to have helped influence the debate on 
future policy”.198 
 
Some parts of the labour movement also became more vocal over Rhodesia pending 
this latest threat of a sell-out. The London Co-operative Society’s Political Committee 
passed the following resolution from the Staines Co-operative Party at their AGM: 
noting the repressive measures taken by Smith’s illegal regime in Rhodesia 
and the clear evidence of the opposition by the African people against the 
Home-Smith proposals calls upon the Labour, Co-operative and Trade 
Union movement to actively campaign against these proposals and to insist 
on the continuance and strengthening of the United Nations sanctions 
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against this inhuman, illegal and racialist regime of terror against people 
who want only elementary human rights.199 
 
This was accompanied by a flurry of CLP and trade union resolutions on Rhodesia, and 
specifically relating to the Pearce Commission around this time. 
 
The Justice for Rhodesia Campaign very clearly planned its activities based on what 
was occurring in Rhodesia at the time. In a document summarising its activities, the 
organisation outlined how it shifted its focus according to the progress of the Pearce 
Commission, and once African opinion had begun to make itself clearly heard, which 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6, they shifted focus to consider how best to 
lobby for positive Rhodesia policy after Pearce. The RECC also planned its activities to 
coincide with specific parts of the settlement proposals, organising a march followed 
by a rally when the commissioners were in Rhodesia conducting their enquiries.200 
They also organised and held “a constant daily vigil” outside the building that was to 
operate as the Pearce Commission’s London headquarters, and be the site of hearings 
once the commissioners returned from Rhodesia.201 This is a very specific example of 
activity not only coalescing around key events in the Rhodesia timeline, but of 
organisations specifically tailoring their events around the form of settlement 
negotiations. It also illustrates how seriously the Pearce Commission was taken by 
advocacy organisations working on Rhodesia as a potential avenue to independence 
on an unacceptable basis. 
 
In March 1972, the AAM organised a conference on southern Africa for trade unions, 
aimed at promoting their work and raising awareness of these issues amongst trade 
unionists. One of the key aims of this event was to highlight Britain’s links with the 
situation in southern Africa, and make suggestions as to what trade unions could do to 
oppose these links. The conference also sought to highlight the role of organised 
labour in the political structure of southern Africa at that time. Notes on this event 
recognise that “there was a lack of representatives from blue collar unions and in 
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general the attendance reflected the unions in which the [Anti-Apartheid] Movement 
has been most active”.202 Whilst this event was not principally organised to deal with 
the Pearce Commission and the latest moves towards settlement, the prominence of 
this issue no doubt played a hand in prompting the AAM to put together such a 
conference, and in encouraging trade unionists to attend. This period will be explored 
in more detail in Chapter 6. 
 
The official results of the Pearce Commission were announced on 23/05/1972, but 
there was already a broad awareness in both Britain and Rhodesia that the proposals 
had been firmly rejected by a majority of the Rhodesian population. Windrich 
characterises the outcome as a turning point in the Rhodesia issue, in that for the first 
time, it became broadly accepted that for any future settlement negotiations to be 
successful, representatives of the African population would have to be included. This 
will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 6. For now it is sufficient to highlight that 
once these results had been formally announced, there was a notable drop in activity 
from advocacy organisations, the labour movement and the press with regards to 
Rhodesia, because the immediate threat of a sell-out had passed, and it was broadly 
felt that the Commission had, surprisingly, identified the correct verdict. 
 
In September 1972 at the TUC Congress, the following motion on Rhodesia was 
carried:  
Congress rejects any settlement which grants independence to Rhodesia 
before majority rule. Congress calls upon the Labour Movement to intensify 
the campaign to compel the Government and the United Nations to strictly 
apply the economic sanctions against the illegal regime. Congress requests 
all members of affiliated Unions to desist from emigrating to, or otherwise 
assisting, Rhodesia. Congress acknowledges the positive lead provided to 
the Trade Union and Labour Movement by the 1971 Congress resolution 
concerning apartheid and Southern Africa.203 
 
It was proposed by the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), and seconded by 
ASLEF, which had a history of engagement on the Rhodesia issue. This is 
demonstrative of persistence in labour movement interest in the Rhodesia issue that 
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simply was not present prior to the Conservative Government’s attempts at 
settlement, and the ensuing Pearce Commission. 
 
Post-Pearce, 1973-76 
Despite their outright rejection, the British Government formally left the Pearce 
proposals open, just as the former Labour Government had done with the Fearless 
proposals several years earlier. A 1973 Justice for Rhodesia press statement makes 
reference to this. It reiterates the organisation’s objectives as being: 
“1 To ensure that Britain fulfils its constitutional, moral and historical 
obligations towards the people of Rhodesia; 
2 To persuade Britain to exert its authority in Rhodesia in recognition of 
the findings of the Pearce Commission; so that 
a)  the illegal regime is replaced by a popularly elected government; 
b) there can be no cause or opportunity for outside powers, and 
particularly South Africa, to usurp Britain’s authority” 204 
 
The statement goes on to say that the campaign will be focusing on securing the 
withdrawal of the settlement proposals, policing sanctions, securing the release of 
political prisoners and ensuring future negotiations are inclusive. 
 
Throughout 1973, with assistance in publishing from the Africa Bureau, the Justice for 
Rhodesia campaign put out Newsbrief Rhodesia ‘73, a regular publication dealing with 
developments in Rhodesia, and the political handling of the issue in Britain. The first 
edition of this was put out in February 1973. It contained a story on Ian Smith’s 
political situation in Rhodesia, updates on the guerrilla war, details about new 
repressive legislation being ushered in by the Rhodesian Front and various other 
related stories.205 Whilst the initiation of such a publication does not directly tally 
with events in the Rhodesia timeline, 1973 being far quieter than the previous year, it 
can be seen as a delayed response to earlier activities. The Justice for Rhodesia 
campaign was only established a year previously, in direct response to the perceived 
threat posed by the Pearce Commission. Organisationally, it could not have put out a 
publication of such detail and scope in the early part of 1972 since it was only just 
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establishing itself and beginning to raise funds; some resources were required to put 
together such a publication. It seems clear that Newsbrief Rhodesia ‘73 emerged when 
it did in response to a lingering fear that the Conservative Government would try to 
reopen lines of communication with the Smith regime and try to resurrect the 
proposals that had been so firmly rejected the year before. 
 
In March 1973, a second trade union conference on Southern Africa was held, again 
organised by the AAM.  This was a similar event to the one discussed above, providing 
information and discussions on the situation in southern Africa, and outlining what 
could be done to help.206 Aside from this, and the continued publication of Newsbrief 
Rhodesia ‘73, the year remained quiet. However, Windrich notes that the Labour Party 
had begun to take “a more militant line” on such issues, since being in opposition. It 
began to take the liberation movements more seriously, and whilst some financial 
assistance had been provided under the auspices of the Rhodesia Fund for 
humanitarian purposes, other funding was starting to be considered. 
 
Towards the end of 1973, the Smith regime had begun to hold tentative talks with the 
ANC, of which the other nationalist organisations were sceptical. Labour returned to 
power in March 1974, following Heath’s resignation. This was as a result of his failure 
to form a coalition with the Liberals after the general election produced a hung 
parliament. At this point, there was no pressing need to act over Rhodesia, since the 
Conservatives had failed to make any progress on the issue, and the Rhodesian Front-
ANC talks were still in progress. This was compounded by Labour’s position as a 
minority Government. The ANC talks broke down, partly influenced by the overthrow 
of Portugal’s dictatorship. This was significant in that it established another 
neighbouring state, Mozambique, with a long common border in the east of Rhodesia, 
sympathetic to the nationalist movement. This strengthened the position of the 
guerrilla efforts, and further stretched the Rhodesia Front troops. This led the ANC to 
believe that it could hold out for a better deal. 
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In April 1975 the Africa Bureau wrote to Harold Wilson prior to the Commonwealth 
heads of government meeting. The purpose of the letter was to set out suggestions on 
the handling of the Rhodesia issue, such as establishing some form of future leaders 
training programme, in order to pave the way for independence.207 In June of the 
same year, the Birmingham Campaign for Justice in Zimbabwe and the Birmingham 
AAM wrote to local and constituency Labour Parties, asking them in turn to write to 
the Foreign Office and prepare resolutions for the Labour Party national conference to 
prevent any sell-out in Zimbabwe.208 This was in response to talks between the newly 
formed UANC, formed as a result of the Lusaka Declaration the previous year and the 
Labour Party. 
 
At the AAM AGM in October of the previous year (1974), it was decided that action on 
Rhodesia should be intensified, and a motion was passed to this effect.  As a result of 
this motion, the Zimbabwe Working Group (ZWG) was established as an interim 
measure before a Zimbabwe Support Group could be set up. It was decided that the 
ZWG would concentrate its attention on Britain and more specifically, because of the 
pace of development, on NIBMAR. This gave a simple unified point of action. At the 
first meeting of this organisation in April 1975, it was agreed that they should work on 
getting the Labour Government to support NIBMAR and encourage the UN and Britain 
to press Mozambique to enforce sanctions.209 
 
Later on in the year, the AAM sent out information on the trials of several nationalists 
to local trades councils, and other organisations of the labour movement. In a 
response to one of these letters, the Westminster Trades Council wrote “I have made 
contact with a number of members and affiliated Branches about the vigil and picket 
though I am sure you will understand that it is difficult to mobilise people at this time 
of year”, and stating that their organisation also sent a letter to the Secretary of State 
asking what proposed steps there are with regards to the trials.210 This kind of activity 
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was directly in response to events in Rhodesia, such as the aforementioned talks, and 
their coverage in the British media. 
 
In October, in response to further trials and executions of African nationalists, the 
AAM put out a pamphlet providing an update on the situation, and advertising a rally 
and march to be held the following month.211 This event was organised to coincide, as 
closely as possible, with the tenth anniversary of UDI. The pamphlet goes on to 
provide a brief overview of the situation as it had unfolded since UDI, and as it stood 
at the time of writing. This shows a response to two different potentially mobilising 
factors; an anniversary of an important date and actions perpetrated by the Smith 
regime that received British media attention and were shocking to members of the 
British public. 
 
Faced with the increasing pressure of the guerrilla war, the Smith regime began to 
hold tentative talks with Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU in late 1975, and these continued on 
into 1976. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these talks eventually broke down. With the war 
gathering pace, Smith made a direct appeal to Britain for help in resolving the conflict 
and establishing some kind of settlement agreement. In response to this, Britain 
drafted proposals setting out a transition to majority rule, for which Kissinger pledged 
American support. Stedman writes that the “United States belatedly “discovered” the 
liberation struggle [in Rhodesia] in April 1976 when Henry Kissinger toured Southern 
Africa and signalled U.S. desire to help reach a settlement in Rhodesia”.212 
 
In the minutes of the January meeting of the ZWG, two particularly salient issues are 
discussed, which highlight the organisation following and responding closely to 
specific events in Rhodesia. The minutes provide news on hangings in Rhodesia 
which, as discussed earlier, often formed a point of mobilisation for advocacy 
organisations. The group also discussed the British South Africa Police’s (BSAP), the 
infamous Rhodesian police force, affiliation to the International Police Association, 
which was based in England. This is interesting, because it demonstrates the 
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organisation exploring issues that may have more resonance amongst the people with 
whom they were trying to expand their support base. This issue will be discussed in 
greater detail in the following chapter. 
From the Kissinger initiative to Lancaster House, 1976-1980 
In mid-September 1976 Kissinger led a peace mission to southern Africa. This 
followed on from a visit earlier in the year to pledge American support. This became 
known as the Kissinger initiative. It culminated in Smith agreeing to a set of proposals, 
which set out a two year transition to majority rule, although he later reneged on this 
agreement by redefining majority rule as ‘responsible rule’. It was also later revealed 
that the proposals put forward by Kissinger had not been cleared by the African 
Presidents. He was supposed to offer the Callaghan proposals from the previous year, 
but believing that these would be rejected, he offered a variation on these that he 
thought would be more acceptable to Smith. 
 
In October, the AAM wrote to Callaghan about military technology captured from 
Rhodesian Forces being of British origin, but manufactured under licence in South 
Africa, in order to circumvent sanctions.  There is no archival record of a reply to this 
letter, or of the AAM publicising the fact in a press release, pamphlet or other kind of 
publication. Whilst there was no public follow up on this issue, it is still indicative of 
action being in response to new information coming to light, comparable to earlier 
discussed responses to things like the trials of nationalists, or settlement talks. 
 
In the same month, the AAM released a statement, entitled ‘The Future of Zimbabwe’, 
which outlined the situation as it stood at the time of writing, and discussed the 
Kissinger initiative. A section of text from the early part of this statement reinforces 
the argument being set out in this chapter: 
The recent developments relating to the future of Zimbabwe require an 
urgent response by the members and supporters of the Anti-Apartheid 
movement and a reaffirmation of their commitment to the cause of 
liberation in Zimbabwe and the armed struggle. 213 
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The statement goes on to detail the problems with the Kissinger proposals, to call on 
the British people to actively support the liberation struggle and to maintain pressure 
on the British Government to “ensure that any constitutional conference is held on a 
basis acceptable to the people of Zimbabwe”. This is an ideal example of an 
organisation using a key event, namely the Kissinger initiative, and the publicity 
surrounding this to try and bolster support for its campaigns and the African 
nationalist movement, and to maintain pressure on the British Government. 
 
Another key development in 1976 was the formation of the Patriotic Front. This 
happened as a result of the Geneva Conference, which was convened to discuss the 
Kissinger proposals. The Front Line States214 played an important role here, 
encouraging the formation of the Patriotic Front so that the liberation movement 
would present a unified face. Surprisingly, this development received little advocacy 
attention, but this is perhaps due to it being overshadowed by concern around the 
Kissinger proposals themselves, as discussed earlier, and also due to earlier attempts 
at unity in the nationalist movement being short lived and ultimately insignificant. 
Meredith notes that the establishment of the Patriotic Front was an uneasy accord 
between Mugabe, the “dedicated socialist intent on establishing in Rhodesia a new 
order which would, as he put it, ‘assault capitalist and bourgeois tendencies’” and 
Nkomo, who embodied both.215 It took a week of secret talks for the pair to reach 
agreement, which was announced on 9th October, 1976.  
 
In May 1977, with further African nationalists facing death sentences from the 
increasingly desperate Smith regime, the AAM began a letter writing campaign. They 
drafted a letter, which was sent out to various affiliated and sympathetic 
organisations, such as the London Co-operative Society and the CPGB, to be sent on to 
Callaghan in order to put pressure on the Labour Government. This letter stated that: 
We are writing out of concern for the many Zimbabweans who have been 
sentenced to death for opposing the Smith regime…Past efforts by the 
British Government to stop these executions have proved to be ineffective. 
Since the United Kingdom is the legal authority in Southern Rhodesia we 
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believe that Her Majesty’s Government should publicly declare that these 
executions are illegal and therefore amount to murder.216 
 
Whilst this was not one particular event, it was a continuation of earlier events in 
Rhodesia which received a reasonable amount of media attention, and also a subject 
that was very emotive and therefore easy to mobilise around people around. The AAM 
had been active on this issue previously, so they were able to reinstate an earlier 
campaign, with renewed vigour due to the latest developments in the situation. 
Towards the end of the year, the AAM also organised a ‘Zimbabwe in Struggle’ 
solidarity day.217 It is not clear that this event was planned to coincide with or 
respond to any particular events in Rhodesia. It is more probable that it was simply a 
response to a dearth in activity in Rhodesia campaigning during the year. 
 
In 1978, in response to the increasing pressure of the ever encroaching guerrilla war, 
the Rhodesian Government decided to pursue a settlement without involving external 
powers. To this end, Smith held talks with Bishop Muzorewa, who was a longstanding 
nonviolent campaigner against the regime, and they reached an agreement, known as 
the internal settlement.  This set out a timetable for holding elections, including 
African parties in the process, albeit still excluding ZANU and ZAPU. With this last 
caveat in mind, it is unsurprising that these moves towards settlement by the 
Rhodesian Front did not inspire confidence amongst advocacy groups campaigning on 
the Rhodesia issue. 
 
These events prompted the Defence and Aid fund to reach out to the labour 
movement, in pursuit of financial support. In a letter to British trade unions, Cannon 
Collins set out the situation in Southern Africa. His appeal was endorsed by Mr. Len 
Murray, who at the time was General Secretary of the British Trades Union Congress. 
The letter stated that: 
Our fund has provided humanitarian assistance in Southern Africa for over 
two decades. I last made an appeal to the British Trade Union Movement in 
1970. Due to the present worsening situation, the importance and scale of 
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our humanitarian effort has increased and once again it is necessary for me 
to call upon your Union for assistance.218 
 
This appeal was a clear reaction to the events leading up to, and including, the internal 
settlement. The nature of the agreement and its exclusion of the two main nationalist 
groups clearly led the Defence and Aid Fund, amongst other organisations, to fear that 
the independence struggle would only intensify as a result. 
 
In March 1978, the Zimbabwe Working Group planned a ‘Trade Union Week of 
Action’. An edition of Zimbabwe Briefing219, focusing on “White Rule & the African 
Worker” was made available specifically for this week of action, along with a list of 
British companies with subsidiaries in Rhodesia. The Working Group had discussed 
this event with Arthur Chadzingwa, a member of ZAPU, who agreed to encourage 
speakers on Rhodesia during the week. A member of the Working Group was also 
invited to do a tour of the northern region after the Week of Action and planned to be 
speaking to trade unions about Rhodesia in particular.220 These events and actions, 
whilst reflecting the AAM’s more general strategy for working on the Rhodesia issue, 
which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, can also be seen to be a 
response to a quiet year in Rhodesia, followed by a dramatic change in events leading 
up to the internal settlement. 
 
The AAM maintained this level of active campaigning as the year progressed. The 
Working Group “agreed to organise a number of activities during May and as part of 
this they were asking the Trade Union Committee to circulate material to trade union 
journals.” 221 Also around the same time, the AAM sent out a letter to members, 
making reference to the recent developments in Rhodesia. It stated: 
 This month’s AA News contains four pages of information on Zimbabwe 
and suggestions for campaigning. In addition, representations from 
members to their MPs will help to build up pressure in parliament against 
those who are urging the Government to endorse the internal settlement 
agreement. A detailed AAM commentary on the internal settlement will be 
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available shortly. The AAM Executive is planning a national day of leafleting 
on May 13th, to bring the issues in Zimbabwe to public attention.222 
 
This line of action was plainly precipitated by the developments in Rhodesia up to and 
including the internal settlement. It also demonstrates a multi-layered approach by 
the AAM, the concept of which will be returned to in the next chapter, in responding 
the situation, indicating how important the organisation felt this issue to be. 
 
The internal settlement also prompted the British Council of Churches (BCC) to 
produce a press release; “Rhodesia: Deteriorating situation and urgent need for talks”, 
after the perceived failure of this agreement, which the organisation had previously 
been in favour of. The press release stated that: 
 We therefore call on the British Government to redouble its efforts to bring 
all the parties to the conference table; and we call upon those inside and 
outside the country to respond to those efforts. With every new incident 
the need for such a conference becomes more urgent.223 
 
This is a particularly clear example of an organisation directly responding to key 
events, even if it was, in this case, a slightly delayed response. 
 
The remainder of 1978 and the early part of 1979 was a quiet period in terms of 
campaigning on the Rhodesia issue. It seems as though, following such a flurry of 
activity immediately after the announcement of the internal settlement, advocacy 
organisations were unable to maintain the campaigning momentum up to the 
elections, since there was such a long gap between these and the initial agreement. It 
was not until April 1979 that a general election in Rhodesia was held, which swept 
Muzorewa and his UANC party to power. Muzorewa was installed as prime minister, 
and the country renamed Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. ZANU and ZAPU boycotted the 
election, reinforcing concerns about the outcome this process would have amongst 
organisations in the UK. Speaking about the internal settlement, Kenneth Kaunda said 
that “the very fact that Ian Douglas-Smith had taken that step – to put a ‘puppet’ in his 
own place - was an indication that he had begun to feel the pressure of the freedom-
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fighters. From that point onwards it was only a matter of time”.224 This captures the 
populace’s prevalent perception of Bishop Muzorewa at this time. 
  
Later in the year, the AAM submitted a complaint to the BBC for using the term 
‘Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. The letter of complaint argues that the use of this term 
“amounts to a form of recognition of the new regime in Salisbury. You will know that 
the territory is known legally as Southern Rhodesia since it remains de jure a British 
colony”.225 Whilst this example is not responding to an event as such, the change in 
name of the country was an evocative campaign point for the AAM, and they clearly 
seized upon a respected British institution failing to recognise the significance of this 
change. 
 
In response to fears surrounding the change in UK Government in May 1979, with 
Margaret Thatcher’s Conservatives entering power, and concerns at what new 
Government policy on Rhodesia might entail, the AAM decided to reinstate the 
Emergency Campaign Committee, now prefaced Zimbabwe rather than Rhodesia (the 
ZECC from now on). In a clear statement of concerns, the AAM wrote: 
The newly elected Conservative government has stated clearly its desire to 
return the regime to legality and to lift sanctions. In the United States the 
Senate has voted for the lifting of sanctions. Various Conservatives and 
Christian Democratic forces in the EEC have advocated similar policies.226 
 
The organisation also called an emergency demonstration, to be held at the end of 
June, and stated that the ZECC’s campaign objectives should be “no recognition of the 
Salisbury regime; no lifting of sanctions but their extension to include South Africa 
[and] support for the Patriotic Front”.227 These developments in advocacy activity, 
driven by the AAM but encompassing a much broader range of organisations under 
the auspices of the ZECC, highlight the sense of urgency surrounding the Rhodesia 
issue following the election of Bishop Muzorewa, and the change of British 
Government. 
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The ZECC followed up its establishment by launching the ‘Zimbabwe Declaration’. The 
aim of the Declaration was to provide an opportunity for the views of all those 
opposed to the policies of the British Government, to be expressed to the 
Commonwealth and through the Commonwealth, to the people of Zimbabwe. Kenneth 
Kaunda had agreed to present the signed Declarations to the Commonwealth, in his 
capacity at the time as Chairman of the Commonwealth Heads of Government 
Meeting. The text of the Declaration was as follows: 
We, the undersigned, declare our opposition to any recognition of the illegal 
regime in Southern Rhodesia and our support for the maintenance of 
United Nations mandatory sanctions. We appeal to the Commonwealth to 
reaffirm its commitment to genuine independence for the people of 
Zimbabwe.228 
 
The ZECC sent out copies of this declaration to be signed by representatives from as 
many related organisations as possible, such as Trade Unions, local and constituency 
Labour Parties and affiliated advocacy organisations.229 This is a clear example of an 
organisation taking the opportunity of an international event, namely the 
Commonwealth meeting (scheduled for August that year), to push its agenda and 
galvanise support for its campaign. 
 
At this late stage, the Labour Party began to take on more of an advocacy role. In June, 
Ron Hayward, then the Labour Party’s General Secretary, wrote to all constituency 
parties and affiliated organisations on precisely this issue. He urged “all Party 
members to play an active role in campaigning against any sell-out in Zimbabwe”, and 
went on to encourage people to attend the AAM organised march and mass rally, 
scheduled for the end of the month.  The following month, the Labour Party sent a 
letter to the AAM, communicating the most recent resolution on Rhodesia passed by 
the NEC. The resolution, moved by Joan Lestor MP, stated that: 
the Labour Party reaffirms its refusal to approve the Rhodesian internal 
settlement and…believes that there should be no collaboration by Britain 
with the Salisbury regime and no recognition of any form by a British 
government. The National Executive Committee expresses its continuing 
support to the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe and its sympathy with the 
                                                          
228 RH, MSS AAM 1207, ZECC ‘Zimbabwe Declaration”, 30/06/1979. 
229 Ibid 
83 
 
African front-line states of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and 
Zambia who are seeking genuine independence for Zimbabwe under 
majority rule, and will use every effort with all the parties concerned to 
achieve a peaceful and just settlement.230 
 
From these actions it is clear that, by this point, the Labour Party stance on the 
Rhodesia issue was far more closely aligned with that of various advocacy 
organisations campaigning on the issue than with the policy of the Conservative 
Government. In this sense the letter and statement can be considered expressions of 
solidarity for the African nationalist movement, and they are therefore of relevance to 
the arguments of this chapter. 
 
At the Commonwealth heads of government meeting in Lusaka, August 1979, Britain 
announced its plans to hold a constitutional conference to seek a resolution to the 
ongoing conflict in Rhodesia, which had only intensified following the internal 
settlement. The Front Line States then played a key role in convincing the African 
nationalist organisations to attend. Charlton writes that “the threat from the front-line 
states was that, had Mr Mugabe refused to go to London and explore the constitutional 
path, Rhodesia’s economically prostrate neighbours would close down the ‘liberation 
war’ which was being prosecuted from their territories.231 The purpose of this 
conference was to draw up a constitution which would be acceptable to all sides as a 
basis for independence. Following this meeting in Lusaka, the TUC drafted a 
resolution strongly expressing support for the African nationalist movement and 
hoping for a positive outcome of the upcoming constitutional conference. The 
resolution ends by encouraging all levels of the TUC and affiliated unions “to respond 
to appeals by the Patriotic Front for educational, medical and other forms of 
humanitarian assistance”.232 This resolution is far more expressive of support and 
more strongly worded than any earlier TUC pronouncements on Rhodesia. Much like 
the Labour Party’s similar shift, this can be attributed to the controversial nature of 
the internal settlement, followed by the genuine hope and concern arising from the 
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new attempts at settlement following the Lusaka conference, as well as the leftwards 
shift in the Labour Party around this time.   
 
The Lancaster House conference, as it was known, was a lengthy affair (10th 
September-15th December 1979), chaired by Lord Carrington, who was then 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. During the course of the 
conference, advocacy organisations kept a close eye on proceedings, fearing a repeat 
of any of the earlier attempts at settlement. A ZECC document sets out a provisional 
timetable covering the early part of the conference, which includes meetings and 
discussions with Patriotic Front members in order to check on the progress of the 
talks, and facilitate the planning of future action if required.233 Agreement was 
eventually reached, and a timetable put in place for the holding of elections and an 
official transfer of power. 
Conclusion 
From the chronological exploration of levels of interest in Rhodesia amongst UK based 
advocacy organisations and the labour movement, obvious fluctuations can be seen. 
During the 15 years from UDI to the close of the Lancaster House conference, there 
were apparent spikes and dips in activity levels around the Rhodesia issue.  
 
Archive material explored in this chapter, set alongside the narrative thread of 
Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, clearly demonstrates that activity on the Rhodesia issue 
clustered around events such as settlement negotiations and controversial actions 
perpetrated by the Smith Government, such as detentions and hangings of African 
nationalists. This argument is strengthened by a consideration of the periods during 
which very little advocacy or labour movement activity was happening in Britain, as 
these strikingly correlate with times when the Rhodesia issue was much quieter 
internationally. Following waves of action on Rhodesia, such as large protests, 
enthusiasm for campaigning generally decreased. The main exception to this was the 
lead up to, and duration of, the Pearce Commission, during which interest in the issue 
was more consistent. This will be discussed in Chapter 6. It is also interesting to note 
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that advocacy and labour movement responses to the situation in Rhodesia were 
mainly to Government-led actions, particularly those of the UK Government. There 
was little activity as a direct response to the unfolding of the guerrilla war, or actions 
of the nationalist movement. This can be attributed to the perception that 
Westminster was the source of real power, and therefore of potential change, in the 
unfolding of the Rhodesia situation. This focus on the British Government is 
something that will be explored in more detail in Chapter 4. 
 
As well as a correlation between key events in the Rhodesia timeline and interest in 
the issue, there were commensurate fluctuations in media attention. During key 
events, such as settlement negotiations, media coverage of Rhodesia spiked. This then 
had the effect of creating a more informed and interested public, which effectively 
meant a more receptive audience for advocacy campaigns. There is relevant 
theoretical work in the social movement theory canon around the idea of levels of 
engagement with social issues. Specifically, the idea of consciously trying to ‘upgrade’ 
levels of engagement from apathetic, to interested, to actively engaged. This will be 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
Labour movement engagement with the Rhodesia issue followed a divergent pattern 
to that of advocacy activity. Whilst spikes of interest in the issue are apparent, there 
was a more general trend of a steady increase in interest in Rhodesia over the 15 
years. This was partly due to the TUC becoming less reticent to involve itself in the 
issue, and also as a result of Labour’s period in opposition in the early 1970s, and 
again from May 1979, during which times the Party spoke more radically on Rhodesia. 
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Chapter 3:  ‘A Peculiarly British Responsibility’? - Advocacy 
methods and the struggle for a democratic Rhodesia 
Introduction 
This chapter will focus on the methods used by UK based advocacy organisations in 
responding to and supporting the struggle for independence in Rhodesia. Having 
noted fluctuations in the levels of support for the nationalist cause during the 15 year 
period under consideration, it is now pertinent to consider what advocacy 
organisations were doing on an operational level in order to further their aims. The 
chapter will begin by setting out relevant existing literature on advocacy 
organisations before moving on to a discussion of social movement theory: a subset of 
social movement theory, which can assist in elucidating an understanding of the 
methods chosen by advocacy organisations in their campaigning on Rhodesia. 
Following this, the theoretical framework will be used to consider archival sources on 
advocacy organisations and the struggle for independence in Rhodesia. This chapter 
addresses one main research question: ‘What methods were used by UK based 
advocacy organisations in supporting the struggle for independence in Rhodesia?’ and 
a supplementary question: ‘Were advocacy organisations constrained by pragmatism 
and existing ideas about how to campaign, and if so, what effect did this have on 
organisations’ chosen methods?’ 
 
Resource mobilisation theory will provide a theoretical framework through which to 
explore the ways in which organisations utilised resources in order to achieve their 
stated aims. The purpose of employing aspects of resource mobilisation theory in this 
chapter is to assist in drawing together quite fragmented archival material. The 
primary sources collected deal with various organisations, at different points during 
the prolonged struggle for independence in Rhodesia. In this sense, resource 
mobilisation theory will provide a theoretical lens through which to focus the 
otherwise disparate archival material, and help to draw some more general 
conclusions about the nature of UK based campaigning on the Rhodesia issue. 
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Existing Literature 
Existing literature looking at advocacy organisations in the UK, specifically those 
campaigning on the Rhodesia issue, is very limited. This body of work is dominated by 
literature that focuses on campaigning around apartheid South Africa,234 or a more 
international focus on advocacy for Rhodesia.235 As discussed briefly in Chapter 1, 
there is little secondary literature that bridges the gap between diplomatic 
negotiations and the grass roots struggle for independence in Rhodesia. There are, 
however, a few studies that offer a tentative link between these two areas of 
scholarship, such as Fieldhouse’s study of the AAM,236 Day’s early study of the 
international activities of the Zimbabwean nationalist organisations237 and Reed’s 
dissection of ZANU’s foreign policy.238 A brief discussion of the problems of these texts 
was mentioned in the initial chapter, but at this point it is worth returning to 
Fieldhouse, since it is the primary text on the history of the AAM, and as such offers a 
good starting point for the explorations of this chapter.  
 
The vast majority of Fieldhouse’s book is focused on the British AAM’s South Africa 
work, with brief sections on Rhodesia and other parts of Southern Africa. Fieldhouse 
writes: 
As we have seen, in its early years AAM concentrated almost exclusively on 
what was happening in South Africa itself, fearing that if it got drawn into 
related conflicts in neighbouring territories its limited campaigning 
capacity would be overstretched and therefore less effective. But by the 
mid-sixties it became all too apparent that what was happening in the 
bantustans and former British High Commission Territories, and the 
struggles for freedom in Rhodesia, South West Africa and the Portuguese 
colonies in Southern Africa, were all inextricably linked to the freedom 
struggle in South Africa. There was an ‘unholy alliance’ of white racist 
domination throughout southern Africa and this had to be tackled as a 
whole.239 
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Despite this shift in focus once the ‘unholy alliance’ became apparent, the book is 
more reflective of the Movement’s earlier position. 
 
In terms of the methods used by the AAM, Fieldhouse provides little information. 
However, he does comment briefly on what seemed to be the driving force behind the 
movement’s Rhodesia campaign, and chronologically explores some of the techniques 
used to campaign. From this it is possible to extrapolate his position on the methods 
used, which can be used to compare to the archival data and theoretical perspectives 
introduced later in the chapter. Fieldhouse argues that UDI gave momentum to the 
AAM’s Rhodesia campaign, and argues that the centre of this was a drive to prevent 
recognition of the Smith regime, commensurate with the idea of NIBMAR.240 In 
discussing the tactics of the Rhodesia campaign, Fieldhouse draws attention to 
activities such as lobbying on issues like the establishment of economic sanctions (and 
later, attempts to curb sanctions-breaking by South Africa), making suggestions for 
conference resolutions to local and constituency Labour Party branches, trying to 
engage the trade unions in the campaign (although even Fieldhouse admits that this 
was with “limited success”) and organising public rallies, such as the one held in 1972 
to protest against the possibility of  a ‘yes’ to the Pearce Commission.241 This is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
 
An interesting point made by Fieldhouse on Rhodesia and its place within the AAM’s 
campaign is that: 
Because Rhodesia, unlike South Africa, was still (at least nominally) under 
British rule until 1980, it often proved easier to persuade people of the 
relevance and rightness of the Rhodesian campaign, compared with the 
campaign against apartheid in South Africa. The Government, politicians 
and the general public were all more ready to recognise this as a peculiarly 
British responsibility.242 
 
However, this does not align with the place that Rhodesia occupies in the book, or 
with difficulties faced by the AAM in trying to gain support for its Rhodesia campaign. 
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Another well-known text on the AAM is Gurney’s “A Great Cause”. Gurney was actively 
involved in the AAM, and edited the movement’s official publication, Anti-Apartheid 
News, from 1969-1980.243 However, this article is almost entirely focused on South 
Africa, looking at the movement’s origins in the boycott movement, and how this 
helped established patterns of operation, for example the movement’s later 
relationship with the South African Congress Movement.244 A later article by Gurney 
has a similar preoccupation with South Africa, but provides a more detailed 
consideration of the AAM’s methods. She highlights that “international solidarity was 
symbiotically linked with the progress of the liberation struggle within Southern 
Africa. Developments within Britain that were quite unrelated to Southern Africa also 
affected AAM campaigns.”245 This idea of a link between advocacy activity and events 
in Britain and overseas was partially picked up on in the previous chapter, 
considering fluctuations of interest in the Rhodesia issue. She also states that the AAM 
worked to build support in Britain among the trade union movement, students and 
churches, and to establish a network of local groups.246 This idea will be explored in 
more detail during the course of this chapter. 
 
A text that is suggestive of the potential for introducing social movement theory to 
consider the work of advocacy movements is Seidman’s chapter on the AAM, although 
this is equally South Africa dominated. He frames the AAM as a global social 
movement. Whilst the chapter is instructive in both the challenges posed by and 
suggested solutions to using social movement theory to analyse such global social 
movements, the discussion of the AAM itself is, much like Gurney’s first article, 
entirely focused on South Africa.247 Thörn’s article adopts a similar focus and also 
argues that the AAM should be understood as a global social movement.248 Skinner 
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has written a fascinating history of international activism, looking beyond the AAM to 
other advocacy organisations such as the Defence and Aid fund, and interactions 
between such organisations, but again focuses exclusively on South Africa, and on the 
earlier period of anti-Apartheid activism, up to 1964.249 
 
Whilst there is undoubtedly some valuable secondary literature on the AAM and its 
history, this whole body of scholarship is dominated by a focus on the movement’s 
actions on South Africa, seeming to write the rest of southern Africa out of the story, 
with the exception of some of the chapters in Fieldhouse’s book. Equally worrying is a 
lack of literature on any of the other advocacy organisations working on southern 
Africa during this tumultuous period of struggle against white domination. As 
highlighted in the introductory chapter, there were many organisations and coalitions 
that formed to campaign on the Rhodesia issue, and other related issues in southern 
Africa in this period. Again with the exception of Fieldhouse, and even then confined 
to the projects orchestrated by the AAM, such as the RECC, these other organisations 
and initiatives are simply not mentioned in existing scholarship on the topic. This 
chapter addresses this oversight and provides not simply a brief history of different 
organisations campaigning on the Rhodesia issue, but a detailed consideration of the 
methods used by such organisations, after a theoretical exploration of resource 
mobilisation theory. 
Resource mobilisation theory  
The chapter will now look at some relevant sub-theories in the study of social 
movements, before applying these to a discussion on the methods used by advocacy 
organisations. In particular, this section will borrow from the theory in order to 
explore how advocacy organisations utilised the limited resources available to them, 
and the reasons behind their chosen methods. This section also explores whether 
these organisations were constrained by existing ideas about how to campaign, and if 
so, what effect this had on an organisation’s chosen methods. Whilst the previous 
chapter considered in some detail the fluctuations in levels of UK-based support for 
the independence struggle, this chapter will revisit movement involvement but from a 
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different angle. As will be seen from some of the archival material explored later in the 
chapter, a significant proportion of advocacy activity, and by extension a significant 
proponent of their chosen campaigning methods, was directed towards expanding the 
organisational support base of the cause in the UK. So in this chapter, movement 
participation will be viewed from the organisational rather than the individual 
perspective. 
 
This section drawing on theoretical frameworks begins by considering some salient 
insights from the resource mobilisation approach, or resource mobilisation theory. 
This perspective is part of what is known as the second wave of social movement 
theory, and arose in response to what are now referred to as ‘traditional’ approaches. 
Much of the earlier social movement theory cannon, the first wave, addressed the 
issue of why movements form. This was generally attributed to the presence of 
grievances within a society, which a movement then coalesces around in order to seek 
change. The resource mobilisation approach challenged this perspective by arguing 
that there is always enough grievance present in any society to sustain a movement, if 
there is a sufficient level of organisational ability to mobilise around it. So this 
approach shifts away from the earlier social-psychological influences, to a perspective 
more informed by socio-economic and political ideas. Much of resource mobilisation 
theory still deals with movement formation, which is not of use in this context. 
However, there are some aspects of the theory that deal more closely with the tactics 
movements employ in relation to their resources,250 and it is this side of theory that 
this chapter will address first. Whilst resource mobilisation theory arose in the 1970s, 
and has subsequently been followed by much other work on social movements, it has 
been used in this context because it is more relevant than later work on a similar 
subject. Social movement theory moved on to discuss what have been termed ‘new 
social movements’, and Buechler argues that this theory, or group of theories, relates 
to a broad range of disparate social movements more concerned with the social and 
cultural domains than the political.251  
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McCarthy and Zald set out the difference between the ‘traditional’ approach and the 
resource mobilisation approach with regards to strategy and tactics. They state that in 
the traditional approach, it was argued that leaders of social movements use 
“bargaining, persuasion, or violence to influence authorities to change.”252 The tactics 
chosen related to “prior history of relations with authorities, relative success of 
previous encounters, and ideology. Tactics are also influenced by the oligarchization 
and institutionalization of organizational life.”253 In contrast to this, the resource 
mobilisation approach considers the role of relations with authorities, but 
acknowledges a broader spectrum of concerns that movements have, such as 
“mobilizing supporters, neutralizing and/or transforming mass and elite publics into 
sympathizers, achieving change in targets.”254 This can cause problems in terms of 
choice of tactics, as there are competing aims, which cannot all be achieved using the 
same methods. This approach also notes that “tactics are influenced by 
interorganizational competition and cooperation.”255  
 
Another useful facet of McCarthy and Zald’s comparison is that of the relationship 
between a social movement and the society in which it is based. They note that the 
traditional approach is unidirectional in its understanding of how social movements 
interact with society, in that it considers the effect society may have on a movement’s 
goals, for example, but ignores “ways in which such movement organizations can 
utilize the environment for their own purpose”.256 This approach acknowledges that 
society is an infrastructure which movements utilise and operate through. “The 
aspects utilized include communication media and expense, levels of affluence, degree 
of access to institutional centres, pre-existing networks, and occupational structure 
and growth.”257  
 
From this brief discussion of some of the innovations of resource mobilisation theory, 
it is possible to focus on three particular points with which to analyse advocacy 
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methodology in support of the African nationalist cause. The first point is about 
organisations having a broad range of concerns that occupy their time and by 
extension the methods they use and the way in which they employ resources. The 
second point is that competition with other organisations may affect the methods and 
tactics used by one organisation. Lastly, the relationship between an organisation and 
society is open-ended; society can be a resource for organisations. Each of these 
points will be examined in turn, in relation to the archival sources that will be 
discussed below. 
 
Theoretical discussion will now turn to look at the concept of repertoires of 
contention, coined and developed by Charles Tilly. Tarrow takes Tilly’s work as a 
starting point, and provides a particularly succinct definition of the term: A repertoire 
of contention refers to “the whole set of means that a group has for making claims of 
different kinds on different individuals or groups”.258 To expand on this, the notion of 
the repertoire is that in any society, intended in the broadest possible sense in this 
context, there is a limited set of actions and processes that can be employed in the 
process of seeking social change, hence the importance of pragmatism in the decisions 
and actions taken by advocacy organisations. Tarrow argues that: 
The repertoire is therefore not only what people do when they make a 
claim; it is what they know how to do and what society has come to expect 
them to choose to do from within a culturally sanctioned and empirically 
limited set of options.259 
 
Tilly and Tarrow both explore the idea that such repertoires do change over time, but 
it is generally a gradual process, with occasional flurries of more rapid change and one 
influenced by the social context in which it takes place.260 Tilly looks at the shift in 
popular protest in Britain during the mid to late eighteenth century, which he argues 
took place quite rapidly, but still affects conceptions of protest in the present: “many 
of the critical changes in popular contention from 1758 to the present crowded into a 
                                                          
258 S. Tarrow ‘Cycles of Collective Action: Between the Moments of Madness and the Repertoire of Contention’ In 
Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action, ed. M. Traugott (London: Duke University Press, 1995), pp 89-115. 
259 Ibid: 91. 
260 Ibid. 
94 
 
few decades around the end of the eighteenth century”.261 Traugott neatly sums up 
this point: 
The metaphor of the repertoire allowed him to stress, without unnecessary 
teleological assumptions, both the continuity that collective action exhibits 
over many generations and the sweeping changes in the accepted form of 
protest that occur only at long intervals.262 
 
This theory suggests that any exploration of the methods used by a social movement 
or its constituent parts must be understood as being constrained and influenced by a 
particular repertoire of contention established in a particular social context. 
 
Tilly argues that, following the aforementioned period of rapid change, forms of 
contention “had a national, modular, and autonomous character”.263 National refers to 
the fact that issues, unlike the earlier repertoire, were no longer confined to specific 
local areas, but concerned the country as a whole. By modular, Tilly means that there 
developed a set of forms of contention that then “served many different localities, 
issues and actors”.264 Again this is distinguished from an earlier period in which forms 
varied from one place to another. Finally, Tilly argues that forms were autonomous, by 
which he means that claimants represented themselves at all levels of contention, 
from local to national, rather than employing representatives when issues stretched 
beyond the local level, as was the case in the earlier period.265 The work on 
repertoires of contention will be taken together with that of McCarthy and Zald in 
exploring the methods used by advocacy organisations in their campaigning on the 
Rhodesia issue. This theoretical framework underlines the centrality of a pragmatic 
approach for advocacy organisations in responding to the Rhodesia crisis, as they 
were limited by a finite repertoire of contention, and had to maximise limited 
resources through this to further their stated aims. As such a pragmatic and cautious 
approach was inevitable, particularly so with an issue that fluctuated in and out of the 
public’s attention at the whim of political developments and media coverage. 
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Advocacy Methodology 
Despite intending to challenge the bias of the existing literature, it seems logical to 
begin with the AAM, since this is the organisation on which there is most available 
archival data, thanks to its size and organisational capacity relative to other 
organisations that campaigned on the Rhodesia issue. This section of the chapter 
builds towards a consideration of the constraining influence of pragmatism on 
advocacy methodology. As stated above in the brief overview of Fieldhouse’s work, it 
is suggested that the overriding aim of the AAM’s Rhodesia campaign was to prevent a 
return to legality in Rhodesia under the Smith regime, which is tantamount to the idea 
of upholding the NIBMAR principle. This is supported by the campaign materials, 
statements and publications of the AAM, and this conceptualisation of the AAM’s main 
aim goes some way to explaining what could be seen as a paradox in terms of the 
AAM’s activities, and those of other organisations, which will be returned to later in 
the chapter. 
 
Before looking at some of the specific activities undertaken by the AAM in its Rhodesia 
campaign, it is instructive to consider its intended scope of operations. Fieldhouse 
argues that “the Movement…tried to engage the political parties, particularly local 
Labour Parties, and the trade unions in the campaign, although with only limited 
success during the period of the 1964-70 Labour Governments.”266 This is borne out 
by the archival data; there are extensive meeting minutes of the AAM’s Trade Union 
Action Group (TUAG), a sub-group of the Movement, responsible for trying to extend 
the support of the Movement and involve trade unions, both in the UK and Southern 
Rhodesia. Minutes from April and May 1968 highlight the decision to pursue contacts 
with members of Rhodesian trade unions. This culminated with the report of a 
meeting between AAM representatives and Josiah Maluleke, who was then Secretary 
General of the Southern Rhodesian Trade Union Congress (SRTUC), agreeing that 
contact should be maintained.267 This is clearly illustrative of McCarthy and Zald’s 
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point about social movements utilising pre-existing networks, and also highlights the 
political sphere on which the AAM was concentrating. 
 
A letter from the AAM to its general members in 1966 demonstrates the 
organisation’s preferred methods of campaigning on the Rhodesia issue. It stated that 
the Smith regime was still in control, and depending on the South African Government 
for economic assistance. In response to the ongoing situation, the letter announced 
that the AAM was organising a national campaign on Rhodesia and had declared June 
to be “Freedom for Rhodesia” month. It urged its members to join this campaign by 
holding public meetings, distributing Anti-Apartheid News (the regular AAM 
publication, the next two issues of which would focus on Rhodesia) and ordering 
stickers and leaflets for general publicity.268 It suggested possible actions in support of 
“Freedom for Rhodesia” month, such as distributing the petition enclosed with the 
letter, distributing the leaflet ‘Crisis in Rhodesia’, organising local meetings to raise 
awareness of events in Rhodesia, “Lobby MPs, and organise deputations to the 
Commonwealth Relations Office”, and to publicise the campaign.269 This provides a 
good summary of the multiple methods the AAM used in order to support the 
nationalist cause in Rhodesia, spanning grass roots campaigning in the UK through to 
engaging with the political elites. 
 
Another way in which the AAM tried to expand its support base amongst UK trade 
unions was through publicising its cause and activities in relevant publications. In 
seeking to engage the labour movement, the TUAG identified a need: 
to get correspondence on Southern Africa into union journals, and that each 
member would look into this with regard to his own journal. Letters and 
articles should relate to what trade unionists in this country could do. Very 
substantial efforts were also needed to get motions on to the order papers 
of national unions who were less sympathetic to the Movement.270 
 
Various discussions at AAM meetings corroborate this as a tactic the organisation 
used. Morning Star, Tribune, Labour Weekly, Seven Days, Voice of the Union and 
individual union newspapers were all targeted as potential forums in which to raise 
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awareness of the Rhodesia situation amongst the broader labour movement.271 
Unfortunately it was not possible to identify circulation figures for such publications, 
as this would have given a clearer insight into the impact of this aspect of advocacy 
activity. 
 
The AAM TUAG also tried to influence TUC policy with regards to southern Africa, 
although any direct action by trade unionists was problematised by the Industrial 
Relations Act of the Heath government in 1971 that “made illegal the withdrawal of 
labour on grounds of conscience”.272 Regardless of this, the AAM persisted in its 
efforts to strengthen the TUC’s line on Rhodesia, and raise awareness at a shop floor 
level: 
It was agreed that we should work to get the TUC to extend its policy on 
South Africa to Rhodesia, with particular emphasis on restricting the flow 
of emigrants to Rhodesia. It was suggested that the TUC should support any 
workers who continued to recognise sanctions. Resolutions should be 
moved at shop floor level to create awareness of the situation in Rhodesia 
and all avenues of propaganda should be investigated.273 
 
This demonstrates a multi-layered approach in trying to expand the AAM’s support 
base amongst trade unionists; a policy focus at the top down to awareness-raising at 
the grass roots. The purpose of such campaigning, when viewed through the lens of 
resource mobilisation theory, was to try to generate new supporters from those who 
were not currently engaged with the issue, through the use of existing social and 
political networks. 
 
There are two facets to consider in understanding why the AAM targeted trade unions 
in such a way. First, one of the more intractable problems faced by the Smith regime in 
the years following UDI was emigration; people leaving Rhodesia for South Africa or 
to return to Britain. This left an ever decreasing pool of productive workers 
contributing to the economy.274 A tactic used in trying to combat this trend, was to 
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publish adverts in Britain presenting Rhodesia as an attractive place to emigrate to. 
The AAM tried to combat such propaganda, particularly through the TUC and by 
lobbying individual trade unions, as evidenced in the previous paragraph. The second 
and perhaps more important facet of the AAM TUAG’s work stemmed from the 
relationship between the Labour Party and trade unions. From this angle, trade 
unionists were seen as a powerful potential resource, particularly given the growth in 
trade union membership,275 in that they were a potential moderating influence on the 
Labour Party, not on the content of policy itself, but should the latter try to sell-out on 
the Rhodesia issue.276 The union network provided access to a far broader spectrum 
of people than the AAM could otherwise have reached, and whilst there was a high 
degree of apathy over the Rhodesia issue for much of the period, unions still 
represented a source of potential influence over CLPs in safe Labour seats and 
presented a potential check on the Labour Party leadership through their influence at 
Party conference and on the NEC, were any controversial decisions to be made. This is 
indicative of McCarthy and Zald’s point about the range of concerns an organisation 
has: lobbying the trade union movement was not of direct relevance to the ultimate 
goals of the AAM but it was seen as one way of trying to expand the support base and 
place a check on Government policy. 
 
An important aspect of the AAM’s methods of operation was maintaining contact with 
representatives of the nationalist movement in the UK, in order to help stay informed 
about the situation on the ground in Rhodesia and inversely to keep nationalists 
informed about the organisation’s campaigning. This is demonstrated through 
numerous letters to UK based nationalist representatives requesting speakers for 
AAM meetings.277 A Zimbabwe Working Group report stated that “Representatives of 
the AAM have continued to keep informed the representatives of the ANC in London 
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together with the ZANU branch in the UK of the work being undertaken.”278 This 
contact with nationalists in the UK was an important aspect of the movement’s work 
in trying to support its other methods of operation, namely trying to engage political 
parties and trade unionists on the issue, and grow support for the movement, because 
personal testimony and primary information on the Rhodesia situation from 
nationalists based in the UK lent credibility to the AAM’s cause. 
 
As discussed in greater detail in the introductory chapter, Reverend Michael Scott 
established the Africa Bureau in 1952 to assist Africans who wished to contest their 
political situation. Later in the Bureau’s life, it shifted its focus to research activities 
and published documents on various African issues, such as the predicted efficacy of 
sanctions against Rhodesia.279 This function of the Bureau is evidently more focused 
than the aims of the AAM, and given this it seems logical that the methods employed 
by the Bureau might be equally more focused than those of the AAM. As highlighted by 
its absence in the brief literature review section in this chapter, the Africa Bureau 
does not feature in existing literature on Rhodesia, and as such, discussions here are 
based solely on the available archival material, and shed new light on the activities of 
another advocacy organisation on the Rhodesia issue. The Africa Bureau’s official 
papers are entirely housed in the Rhodes House archive, with occasional references 
occurring in other archives through organisational and personal interactions. The 
chapter also draws on an interview with Guy Arnold, Director of the Bureau from 
1968 until 1972.  
 
Many of the Africa Bureau papers relating to its work on Rhodesia are general 
materials collected for research purposes, which were produced by the nationalist 
movement itself and other organisations in Rhodesia. There are 13 files, comprising 
an entire box in the Africa Bureau collection, that highlight different groups and their 
respective publications, press releases and other assorted papers.280 These documents 
include early ZAPU statements and policy documents, some editions of Zimbabwe 
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News (a ZANU publication), copies of speeches, by figures such Bishop Muzorewa, and 
ANC statements. These are all primary documents originating in Rhodesia and set out 
nationalist views and policies on the situation at the various times of publication. The 
purpose of collecting such documents was clearly to stay informed of the situation on 
the ground in Rhodesia and the position of the various groups involved in the 
nationalist struggle as it developed over time. Whilst the AAM papers also hold some 
similar collections of documents, they occupy a far greater proportion of the Africa 
Bureau collection, highlighting the importance of the research aspect of the Bureau’s 
work; its chosen method of operation. 
 
Papers from the Rhodesia Sub-Committee of the Africa Bureau discuss a broad range 
of issues related to the Rhodesia situation such as oil, sanctions and regional politics. 
All of the minutes from this sub-committee centre around the planning of different 
research papers, which is closely related to the aforementioned aim the Bureau had in 
producing research and informed publications on African liberation issues. In the 
same file as these minutes there are various memoranda and research papers, the 
results of the planning of the Sub-Committee meetings. One such memo, entitled 
‘Rhodesia – Chess Game 1972’, describes parties involved in the situation and the 
supposed desired outcome of each.281 A background paper, ‘Oil and Rhodesia’ by 
James Lemkin, a member of the Sub-Committee, discusses some of the complexities 
and the international dimension of trying to enforce oil sanctions against the 
Rhodesian regime. 
 
In addition to the Rhodesia Sub-Committee, there was also the Africa Bureau Rhodesia 
Circle, although the surviving papers for this sub-group are far less extensive than 
those of the Sub-Committee.282 There are various notices arranging meetings of the 
Circle, but only one set of minutes, from the very first meeting held under such 
auspices. The first item discussed at this meeting was whether or not the Circle could 
do anything with regards to the split in the African nationalist movement, as this was 
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seen as a major stumbling block in assisting the independence struggle and facilitating 
a solution to the Rhodesia crisis. The meeting concluded that the Circle was probably 
not able to help with this particular issue but that it “was important that African 
leaders should realise the seriousness which their divisions had on political opinion in 
this country.”283 That said, the minutes give no indication of how the Rhodesia Circle 
intended to go about ensuring this, although it is noted that one member raised the 
issue that trying to rouse British public opinion in support of the nationalist cause 
should be considered but not how this should be done. This is illustrative of 
competing priorities for one organisation, and the consideration of how best to 
channel limited resources, which reflects the argument about the broad range of 
concerns SMOs have in resource mobilisation theory. The file of Rhodesia Circle 
documents also contains a few draft statements on Rhodesia, further to these minutes 
and notices arranging further meetings. What is notable about this one set of 
surviving minutes is the more direct approach taken, or at least considered, by the 
Rhodesia Circle, compared to that of the Sub-Committee, and the more direct 
engagement with the Rhodesian side of the situation. 
 
The Africa Bureau organised and held a conference in London in 1965, prior to the 
announcement of UDI. Speakers at this conference included representatives of 
academia, left wing media, the Labour Party and the nationalist organisations; a 
typical cross section employed in advocacy work. The purpose was “to provide 
information on the present situation in Rhodesia, to consider the implications for 
Britain of the continuing crisis, and to discuss the policy which should be adopted by 
Britain”.284 The conference concluded that: 
There was general agreement that British public opinion remained ill-
informed about events in Rhodesia: most people were unaware of the large 
numbers held in detention or restriction without trial and knew nothing of 
the extent of the breakdown of all relations between Africans and 
Europeans…The extreme urgency of finding a solution was recognised. This 
meant that there was little time to mount an educational campaign with the 
British public. The best method would be to get public attention focussed 
on individual cases of hardship and injustice.285 
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These points highlight the focus of the Africa’s Bureau’s advocacy work on the issue, 
essentially raising awareness of the details of the situation in Rhodesia in order to 
gain further support for activism. It is also interesting that the conference concluded 
that publicising specific cases would garner better results than trying to raise 
awareness of the situation as a whole. This has now become a staple method in 
campaigning, with adverts for charities and campaigns frequently employing such a 
technique. The conference report also briefly discussed opinions on the potential use 
of force, but unlike the idea of raising the profile of the situation in Rhodesia, this 
particular discussion did not culminate in any concrete conclusions.  
 
From the records of this conference, and the minutes of the Rhodesia Sub-Committee, 
two things become apparent about the Africa Bureau’s methods regarding Rhodesia 
campaigns. The first is that the organisation took into account the general lack of 
public awareness in formulating its policy on public engagement, and thus the 
decision to focus on a ‘human interest’ angle was made. This was coupled with the 
provision of well researched background papers on Rhodesia, intended for those 
already interested but lacking a deeper awareness. This demonstrates a core point in 
resource mobilisation theory: that one of the foci or concerns of organisations will be 
to change mass publics into sympathisers for a particular cause.  The lack of evidence 
regarding the Bureau’s views on what British policy should be with regards to the use 
of force also shows a greater focus on the micro level of the campaign; trying to get 
members of the public interested by telling shocking stories about detentions, or in 
trying to mitigate the potential negative impact of nationalist factionalism on British 
public opinion, rather than trying to alter the policy of the British Government. Whilst 
this point is drawn mostly from documents at an early stage of the period under 
consideration, it is demonstrative of a difference to the methods used by the AAM, 
which adopted a dual track approach focusing on British government policy and 
public opinion, both of which fall under Tilly’s national focus in terms of the repertoire 
of contention. 
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The Africa Bureau attempted to differentiate itself from other organisations. In an 
interview with Guy Arnold he stated that they had held a long discussion with Ethel de 
Keyser and Abdul Minty of the AAM to discuss potential collaboration, but ultimately 
it became clear that they wanted the Africa Bureau to be led by AAM policy. He also 
said that there was some suspicion amongst Africa Bureau committee members of the 
AAM’s methods, for example the organisation of and participation in protests, which 
the Bureau did not regard as one of its methods, having refocused it attention more 
directly on research.286 Formally, the Africa Bureau stated its intention to cease 
working with the AAM on the grounds that “it is thought best to confine our efforts 
and our limited resources to pursuing the policies of the Bureau in ways which it 
believes to be most effective and appropriate to the ends we seek to serve.287 This 
example very clearly demonstrates organisational tactics being influenced by 
interorganisational competition. 
 
The Africa Bureau recognised the changing political scene, both in Africa and the UK, 
and the need for the organisation to alter its focus accordingly. It highlighted the 
increased challenge of funding its operations since many African states became 
independent: “we can no longer rely on popular interest to supply our financial 
resources as we did during the struggle for independence”.288 It argued for a focus on 
“accurate and specialist knowledge…if we are to assist in the honourable and 
responsible discharge of Britain’s responsibilities both to the ex-colonies and to Africa 
as a whole”.289 It is in light of such arguments that the planned reorganisation of the 
Bureau was justified. The Bureau shifted its research work to the Africa Publications 
Trust, a related charity, to allow for limited funds to be focused on “the task of 
influencing policies”. It was also argued that “policies of protest and demonstration 
can no longer bring change at a time when direct British political control no longer 
exists in Africa”. This change in focus was an attempt by the Bureau to further 
differentiate itself from the AAM, Justice for Rhodesia and other organisations that 
were still actively organising protests and campaigns. It shows a clear shift in focus to 
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research, and is reminiscent of the Fabian idea of permeation, succinctly defined as 
"the strategy of spreading Fabian ideas to all receptive parties, leaders, and 
government officials, and working through them for reform”.290 In this sense the 
Africa Bureau differed in its methods to the other organisations considered, as it 
focused very clearly on this strategy of disseminating information to influence opinion 
on the Rhodesia issue. In this sense, it countered the trend amongst the other 
advocacy organisations, and the African nationalist movement, of focusing specifically 
on the Labour Party. However, by the late 1970s, the Executive Committee of the 
Bureau decided that it had outlived its original purpose, and it was eventually closed 
down in 1978.291 
 
The RECC and later the Zimbabwe Emergency Campaign Committee (ZECC) were both 
formed from a broad spectrum of organisations, initially at a meeting called by the 
AAM in December 1971. The agreed purpose of the RECC, at its inception, was “to 
organise a massive, broadly based demonstration” in opposition to the Home-Smith 
settlement proposals which were under discussion at the time.292 This drive to draw a 
range of sympathetic organisations together to work on the same issue demonstrates 
an awareness that at pivotal moments, it was important to avoid competing for 
support and attention as this would ultimately be less effective. At its inaugural 
meeting arrangements for the aforementioned demonstration were discussed, and a 
working party established in order to organise it. This working party included 
representatives from various organisations, both political and advocacy, such as the 
AAM, the Labour Party and the Communist Party. The demonstration was scheduled 
to be held February 1972, whilst the commissioners were in Rhodesia gathering 
opinion, and various ideas for speakers were put forward, such as David Steel, Liberal 
MP; Jimmy Reid, leader of the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders Work-in; a representative 
from the OAU; a Rhodesian ex-detainee and Kenneth Kaunda or Julius Nyerere to 
represent the regional interests.293 This event is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
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The coalescing of multiple organisations under the auspices of the RECC and ZECC is 
illustrative of the influence of pragmatism, as it demonstrates an awareness that to 
compete for support at crucial times in the campaign (particularly the Pearce 
Commission and lead-up to Lancaster House) would be damaging. It was preferable to 
coalesce at such times to maximise on media impact and public awareness even if that 
meant sacrificing subtle differences in opinion about how best to campaign on the 
Rhodesia issue. 
 
RECC minutes from early 1972 give a more accurate impression of the kinds of groups 
that became involved in this joint campaign. Under the ‘Present’ section of the minutes 
there is a lengthy list of names, accompanied by the organisation represented in each 
case. There were representatives from the National Union of Students (NUS), trade 
unions, AAM, Africa Bureau, Defence and Aid Fund, Labour Party, Communist Party 
and the main African nationalist organisations from Rhodesia.294 This is suggestive of 
the extent of organisational interaction that the RECC managed to inspire with its anti-
Home-Smith settlement proposals activities. It also demonstrates McCarthy and Zald’s 
point that society can act as a resource for organisations by offering pre-existing 
structures through which to campaign. There were also two sets of publicity material 
designed to promote the mass protest that had been organised. One had a print run of 
50,000 copies “to be distributed within the next week” [following the meeting] rapidly 
followed by the second leaflet which gave details of the speakers confirmed for the 
protest. This demonstrates the scope of publicity the RECC achieved for its protest, 
and the organisational strength of the Campaign in that it successfully brought a wide 
range of other groups together, and could then use these sub-networks to distribute 
publicity materials. 
 
At the same time, the RECC was also designing a leaflet to be distributed at the protest 
event itself. There was some discussion around what the leaflet should contain and 
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any additions and alterations that should be made to a draft version that was 
circulated at an RECC meeting. It was concluded that the leaflet should include: 
examples of concrete action undertaken by different organisations; a 
request for money for the campaign…raise money for the liberation 
struggle as well as the campaign; include the name and address of the AAM; 
campaign against emigration to Rhodesia; the facts about the Rhodesian 
situation… request funds for the African National Council; request funds for 
the Defence and Aid Fund for Zimbabwe; proposal for a lobby of MPs when 
the Pearce Commission returns.295 
 
This demonstrates two important points about the nature of the RECC. It shows the 
interest of different organisations playing out under the auspices of the campaign, 
and, second, it highlights the divergence of the methods employed by the RECC from 
those of the AAM or the Africa Bureau, in that it was attempting to fundraise directly 
for the nationalist cause, rather being a solely research or protest focused campaign. 
In particular the RECC and the Africa Bureau diverged in their campaigning methods, 
with the latter completely eschewing protest and demonstrations as a viable method 
of influencing the situation, given that Britain did not have direct control. 
 
The Justice for Rhodesia Campaign was formed around a similar time to the RECC, in 
response to a fear of a settlement, with a stated aim to “coordinate and focus some 
aspects of this work” being done by other organisations working on Rhodesia.296 Its 
strategy was focused more on the provision of research and information on Rhodesia 
for Party resolutions and parliamentary questions, publishing articles, lobbying 
Government and helping to police sanctions than on organising “mass meetings or 
marches”.297 Direct support for the African nationalist movement did not fall under its 
remit.298 In ‘Report on the Activities of the Justice for Rhodesia Campaign’, a good 
impression can be gleaned of this organisation’s methods of operation. It highlights 
that its initial aim was to mobilise opposition to the Pearce Commission’s settlement 
proposals. In order to do this, the first actions taken were to produce and distribute a 
leaflet on the subject, and to hold a meeting at Westminster Hall. The meeting was: 
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addressed by Bishop Huddleston, Lord Caradon, Bishop Butler, Eshmael 
Mlambo of the African National Council, and Jeremy Thorpe M.P. Mr 
Garfield Todd, former Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, was to have 
spoken at the meeting, but was prevented from doing so by his detention by 
the regime. A message of support was sent to the meeting by Harold 
Wilson.299 
 
This impressive line-up suggests that the Justice for Rhodesia Campaign played an 
important role in campaigning against the settlement after it was announced. The 
Justice for Rhodesia campaign’s objectives were two-fold: to “ensure that Britain 
fulfils its constitutional, moral and historical obligations towards the people of 
Rhodesia”, and to “persuade Britain to exert its authority in Rhodesia in recognition of 
the findings of the Pearce Commission” in order that the illegal regime is replaced by 
an elected government and so that Britain’s authority in Rhodesia is not usurped by 
South Africa or other external powers.300 Justice for Rhodesia also published the 
monthly paper Newsbrief Rhodesia ‘73,301 which provided news on the situation in 
Rhodesia. Its starting circulation was 2000, which rose to 3750 by June 1973, “at 
which figure, in order to keep within the budget, we must pause”, which demonstrates 
that there was a greater audience than they could cater for.302 Further discussion of 
the Justice for Rhodesia Campaign and the RECC will take place in Chapter 6, which 
focuses specifically on the period surrounding the Pearce Commission. 
 
Arising out of the AAM in the mid-1970s was the Rhodesia Working Group (RWG), an 
organisation initiated at the AAM’s AGM in October 1974 as a response to a feeling 
that action on the Rhodesia issue should be intensified. At the initiative’s inception it 
was decided that the focus should be on Britain. This stemmed from a prevailing 
perception, not only amongst advocacy organisations, but also the African nationalist 
movement, that the real power broker in this situation was the British Government. 
Chapter 5 will explore this point with regards to the nationalist movement in further 
detail. At the inaugural RWG meeting, it was decided that the organisation should 
work on getting the Labour Government to support NIBMAR, and that they should 
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encourage Britain and the UN to pressure Mozambique to enforce sanctions. It also 
stated that support for the issue should be developed “through local AA groups, trades 
councils, CLPs, etc. (fund raising for liberation movement, support for political 
prisoners, etc.).”303 At later meetings the group discussed pertinent developments in 
the Rhodesia crisis, such as hangings, military recruitment and BSAP affiliation to the 
International Police Association, based in England, in order to provide information on 
the situation in Rhodesia to the aforementioned target groups to encourage 
participation in advocacy work.304 
 
‘ZWG report on activity during 1976’, which highlighted the focus and activities of the 
Working Group, gives an insight into the intended methods of this organisation. “The 
immediate priority arising from the meeting on 6 March was the production of a 
leaflet entitled ‘Crisis in Rhodesia’. In total, 50,000 of these have been produced. Their 
distribution has been widespread.” The leaflet was distributed to various community 
relations councils, trade unions, trades councils, CLPs, local AAM groups and student 
groups.305 The report further states that: 
A special effort has been made to develop support within the Labour Party 
especially at the time of the Greenhill visit to Salisbury. A letter was sent to 
all CLPs as a result of which 13 resolutions at least were submitted to the 
NEC. In addition we have had a number of requests for speakers.306 
 
This demonstrates the focus on trying to expand UK based support for the issue, as 
stated in the first set of minutes, and shows the organisation interacting with the 
broader Labour Party and labour movement; utilising existing structures through 
which to campaign. 
 
As mentioned above, the ZECC was, like its earlier incarnation, the RECC, formed from 
the collaboration of other organisations working on the Rhodesia issue. Following the 
actions of the RECC and the culmination of the Pearce Commission “it was decided 
that the AAM should be given the responsibility of calling the campaign into action if 
the possibility of a sell-out was to occur again”, and in response to the newly elected 
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Conservative Government’s policies on Rhodesia, this is precisely what occurred in 
1979.307 The campaign’s revival was supported by the claim that the British 
Government:  
stated clearly its desire to return the regime to legality and to lift sanctions. 
In the United States the Senate has voted for the lifting of sanctions. Various 
Conservatives and Christian Democratic forces in the EEC have advocated 
similar policies  
 
and that therefore the AAM called for an emergency demonstration to be held on 
30/06/1979. It was concluded that the focus of the newly formed ZECC’s campaign 
should be on preventing the repeal of sanctions308, and encouraging their extension to 
South Africa, preventing recognition of the Smith regime and providing support for 
the Patriotic Front, though it did not specify what form this support should take.309 
 
Various conclusions can be drawn about the methods employed by the ZECC, which 
operated in a similar way to its predecessor. One of its primary concerns was 
cementing its relationship with UK trade unions, and how to extend the scope of this 
collaboration to strengthen the campaign. On this topic, it was stated that 
representatives of the PF should be encouraged to speak at trade union meetings on 
Zimbabwe, and that efforts should be made to get the TUC to pass a resolution at 
Congress to encourage broader labour movement action.310 This highlights the 
intended methods of the ZECC in seeking greater trade union involvement, and 
demonstrates a clear acknowledgement of the fact that greater interaction between 
representatives of the nationalist movement and trade unionists would be helpful in 
encouraging support for the former amongst the latter. Given that there were at this 
time over 13 million trade unionists in the UK311 it is understandable that the ZECC 
adopted this pragmatic approach. 
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Even after the triumphant announcements of the Lancaster House talks, and the high 
hopes pinned to it by the British Government and various other concerned parties, 
there was a notable degree of trepidation amongst UK based advocacy organisations, 
and some parts of the British media that this would simply be the next act in the 
‘comedy of errors’ that was the Rhodesia crisis.312 Indeed, Brickhill argues that during 
the talks “the nationalist leaders complained that they were forced to compromise 
their political programme to an unacceptable degree by Britain”313 and Gurney states 
that during this period the AAM “continued to warn against bad faith on the part of 
the Thatcher government”.314 In light of this, the ZECC organised a detailed schedule 
of events surrounding the programme of the Lancaster House talks to prevent it from 
turning into another sell-out, should that seem to occur. ‘ZECC and the Lancaster 
House Conference’ set out a provisional timetable of events such as discussions and 
meetings with representatives of the Patriotic Front to assess the trajectory of the 
Lancaster House talks and to plan future action, should this be required.315 This 
demonstrates the organisational interaction of the RECC working in a practical way to 
liaise with nationalist representatives and take preventative action should the need 
arise against another proposed settlement with the Smith regime. 
 
It is worth briefly exploring some documents that shed light on interaction between 
relevant organisations. A letter from Jill Jessop, Secretary of the Fabian International 
Commonwealth Bureau (FICB), to Jeremy Bray MP,316 states that he had been booked 
to speak at both a Fabian Society meeting and an Africa Bureau meeting just four days 
apart on the Rhodesia issue. In order to avoid competition on the same issue, the 
Fabian meeting was cancelled, and people were encouraged to attend the Africa 
Bureau meeting instead.317 Similarly, the Justice for Rhodesia campaign made it clear 
that “since it was important to avoid any appearance of competition with Anti-
Apartheid Movement or to duplicate its work, it was felt that local contacts should be 
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put in touch with local Anti-Apartheid groups”.318 These examples again highlight the 
role of pragmatism in encouraging coordination and cooperation between different 
organisations, and avoiding duplication of effort. This coordination in itself is an 
important methodological concern. 
 
Broadly speaking, there was a disconnect between what the nationalist organisations 
requested from UK based advocacy organisations, and how the organisations 
responded. ZANU and ZAPU repeatedly requested material and operational assistance 
from organisations in the UK. This generally took the form of financial aid, but 
sometimes advocacy organisations would be asked to put nationalist representatives 
in touch with influential figures in the UK, or to help publish nationalist propaganda. 
However, the response from advocacy groups was almost always to persist with UK 
based campaigning and lobbying, rather than responding to the precise requests of 
the nationalists. This significant point reinforces the argument made earlier that there 
was a prevailing perception of the British Government as the source of potential 
change and authority in relation to the Rhodesia situation, which clearly had an effect 
on the way in which the AAM and other organisations responded to nationalist 
requests. 
 
The response of advocacy organisations to the requests of the nationalist movement 
can also be explained by the influence of pragmatism on their chosen methods of 
operation. Had their actions been more focused on fundraising for the nationalist 
movement, they would have risked undermining their entire campaigning strategy. 
Such actions would have alienated those among their support base who viewed ZANU 
and ZAPU as terrorist organisations but were happy to campaign against apartheid on 
a constitutionalist basis. Public understanding and media coverage of developments in 
Rhodesia were also shaped by concurrent events such as The Troubles in Northern 
Ireland, which would have strengthened the perception of nationalist movements as 
terrorist in nature. In such a context, advocacy organisations being seen giving 
material aid to armed ‘terrorist’ groups would have invited media condemnation 
which would have had potentially damaging implications for their support base. They 
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would also have risked discrediting themselves with the Labour Party and the trade 
unions, and therefore losing the capacity to exert influence over government policy. So 
whilst some members of advocacy organisations, particularly those further to the left, 
favoured providing material aid to the nationalist movement, rather than an 
abstracted policy of assistance that prioritised lobbying in Britain, a propensity for 
pragmatism and moderacy of approach steered the hand of advocacy organisations 
towards the latter course of action. 
 
This situation was very clearly set out in an Africa Bureau account of a meeting with 
ZANU representatives Nathan Shamuyarira and Frank Ziyambi: 
Ways in which Africa Bureau could help ZANU and African nationalism: 
1. On propaganda level – to answer that put out by Anglo-Rhodesian 
Society. 
The Bureau might be able to provide service by being in touch immediately 
with sympathisers to answer this propaganda. 
2. How to raise money for their activities in Lusaka. 
3. Put ZANU in touch with sympathisers, such as Archbishop Ramsey, I. 
MacLeod.319 
 
However, the Africa Bureau Rhodesia Sub Committee notes did not address this 
specific request for assistance. Instead the Sub Committee spent the majority of its 
time in the planning of future meetings, and organising the writing of reports on 
subjects such as sanctions. 
 
This idea of UK based advocacy work not addressing the specific concerns or requests 
of the nationalist movement is supported by a ZAPU statement, in which Jason Moyo 
argued that British organisations were yet to play an effective role in giving support to 
the African nationalist movement. He also stated that ZANU would continue to press 
them for any assistance they could give.320 This was not that long after prominent 
advocacy campaigning in the UK surrounding the Pearce Commission, which included 
the formation of the RECC as discussed earlier. This suggests dissatisfaction from the 
nationalist organisations over the form that assistance from UK organisations was 
taking, and a frustration that campaigning was ineffective. 
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Clearly advocacy organisations in the UK were working with limited resources, and 
providing substantial financial assistance to ZANU and ZAPU would have been 
impossible. This is illustrated by a letter from Guy Arnold of the Africa Bureau to 
Herbert Chitepo of ZANU in response to the latter’s request for funds. Arnold wrote 
that “the Bureau at present has virtually no money and I am in the middle of fund 
raising in this country at a time when general attitudes are indifferent or antagonistic 
towards Africa”. This highlights not only the issue of limited resources that advocacy 
organisations were working with, but also the problem of fluctuating interest in the 
Rhodesia crisis, as discussed in the previous chapter, and the difficulties this 
presented in terms of trying to galvanise support for the cause. However, despite the 
constraints of limited funds, it seems that organisations were perhaps also limited by 
adherence to conventional ideas about campaigning. A good example of this notion is 
the RECC rally organised around the time of the Pearce Commission. Although this 
was attended by around 15000 people,321 it served little purpose in the sense that the 
Pearce Commission was charged with ascertaining African opinion on the latest 
settlement proposals, the so called ‘test of acceptability’, which was duly found to be 
resoundingly negative. Mike Terry of the AAM argued that without the strong ‘No’ 
campaign ‘there was a greater chance that there would have been a settlement in 
Rhodesia’.322 However it is implausible that it had any such effect, given the lack of 
media freedom under the Smith regime323 and the reasonably robust process of the 
Pearce Commission. That said, the rally attracted media coverage, albeit not 
overwhelmingly positive,324 and therefore served to raise further awareness of the 
Rhodesia issue in the UK. 
 
The nuanced consideration of social movement concerns as articulated by McCarthy 
and Zald is reflective of the nature of advocacy organisation activity surrounding the 
Rhodesia issue. The AAM’s stated aims were simply to campaign against the white 
racist regimes of southern Africa and, specifically with regard to Rhodesia, to 
                                                          
321 Fieldhouse, Anti-Apartheid: 136. 
322 Ibid. 
323 E. Windrich, ‘Rhodesian Censorship: The Role of the Media in the Making of a One-Party State’ African Affairs 78: 313 
(1979): 523-534. 
324 See for example ‘43 held after London rally’ The Guardian, 14/02/1972. 
114 
 
campaign against the British Government ‘selling out’ to the Smith regime. However, 
this aim in itself is not instructive of the organisation’s methods. As discussed above, 
the AAM took a ‘multi-layered’ approach in trying to extend support for its cause 
amongst the labour movement; trying to encourage trade union leaders to alter policy 
and pass resolutions on Rhodesia, and at grass roots by trying to raise awareness and 
thus mobilise support amongst trade unionists. Whilst it is stated earlier in the 
chapter that it is difficult to assess the level of success such a strategy had, McCarthy 
and Zald’s argument about multiple concerns facing social movement organisations 
helps to shed some light on why this might have formed part of the AAM’s 
methodology in its Rhodesia campaign. 
 
Whilst a simplistic view of the AAM’s actions might hold that the TUAG was simply 
trying to expand the support base of the cause amongst another demographic, 
thinking more carefully about the potential effects of the different campaign strands 
shows a more complex methodology in play. Trying to raise awareness and 
understanding of the Rhodesia issue amongst trade unionists has a direct relationship 
to the British Government (McCarthy and Zald’s point about the traditional focus of 
social movement studies; engagement with the authorities); the Rhodesian 
Government (an engagement, albeit indirect, with the object of desired change) and 
the wider source of potential sympathisers. Whilst the point stands that it is difficult 
to assess how effective the AAM’s attempted engagement with trade unions was, 
analysing this engagement through the lens of one strand of resource mobilisation 
theory helps to highlight the implementation of a far more complex and holistic 
methodology than is immediately apparent. 
 
McCarthy and Zald distinguish between social movement organisations (SMOs), social 
movement industries (SMIs) and the social movement sector (SMS). In this instance a 
SMO would be, for example, the AAM or the Africa Bureau, the SMI would be all 
organisations and campaigns surrounding the Rhodesia issue, or southern Africa if 
you wanted to take a broader conception of the SMI. The SMS refers to all social 
movements within a society, regardless of the cause they are working on, so it is 
worth being aware of the possible effect on issue competition with other SMOs in 
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separate SMIs. This leads into discussion of the second point set out above, regarding 
the effect of interorganisational competition on a movement’s tactics. Since the 
campaign in support of the African nationalist movement was quite diffuse in terms of 
the organisations involved, discussion will first be focused on intra-SMI competition. 
 
To a large extent, from sources that touch directly on this issue, it seems that advocacy 
organisations, or SMOs, were acutely aware of the pitfalls of operating in competition 
with one another over the Rhodesia issue, and as far as possible sought to avoid this. 
Two examples discussed above, of Jeremy Bray being booked to speak at two 
meetings, and this being avoided, and the Justice for Rhodesia Campaign and AAM 
explicitly avoiding the duplication of efforts, demonstrates that organisations were 
keen to avoid competition with other similar organisations, although in the case of 
Justice for Rhodesia and the AAM this point is somewhat weaker since the latter was 
instrumental in the creation of the former. However, the existence of the Justice for 
Rhodesia campaign in itself shows a high level of cooperation in the Rhodesia SMI, 
since it brought various organisations together to work on a focused campaign. This 
point is also supported by the example of the Africa Bureau consciously differentiating 
itself from other organisations. Whilst this is the opposite of collaborative work, it 
shows an awareness of the benefits of organisations working on different aspects of 
campaigning, according to individual strengths. This aspect of advocacy organisations’ 
methods is also illustrative of the influence of pragmatism on their strategic choices 
and ways of working, driven partly by limited sources of funding and support. 
 
It is difficult to argue without further primary evidence of the ways in which the 
various organisations working on the Rhodesia issue in Britain interacted with one 
another on a more personal level, although, as highlighted in the introductory chapter, 
there was an overlap of personnel between some of the main organisations 
campaigning on Rhodesia. This overlap indicates a desire to avoid duplication of 
efforts of other similar organisations, and the change in focus of the Africa Bureau 
demonstrates that where competition contributed to the limited availability of funds, 
organisations were keen to seek out some kind of niche, or focus, so that campaign 
efforts could be more productively channelled.  
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In terms of the effect on tactics that competition with other issues may have had, it 
would seem to relate directly to the nature of the fluctuating levels of support. 
Chapter 2 highlighted the correlation between key events in the Rhodesia timeline 
that received media attention and a boost in advocacy organisation activity. Relating 
this point to the subject of this chapter, it can be argued that a key tactic used by 
advocacy organisations was to capitalise on media coverage of key events. A good 
example of this would be the AAM utilising publicity about settlement attempts to 
foster anger at the potential sell-out of the British government, in order to strengthen 
attendance at public meetings and demonstrations on such issues. This links neatly to 
the third point, borrowed from McCarthy and Zald, which places society as an 
infrastructural resource that movements can draw on. 
 
Perhaps the strongest, albeit broad, example of this argument is advocacy 
organisations working on the Rhodesia issue utilising existing social structures 
through which to focus their operations. Whilst the AAM saw trade unions as an 
important, largely untapped, pool of potential sympathisers, the union structure also 
represented an easy way of targeting a large group of people relatively easily, since 
communication structures were already in place. Whilst Fieldhouse states that the 
AAM’s strategy of involving the trade unions was met with “limited success”,325 and 
examples cited above corroborate this, McCarthy and Zald’s argument would seem to 
provide an, at least partial, explanation as to why the organisation persisted with this 
line of activity, even going so far as to establish a sub-group devoted to this aspect of 
its work. 
 
Various conferences and public meetings led by different advocacy organisations 
involved in the Rhodesia issue made use of contacts in society, outside of the inner 
circle of the social movement, in order to help raise awareness of the cause and 
support the campaign. The Africa Bureau organised a conference on Rhodesia in late 
1965 “to provide information on the present situation in Rhodesia, to consider the 
implications for Britain of the continuing crisis, and to discuss the policy which should 
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be adopted by Britain”. Speakers at this conference included John Reed of University 
College Rhodesia, Colin Legum of the Observer and George Cunningham who was 
Labour Party Commonwealth Officer at the time.326 This range of people involved in 
the conference demonstrates the Africa Bureau utilising sympathetic contacts from 
different sectors of society in order to provide different perspectives on the Rhodesia 
issue to conference attendees, and also to try and ensure coverage of the event in 
circles outside of existing Africa Bureau affiliates. This was the case with many similar 
events held by other organisations campaigning on Rhodesia; participants 
represented a cross section of, albeit generally sympathetic, society. 
 
In terms of Tilly’s arguments regarding repertoires of protest, the UK based Rhodesia 
advocacy campaign was certainly national in nature. Various SMOs were active in 
keeping up to date with, publishing information about, and responding to the actions 
of the British Government in relation to the Rhodesia issue. This really formed the 
focal point of the campaign at all stages, since the British Government was such an 
integral part of the situation. Furthermore, as discussed in the previous chapter, it was 
when the British Government was most active on Rhodesia, particularly around the 
times of settlement negotiations and Commonwealth meetings, that UK based 
advocacy organisations were also at their most active. Whilst the focus was ostensibly 
international, in that the recipients of the claimants’ actions were Rhodesia freedom 
fighters, the campaign in the UK largely coalesced around national issues, with some 
action taken around shocking events in Rhodesia such as public hangings. It is almost 
certainly the case that internationally based repertoires of action have now, if not 
superseded, become as prevalent as national forms of protest. In many ways the 
Rhodesian issue falls into both categories, because of its complex international make-
up. Regardless of this, Tilly’s point stands that action was certainly focused over and 
above a local level, whilst simultaneously making use of local structures of 
organisation. 
 
The key forms of organisation and operation of the larger SMOs working on the 
Rhodesia issue were certainly modular. This is particularly noticeable with the AAM, 
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purely because of its size. It had local branches, which adhered to the same aims and 
focus as the national organisation, and were tasked with local variants of the national 
campaign, for example to seek resolutions from local and constituency Labour parties, 
and to raise awareness of the issue in the local area.327 The modular nature of the 
repertoire of contention was also noticeable amongst student action. There were 
many ‘teach-ins’ organised on various UK university campuses to raise awareness of 
the Rhodesia issue, and try and establish a larger support base for the pro-
independence advocacy movement.328 
 
The final point of Tilly’s three-part characterisation of contemporary repertoires is 
autonomy; the idea that claimants, or social movement organisations, represent 
themselves directly to the source of the grievance. Going back to data examined 
earlier in the chapter, relating to the methods used by various organisations, there is 
lots of evidence of meetings with representatives of the Government, at various 
intervals during the playing out of the Rhodesian situation, at which organisations 
directly discussed their concerns on the issue. Clearly, whole organisations were not 
attending such meetings, but neither were they employing representatives from 
outside of the movement. Sometimes at public meetings called by advocacy 
organisations, representatives of the Government or the nationalist movement 
attended in order to provide a credible direct source of information on the situation, 
but such meetings were largely aimed at raising awareness and trying to boost the 
number of supporters of the advocacy cause, rather than directly representing the 
movement’s concern to power brokers.  
 
From this brief discussion it is clear that Tilly’s conception of the contemporary 
repertoire of contention is applicable to UK based advocacy organisations 
campaigning on the Rhodesia issue. If organisations were constrained by familiar 
ideas about the structure and form that social movement organisations take, it would 
follow that the repertoire of contention also influences organisations in terms of the 
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more specific protest actions and methods they employ. Certainly from the above 
consideration of advocacy methodology, there are no particular tactics or actions that 
stand out as representing an innovation in the way that campaigning is carried out. It 
would seem that the methods used by advocacy organisations working on the 
Rhodesia issue conformed to engrained social logics of ‘how to campaign’. 
Conclusion 
This chapter identified and discussed the methods used by UK based advocacy 
organisations in campaigning in support of the African nationalist movement in 
Rhodesia. From this discussion it can be seen that organisations used a wide range of 
different methods available to them, with some organisations drawing on a wider 
range than others. The variety of different methods employed is most closely 
correlated to the focus and aims of an organisation. The best illustration of this point 
is the Africa Bureau. It used a narrower range of campaigning methods, often akin to 
the Fabian strategy of permeation, than the other organisations that had more general 
aims and used a variety of tactics. Despite these differences between organisations, 
the central methods used in campaigning on the Rhodesia issue remained much the 
same: protests, public meetings, the production and distribution of leaflets, and the 
involvement of other sympathetic organisations to extend their support network, 
focusing particularly on the British labour movement. These methods, and the 
particular actions taken by various organisations illustrate the constraints placed on 
the Rhodesia campaign by the pragmatic approach adopted by many of those leading 
it. It can be argued that organisations campaigning on the Rhodesia issue were 
constrained by a more specific repertoire of contention than Tilly’s: one that limited 
any perceived militancy of action, encouraged the maintenance of a reasonable 
working relationship with the Labour Party and trade unions never strayed into 
providing material support for the nationalist movement. This was a repertoire 
guided by pragmatism and an attempt to maximise the support base for the campaign 
to the broadest possible audience and therefore exert political influence. 
 
Much advocacy campaigning on Rhodesia met with limited success. With the 
exception of the Africa Bureau, which decided to close because it was deemed to have 
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outlived its initial purpose, other advocacy organisations working on the issue 
survived to see Zimbabwean independence. Survival in itself was an indication of 
some success, since it required interested participants and a certain level of resources. 
Furthermore, there was media coverage of many of the advocacy organised protests 
and events on Rhodesia, and dedicated publications that delivered a greater level of 
detail on the Rhodesia crisis than the mainstream media was providing. That said, it is 
difficult to assess what impact such activities had on the trajectory of the Rhodesia 
crisis itself. It is questionable that, for example, the coverage of events in Anti-
Apartheid News, or the rally in Trafalgar Square had any impact on the decision-
making of successive British Governments on Rhodesia, and certainly the African 
nationalist movement felt that advocacy organisations were not benefiting their cause. 
This limited success is a result of the over-cautious approach advocacy organisations 
adopted as a result of being constrained by pragmatism. 
 
Whilst at first glance it can appear that UK based advocacy organisations working on 
the Rhodesia issue campaigned somewhat sporadically, and ignored the requests of 
the African nationalist movement, looking at their activities through the lens of 
resource mobilisation theory can help to distil the seemingly incoherent picture of 
events into one that follows a more logical pattern of action. Of particular salience 
here is the first point borrowed from McCarthy and Zald regarding the range of 
concerns that a SMO has aside from its specific aims. Applying this point to the actions 
of the various advocacy organisations considered in this chapter helps to make more 
sense of the various methods that were being employed, that did not always seem to 
directly further the aims of the different organisations. Organisations could not simply 
focus all of their time and resources into fundraising for the nationalist movement, 
since in order to do either of these things effectively they needed the support and 
understanding of the British public. However, advocacy organisations were perhaps 
too concerned with this, and focused almost all of their attention on building support, 
particular amongst audiences who were preoccupied with other issues, as was the 
case with the majority of the trade union movement. 
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It seems clear that the actions of various advocacy organisations in campaigning in 
support of the nationalist movement, conform to the three points drawn from 
McCarthy and Zald’s seminal paper on resource mobilisation theory. As set out above, 
the point about multiple concerns of a movement was of particular use in helping to 
decode the initially disparate array of social movement activity on Rhodesia. But 
equally, the points on organisational competition and engaging with society as a 
resource also help to explain the methods used by organisations. Admirably, 
competition with other organisations was avoided as far as possible, which meant 
certain organisations re-shaping or narrowing their focus so as not to ‘duplicate 
efforts’. It also meant that, when possible, events or campaigns would be co-run by 
two or more organisations to maximise efficiency and attendance. The final point, 
about society as a resource rather than just the object of intended change, was more 
challenging to explore, simply because of available archival material. However, it can 
be seen that organisations made use of existing structures, such as local and 
constituency Labour parties, trade unions, existing publications, and contacts in 
various fields outside of the SMS to help facilitate campaigning.  
 
An important final point arising from the discussion of advocacy methodology, 
coupled with the insights gained from applying some theoretical perspectives, is that 
there needs to be an analytical separation of ends and means when looking at the 
historical trajectory of campaigns. It is easy to consider an organisation’s stated 
aim(s), and then move chronologically through its campaign as it unfolds with an 
implicit conception that each action is perpetuated by the initial stated aim. 
Fieldhouse’s discussion of the AAM unfolds in this way. However, this approach does 
not consider how each action relates to the initial focus of the organisation, nor does it 
consider the constraints placed on an organisation by the broader context in which it 
is operating. For example, the inability to materially support the nationalist movement 
because of a pragmatic awareness that this may alienate supporters who saw 
nationalists as terrorists but nonetheless supported independence on a 
constitutionalist basis. Organisations are influenced by a far broader range of 
concerns, a more complex relationship with other organisations and with society, and 
with campaigns that have gone before, and it is only through considering the existence 
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and impact of these things that a clearer picture of advocacy methodology can emerge. 
Understanding that advocacy organisations were constrained by pragmatic 
considerations of the reality in which they were operating is key to understanding 
their chosen methods and actions. This links to the next chapter, which considers the 
labour movement’s response to the Rhodesia crisis, as the idea of competing concerns 
plays a key role in that analysis. 
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Chapter 4: The British labour movement and the Search for 
a Solution to the Rhodesia Crisis 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the relationships of British trade unions and the Labour Party 
with UK based advocacy organisations, the African nationalist movement, and each 
other. The aims of the chapter are to identify the character of these relationships, and 
to consider what this can tell us about the Party leadership and the trade union 
movement’s stances on Rhodesia. As mentioned in Chapter 2, there were many other 
issues on the agenda, with which Rhodesia was competing for attention, and this will 
be considered in more detail here with specific reference to trade unions and the 
Labour Party. In this context, Labour Party leadership refers to the prime minister and 
the Cabinet at times when Labour was in power, and the Leader of the Opposition and 
shadow cabinet during periods of opposition. 
 
This chapter centres on two research questions: how did British trade unions and the 
Labour Party interact with each other, and with advocacy organisations and the main 
African nationalist organisations in response to the Rhodesia issue? The second 
question is about the character of these relationships; for example were they 
characterised by positive interaction and mutual support, and if so, how was this 
manifested in various interactions? In this chapter the Labour Party becomes the 
central force in the story, around which narratives of the other organisations coalesce. 
As will be seen, each of the other groups of organisations almost completely focused 
their attention on the Labour Party, because they were perceived as the key power 
brokers in the Rhodesian crisis. Therefore, despite the thesis’ stated objective of 
moving away from elite dominated accounts of the Rhodesian situation, it was not 
possible to omit the Party leadership from the story. Indeed, by looking at interactions 
with advocacy organisations, the African nationalist movement and trade unions, the 
elite dominated narratives found in the existing studies can still be countered. 
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There is almost no consideration of the role of the trade union movement in the 
Rhodesia issue in existing secondary literature. As discussed in the literature review, 
texts focusing on British policy towards Rhodesia during the period under 
consideration generally take a governmental approach, and to a large extent fail to 
consider the actions of grass roots organisations or the broader labour movement in 
Britain. This chapter seeks to counter these elite-dominated narratives of Britain’s 
engagement with the Rhodesia issue. 
 
Wrigley argues that Wilson had a preoccupation with putting the Conservative Party 
on the back foot, which could dominate his thinking on the Rhodesia issue. He further 
argues that this preoccupation with image and the Tories meant that moral principles 
sometimes took a back seat in the creation of foreign policy.329 This is reinforced by 
Ralph Miliband’s analysis of the Labour Party’s parliamentary socialism, which he 
contended struggled to maintain “a clear distance between itself and its political 
opponents”.330 Miliband argued that Labour’s leaders:  
Would not venture into territory where they stood no danger of being 
followed by their opponents, and their opponents would not beat a 
dramatic retreat from the territory which the Labour leaders felt to be their 
own. 
 
This point will be taken into consideration in discussing the character of relationships 
between it and the trade union movement in responding the Rhodesia crisis. 
 
Labour Party relationships 
In May 1966, Richard Crossman wrote of the personal control Harold Wilson 
exercised over the Rhodesia issue, committing the rest of the Cabinet to bystander 
status. He stated that “on Rhodesia, when the Cabinet gets going, the Prime Minister 
just sits and chats and we occasionally ask him a question and the meeting 
disintegrates into amiable discussion, because all the decisions are taken by the 
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PM”.331 This is reinforced by the lack of discussion on Rhodesia in the PLP minutes. 
This prime ministerial influence was coupled by a strong ‘official mind’ influence of 
the civil service. Both influences tended towards the same goal of seeking a formal 
settlement as quickly as possible, whilst ensuring that there was at least some 
promise of progress towards majority rule, and trying to manoeuvre amongst the 
nationalist leaders to identify the more moderate characters who were less under the 
Communist influence. Wilson then had the added goals of trying to maintain Party 
unity, and trying to put the Conservative Party on the back foot. He pursued a 
pragmatic policy in relation to Rhodesia, which frequently overrode a commitment to 
an ethical foreign policy. A good example of this pragmatic approach, from early on in 
the Rhodesia crisis when it was apparently succeeding, comes from Crossman’s 
diaries:  
First he tried to prevent UDI at all costs; then he put on mild sanctions 
which wouldn’t upset people; now he’s moving forward to more serious 
sanctions. Each time he carries public opinion with him and creates a 
situation in which an unsure Tory leader has been quite unable to display 
any qualities of leadership.332 
 
These underpinning influences and aims can be seen throughout the Labour Party 
leadership’s handling of the Rhodesia situation, from its formal negotiations with the 
Smith regime, to its dealings with nationalist representatives and the advocacy 
movement in Britain.  
 
Discussing the actions of the nationalist movement in seeking support from and 
interacting with people outside of Rhodesia, Day argues that the nationalist leaders 
persistently perceived Rhodesia as a normal colony, and that this assumption 
coloured the demands nationalists made of the British, for example asking them to 
rescind laws passed by the Rhodesian Front Government. He states that, “the 
nationalists have repeated their entreaties over and over again to an almost 
permanently impervious British Government.”333 This point captures the need to 
include the Labour Party leadership in comparative discussion in this chapter, whilst 
the thesis aims to move away from such elite dominated accounts. The Labour 
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leadership was seen, not just by the African nationalist movement, but the trade union 
movement and advocacy organisations as the key power-broker of the situation in 
Rhodesia, and was therefore where much campaigning on the Rhodesia issue was 
aimed. 
 
A meeting held shortly after UDI between Labour Ministers, represented by Arthur 
Bottomley, and Nelson Samkange, a ZAPU representative based in London, provides 
an early example of the type of relationship established between these two parties. Mr 
Samkange was clearly eager to establish what Labour’s post-UDI policy on Rhodesia 
would look like, and received, what were to become typically, evasive and cautious 
answers. The (British) minutes state: 
Mr Samkange said that while they [ZAPU] broadly accepted that the British 
Government was determined to bring Mr Smith’s regime down, they did not 
necessarily agree with the methods being employed. What ZAPU wanted to 
know was what the British Government intended to do after the regime had 
been ended… The Minister of State said that…it was not easy to define what 
would happen afterwards but the British Government would probably be 
making a statement in due course.334 
 
This sort of exchange was typical of the many to follow between representatives of the 
African nationalist movement in the UK, and members of the British Government or 
the civil service. Nationalist representatives often posed difficult questions, relating 
explicitly to some aspect of British policy on Rhodesia. In response, British officials 
generally had no direct response, since this would have required setting out a 
commitment to certain policies. Instead, Labour Party representatives often made 
vague placatory remarks in the context of a verbal discussion, but did not commit 
themselves to any particular course of action. Despite this, these exchanges always 
seemed to take the same diplomatic tone, on both sides. 
 
In a display characteristic of the polite manner in which UK based African nationalist 
representatives seemed to address British politicians, Samkange wrote to Herbert 
Bowden congratulating him on his appointment as Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations. In the letter, he requested a meeting with Mr Bowden, 
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saying “I am ready to meet you any day and at any time which is convenient to you”.335 
Whilst it was not possible to locate a reply from Bowden, the initial letter itself is 
instructive, since it gives a clear impression of the deferential way in which UK based 
nationalists addressed members of the Labour Party leadership. This is borne out in 
many examples, both in writing and in records of face to face interactions. This point 
will be returned to in greater detail in the next chapter, which will compare the 
behaviour of African nationalists based overseas, particularly in Britain, and those 
based at home, including the regional bases of Zambia and Mozambique. The aim of 
this comparison will be to establish whether there was another fault line in the 
nationalist movement between these two groups in terms of attitude to, and 
communications with Britain. 
 
In a memo from Salisbury-based British diplomats, sent to the Commonwealth Office, 
an account of Mkudu’s leadership of the opposition African national party, the UPP, is 
provided. It reasoned that his purpose was “not so much to seek personal 
aggrandisement as to use UPP as a focus and to persuade ZANU/ZAPU elements to 
sink their differences.” Mkudu and the UPP were far more moderate than either ZANU 
or ZAPU, believing that majority rule was inevitable in the long term, but that it should 
be achieved by “evolution not revolution”.336 Mkudu believed that “British 
Constitution proposals offer Africans the assurance of real advance”, the African 
population should register and vote when possible, change should be sought through 
moderate methods over violent ones and that NIBMAR should “not be interpreted as 
meaning majority rule tomorrow”; there is bound to be an interim period.337 This final 
point, it was reported, Mkudu was struggling to convey to the population in general. In 
conclusion: 
we have nothing to lose and possibly something to gain by giving Mkudu 
what help we can, particularly over the NIBMAR hurdle. This could take the 
form a statement clarifying Her Majesty’s Government’s thoughts on what 
this is likely to involve.338 
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This shows a willingness on the part of the FCO to accept an interim period short of 
NIBMAR if it meant moving towards a resolution of the Rhodesia crisis, and the 
recommendation of this course of action to the Government. It is clear that Mkudu’s 
moderate views and policy regarding the advancement of majority rule was far more 
in line with the opinion of the Labour Party leadership than that of ZANU or ZAPU. 
Given this, the civil service saw the potential for establishing a relationship based on 
assistance and accommodation, rather than the polite dismissal afforded to the other 
nationalist groups. 
 
In a meeting between Herbert Chitepo, representing ZANU in Britain, and Herbert 
Bowden, the former challenged the Labour Government on three specific points: that 
the British seemed to denigrate the leadership of the African nationalist movement; 
that there seemed to be no precise definition of what NIBMAR was, and the futility of 
the present sanctions regime.339 Chitepo elaborated that it was disturbing that “there 
was no positive programme for the application of NIBMAR”, to which Mr Bowden 
“spoke of a “long haul” and Sir Morris James thought its application would be 
“determined by events””. The ZANU account of this meeting does not detail any British 
responses to the concerns raised, with the exception of NIBMAR being referred to as a 
‘long haul’. The British minutes, in response to nationalists pushing for British-African 
negotiations following the failure of Tiger state:  
the Commonwealth Secretary said that the British Government had always 
been conscious of the need to keep in touch with African opinion…and that 
the Prime Minister had had talks with both Mr Nkomo and the Rev. N. 
Sithole just before i.d.i. [UDI].340 
 
From looking at both accounts of this meeting it can be seen that several points were 
raised by the ZANU delegation that were either avoided, or answered obscurely by the 
Labour Government representatives. 
 
A comparable meeting took place the following month between Arthur Bottomley, 
then Minister for Overseas Development, and ZAPU representatives, Mr Chitsiga 
(ZAPU representative in London) and Mr Pilani-Ndebele (First Secretary of the ZAPU 
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London Office). This meeting began very politely, with Mr Chitsiga saying that it was 
essentially a courtesy call, since he and Mr Pilani-Ndebele were relatively new to the 
UK. This quickly moved on to the issue of NIBMAR, as had occurred in the meeting 
between the Government and ZANU representatives earlier in the month: “Mr Chitsiga 
said they sought a clarification of the British Government’s position on NIBMAR”.341  
The reply to this evaded the essential thrust of the nationalist question, which was 
what Britain intended to do regarding the policy. Labour’s reticence to provide a clear 
answer on this point illustrates an emphasis on maintaining the Party line on 
Rhodesia in the post-Tiger period. In Cabinet immediately following Smith’s rejection 
of the proposals, various hypothetical situations were proposed including “a return to 
the 1961 Constitution during the period before independence, including the 
suggestion of an Act of Union between the United Kingdom and Rhodesia” and a 
flexible interpretation of NIBMAR that “did not imply that majority rule would follow 
at once or even in the near future.”342  
 
Mr Chitsiga also tried to push the issue of Britain using force if law and order were to 
break down, which was strongly rebuffed by Mr Bottomley saying that Britain 
“deplored talk of violence, and did not believe violence could secure the future for 
Rhodesia.” This point is reiterated later in the meeting when it is stated that “our 
reports indicated that at present the situation in Rhodesia could not be described as 
showing a break down in law and order.”343 These discussions, as in the two records 
of the meeting held earlier in the month, give an impression of how the Labour 
Government and representatives of the African nationalist movement interacted. 
These face to face dealings illustrate the nationalists trying to get the British to answer 
probing questions about their policy on Rhodesia, and Labour Ministers giving 
consistently polite but evasive answers, ensuring the nationalist movement had 
nothing concrete it could report to the media, or use in later negotiations. 
 
UK minutes report a meeting with a ZANU delegation in October 1967: 
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Mr Shamuyarira recalled with pleasure the meeting he had had with the 
Secretary of State in July 1964 in Malawi. On behalf of ZANU he 
congratulated the Secretary of State on his appointment and said that they 
were confident they could look to him for sympathy. They recognised that 
he had inherited an awful problem. While the cause was undoubtedly the 
actions of the illegal regime they nevertheless felt that the British 
Government’s response had been unenlightened and in particular had two 
main defects. 344 
 
The ZANU delegation elaborated that the British Government appeared to believe in 
the possibility of a compromise with the Smith regime, and that they “had given no 
commitment to an alternative government and seemed to have no views on an 
alternative situation”.345 These minutes show a growing assertiveness on the part of 
the African nationalist contingent. Although the encounter begins with the familiar 
polite, bordering on obsequious, tone, this quickly gives way into an overt challenge to 
the Government’s position. The reported response from the Secretary of State consists 
largely of platitudes such as “he wished to see an honourable settlement” and “there 
was no question of a sell-out”.346  
 
Prior to the Labour Party conference in 1967, a memo was issued requesting civil 
servants to compile notes on certain key figures, in advance of possible encounters 
with them during the conference. This included a section on ZANU and ZAPU: 
The Secretary of State would like the [Rhodesia] Department's advice on 
how he should handle them [ZANU/ZAPU] at Scarborough. Should he go out 
of his way to meet them, or if they approach him asking for a formal 
meeting should he agree to see them?347 
 
The memo asks for a list of names of likely representatives, and any useful 
information about them. This document is illustrative of the unequal footing upon 
which the relationship between representatives of the African nationalist movement 
and representatives of the Labour Government was based. Prior to any possible 
encounter with African nationalists, the requisite Labour Minister was able to request 
background information on the people they would be meeting with, the situation as it 
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stood, and specific advice from the Rhodesia Department on how best to handle 
possible questions. The nationalist representatives had none of this support in 
entering into discussions with the Labour Government. Day’s assertion that it was 
generally the responsibility of more senior nationalists in the overseas offices to 
“wring money from local sources” is suggestive of the difficulties nationalists faced in 
maintaining a presence in Britain.348 
 
In March 1968 Frank Judd led a delegation of Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) 
members to see the Chancellor, then Roy Jenkins. Although not an example of direct 
communication between African nationalists and the Labour Government, the 
documentation surrounding this visit is insightful into the guiding principles behind 
much of the Government’s policy in this area. The Rhodesia Department memo sent to 
Roy Jenkins prior to the visit reads: 
We strongly recommend the Chancellor, when seeing the deputation, to 
take note of any propositions which are made, but to avoid any 
commitment as to the extent to which we might be prepared to go. He can, 
of course, reject the use of force…  As to any other propositions he should 
say that he will bear these in mind and convey them to his colleagues as 
appropriate.349 
 
The way in which this memo advises Mr Jenkins to respond to points made by Mr Judd 
is clearly reminiscent of the responses given to representatives of the African 
nationalist movement in earlier examples of meetings. The words “avoid any 
commitment” in particular evoke the way in which nationalists’ questions are 
typically sidestepped. Following the above quote, the rest of the brief goes through 
various general policy points relating to Rhodesia, such as the intended outcome of 
sanctions, and the continued opposition to the use of force. This example also 
illustrates the direct influence of the civil service on the Labour leadership and how 
the Rhodesia situation was handled. 
 
In October 1968, the resumption of talks with the Smith regime triggered a strident 
response from Frank Ziyambi, the London-based ZANU representative. He wrote to 
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Harold Wilson, signalling the nationalist movement’s continued commitment to armed 
struggle, since the talks excluded them and this was the only way to proceed. Second, 
he argued that law and order had essentially broken down in Rhodesia, referring to 
the guerrilla war, and pointed out that Britain had earlier said it would only consider 
the use of force in such a case.350 It called on the British Government to make a choice; 
“to come out openly and unequivocally on the side of the black majority in Zimbabwe, 
or on the side of the white settler minority”.351 There is no official reply to this letter 
present in the archives, however there is a FCO document discussing how to respond 
to the letter, which further demonstrates the guiding policy behind Government 
dealings with African nationalists. The note stated that Number 10 should be advised 
“not to attempt to send a detailed rebuttal of Mr Ziyambi’s points.”352 It went on to 
state that in the view of the Rhodesia Department, “law and order in the usual 
meaning of these words, has not broken down”. It concluded by saying that these 
arguments would probably not “weigh” with Mr Ziyambi, and that it would not be a 
good time to get into a debate with him which he might subsequently publish. This 
proposed response was characteristic of the dismissive way in which the Labour Party 
leadership dealt with representatives of the nationalist movement in these earlier 
encounters, without really engaging with the arguments set out and finding a way of 
politely ignoring them. 
 
In early November 1968, whilst on a trip to follow up on the Fearless proposals, 
George Thomson353 met with the Reverend Sithole and Robert Mugabe in Salisbury. At 
this time, Thomson was in frequent contact with Wilson regarding the progress of the 
negotiations with the Smith regime, and very much toed the Party line, telling Kaunda 
on a visit to Zambia that “the pressures in Britain and elsewhere had compelled the 
British Government to talk to Smith despite the embarrassment caused to their 
African allies and to the British Labour Party.”354 There are two accounts of this 
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meeting; British minutes, and ZANU’s record of the meeting, which were “very close in 
substance” according to a Rhodesia Department assessment.355 The full British 
minutes, running to ten pages, highlight the discussion of such issues as the Labour 
Party’s proposals for settlement, the role of sanctions, the use of force (British and 
nationalist) and some finer theoretical points of how an actual transfer of power 
might take place, should any agreement ever be reached. The following passage is 
indicative of the form which the negotiations in this meeting took: 
A further long argument about the use of force ensued, during which Mr 
Thomson and Mr Foley repeated the reasons why HMG had felt compelled 
to rule out this means of dealing with the rebellion. The ZANU 
representatives continued to profess that they were entirely unconvinced 
by the Minister’s arguments. 356 
 
This passage demonstrates a familiar exchange of views, without accommodation by 
either side to move towards any form of compromise, let alone agreement. 
 
Despite some familiarity in the lack of agreement reached in this discussion, the 
minutes differ from earlier examples in that the nationalist representatives were 
given equal chance to speak, and provided intricate and comprehensive responses to 
the arguments set out by the British contingent. This was not always the case. In 
earlier examples it would be unfair to say that the British held court, but they 
certainly occupy a greater percentage of space in the minutes, and the responses given 
by African nationalists were less specific and challenging as those in this encounter. 
This is perhaps to be expected, given that in this instance the British were dealing 
with ZANU’s leadership, and the rapidly rising star of Mugabe. This example of 
interaction between African nationalists and Labour Ministers differs from instances 
discussed above in that it was held in Rhodesia with high level nationalist leaders, 
rather than representatives of the movement based in London. This serves to 
demonstrate the difference of approach between nationalists based in Rhodesia and 
those based overseas; this is addressed in the following chapter.  
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On the same day as this meeting, George Thomson met with Joshua Nkomo, who was 
taken from his place of restriction at Gonakudzingwa. The meeting began with him 
describing the conditions of his restriction: 
They were confined to a compound 35 yards square in which four other 
restrictees were housed. They had no contact with other restrictees or 
detainees. There was no radio available and the only newspapers they were 
allowed were local ones. These had however been recently cut off and Mr 
Nkomo had not known that Mr Thomson was in Rhodesia until the 
afternoon of the previous day when the police had told him that the 
meeting was to take place. 357 
 
This point in itself highlights the inequality of the basis of this interaction; that Nkomo 
had very little time and no resources to prepare for the encounter with the Labour 
Ministers, yet the latter will have known well in advance and have had the resources 
of the Rhodesia Department at their disposal prior to the meeting. This point was 
certainly not lost on Nkomo who pressed Mr Thomson on the matter, and asked how 
he was expected to respond to British proposals which he would hear about for the 
first time at the meeting, and was therefore unable to consult his colleagues. Once 
discussion in the meeting turned to the Fearless proposals, Nkomo offered his 
preliminary impression, which was all he had consented to give, abundantly clear. “It 
seemed that our present proposals were even worse than the ‘Tiger’ proposals which 
had themselves not been acceptable to him”.358 Despite Nkomo’s protestations about 
having neither time nor the opportunity to discuss with his colleagues, the ensuing 
discussion of the Fearless proposals was of a very similar tone and character to that 
outlined in the meeting with ZANU representatives. In common with that meeting, the 
interactions between Nkomo and the British indicated a different tone to those with 
ZAPU representatives based in Britain, which will be discussed in greater detail in the 
next chapter. 
 
This idea about the inequality of interactions between Labour and nationalist 
representatives is reinforced by the example of Wilson’s visit to Rhodesia shortly 
before UDI. He met with Sithole and Nkomo in Salisbury, who had been brought to the 
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capital from their detention camps. They met with Wilson in the late afternoon, having 
travelled all day in the hot sun, without food. To his credit, Wilson was furious at the 
treatment the nationalist leaders had received, and insisted that he wouldn’t meet 
with them until they had been fed the same food he had eaten for lunch.359 This 
example illustrates even more starkly than the previous one the unequal footing 
nationalist representatives were on when conducting discussions with Labour 
representatives, but also highlights the emotional response that the Rhodesia issue 
often provoked amongst those in Britain who campaigned in support of the nationalist 
struggle. Whilst this was unusual for Wilson, it is important in that it highlights that, 
whatever happened later on, his ultimate stance was one of principled equality. 
 
A month after this encounter, George Thomson met with Frank Ziyambi, a ZANU 
representative based in London, at the House of Commons. The meeting began with 
Mr Thomson recounting his meeting with the ZANU leaders in Salisbury, and 
informing Mr Ziyambi that he had “found them in excellent shape and with their spirit 
quite unaffected by imprisonment”.360 Following the meeting in Salisbury, Mr Sithole 
was removed from prison to face on trial by the Rhodesian authorities, the discussion 
of which occupied a further portion of the meeting. The meeting was an example of 
the very polite and even friendly tone which interactions between these two groups 
often took. Mr Thomson emphasised his pleasure at being able to discuss the Fearless 
proposals with nationalist leaders in Rhodesia, since it was a rare opportunity “to 
bring some of their [the nationalist movement’s] leaders rather more fully into the 
picture”.361  Towards the end of the encounter a rare moment of agreement seemed to 
be reached between the two parties: 
Mr Ziyambi said that…he would be grateful for an assurance from Mr 
Thomson that HMG would take no further initiative with Mr Smith. Mr 
Thomson said that he was happy to give this assurance. The next move 
would have to come from within Rhodesia. The political opinions of the 
white Rhodesians were clearly now in a state of flux and we would just 
have to wait and see what happened.”362 
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Whilst this is a rare example of an African nationalist representative asking a Labour 
Minister for a concrete assurance and receiving it, in this case it can be attributed to 
circumstance. The nature of the request happened to correlate with popular opinion 
on the aftermath of Fearless,363 and whilst the proposals remained nominally ‘on the 
table’364 it was politically beneficial for Labour to consent to not pursuing further 
settlement initiatives. 
 
Following the election of Edward Heath’s Conservative Government in 1970, ZANU 
and ZAPU sent a joint memorandum to the British Government in July 1971 setting 
out their position in relation to the latter’s most recent actions, and stating that any 
attempts to negotiate a settlement must prioritise the opinions of the African 
leadership. It ended with a strong assertion of opinion. “Is it the intention of the 
British Government to go down in History as having connived with their kith and kin 
to sell out the six million people? On our part, we shall, forever, show determination to 
liberate our people.”365 There is no evidence of a reply to this memorandum, nor was 
it possible to locate any discussions of it. However, it demonstrates the strength of 
position of the African nationalist movement at this stage in the independence 
struggle, and is indicative of a difference in tone between interactions with the Labour 
Party and the Conservative Party, this being an example of the latter. It also 
demonstrates the difference between direct interactions and those conducted 
remotely, with the latter making more general points and adopting a less polite tone 
than the former. This highlights the instrumental approach of the African nationalists 
in their dealings with representatives of the British political establishment, and a 
belief that direct exchanges might be more productive if they utilised this polite tone 
of interactions, whereas in correspondence they were freer to express the beliefs of 
the movement, with less immediate consequences. 
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In a letter to a colleague in the Rhodesia Department, a Mr J W D Gray366 recounted an 
unofficial meeting he had with Mr Chitepo of ZANU. He stated that “both Mr Chitepo 
and I were at pains to emphasise that there was no formal character to the 
meeting”.367 The letter further stated that “I was able to dress up my interest in 
Rhodesian affairs by reference to certain family connections”, which shows a slightly 
unequal balance to the interaction from the outset. The letter then proceeded to 
outline the key points made by Mr Chitepo during the course of the meeting, which for 
the most part were simply background information already known by the British, 
such as Mr Chitepo’s position, and not of relevance here. However, it did make 
reference to Chitepo’s assessment of ZANU’s view of the British, which is that they 
were “beginning to regard HMG as their enemy since it appeared to be aligning itself 
more and more with the white settlers.”368 The conclusion of the letter merits quoting 
in full, since it provides a clear and somewhat amusing summation of the British 
perspective on how to interact with representatives of the African nationalist 
movement: 
Needless to say, I took an entirely non-committal line in response to all 
these points. Insofar as I made any comments on the settlement or the 
present situation regarding Rhodesia, it was in line with the briefing which 
we have received from the Department on this point. Indeed, Mr Chitepo 
was kind enough to say that he recognised a large number of the arguments 
which I used!369 
 
In late 1971, a meeting was held between Labour Party representatives and a 
nationalist delegation led by Bishop Muzorewa of the ANC. Whilst this is not strictly 
within the remit of the thesis, since a focus on ZANU and ZAPU was declared from the 
initial chapter, it warrants brief discussion for the comparative perspective it offers. 
The minutes demonstrate a far less antagonistic stance than was adopted by 
representatives of ZANU and ZAPU, as discussed above. For instance, the Bishop 
simply advocated the maintenance of sanctions until a resolution was reached that 
was acceptable to the majority of the population. This demonstrates the moderate 
ANC stance, compared to the rhetoric of ZANU and ZAPU. Commensurate with the 
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Bishop’s moderate tone, the meeting began with him being offered £500 towards his 
campaign from the Labour Party’s Southern Africa Solidarity Fund.370 This highlights 
the growing divergence between the moderation of Labour Ministers, and the more 
progressive stance adopted by Party Conference. However, support of the ANC would 
have likely been popular amongst many in Britain, as its more moderate stance 
offered the intention of gradual change. Furthermore, to those who were 
uncomfortable with the violence and forceful rhetoric of ZANU/ZAPU, and the overtly 
racist actions of the Smith regime, the ANC would have offered a comfortable middle 
ground that corresponded with Labour’s parliamentary socialism. With the Party 
leadership’s focus on trying to gain the upper hand over the Conservative Party in 
terms of policy, this can be seen as a pragmatic move. The donation to Bishop 
Muzorewa also demonstrates the difference in the tone and substance of interactions 
when representatives of the Labour Party were dealing with someone who was 
regarded as being more moderate.371 Under the auspices of the Fund, the Labour 
Party later donated £1000 to the Patriotic Front, which was perceived in Britain as a 
front for unity between the nationalist factions, but the Labour Party would not have 
given money in this way to the individual nationalist factions.372 The Labour Party’s 
Fund certainly would not have given money in this way to the individual nationalist 
factions. 
 
In June 1976 Ignatius Chigwendere, a London-based ZANU representative, wrote to 
Barbara Castle, at this point a back bench MP, about the use of secret trials and 
subsequent executions of Zimbabweans in Zambia.373 The responses to this missive 
represent an example of more genuine collaboration between members of the 
nationalist movement and senior Labour figures. Castle passed the matter on to Jenny 
Little, then International Secretary, and asked her to put it on the agenda of the next 
International Committee meeting, at which it was decided to ask Joan Lestor to 
                                                          
370 This fund was chaired by Judith Hart, and had been set up in 1970 in response to resolution passed at Conference 
calling on the NEC to offer full moral and material support to liberation movements in southern Africa, and was funded 
by donations from CLPs and trade unions. See ‘Labour gift to African rebels’, The Guardian, 21/12/1971. 
371 LHASC, LPID Papers, Box 111, Rhodesia Correspondence 1972, Notes on a meeting with Bishop Muzorewa, December 
1971. 
372 Hansard, HC PQs, 24/05/1979; ‘Labour’s Nkomo Gift’ The Guardian, 22/05/1979. 
373 LHASC, LPID Papers, Box 111, Rhodesia Zimbabwe Correspondence, letters between Ignatius Chigwendere, Barbara 
Castle and Jenny Little, 11/06/1976-29/07/1976.  
139 
 
investigate the matter. Jenny Little then wrote a reply to Mr Chigwendere informing 
him of the actions taken. It was not possible to find any further documents on this 
particular subject, in order to ascertain what happened next. However, the response 
of Barbara Castle and Jenny Little to the initial concern demonstrates a genuinely 
collaborative interaction that cannot be seen in earlier examples of meetings between 
nationalists and Labour Party leadership representatives. The explanation for this 
difference is the scope of the issue under discussion, and the relative freedom of 
Britain to act. In meetings discussed earlier, nationalist movement representatives 
were generally raising very broad based concerns, relating directly to the British 
Government’s actions and policy, whereas in this instance it was a very specific 
concern relating to a third party. Furthermore, Castle had always been actively 
supportive of the nationalist movement and, as Crossman wrote in 1965, “paid the 
price for her pertinacity in taking the black African point of view and in being the one 
member of the Cabinet prepared to prevent a settlement in Rhodesia.”374 
 
A Rhodesia Department circular from 1969 outlined some guidance notes on contacts 
with liberations movements.375 It makes several key points of salience in 
understanding the character of interactions. It accepts that under more liberal 
circumstances, many illegal organisations would be legitimate opposition parties, and 
that, apart from the use of force which is to be opposed, “some political objectives of 
nationalist movements are in themselves acceptable and have the sympathy of 
HMG”.376 It goes on to highlight the importance of maintaining contact with nationalist 
organisations otherwise future influence could be left entirely to Russian and Chinese 
Communist elements. It also notes that “it might indeed be in our interests to 
encourage more moderate elements”.377 This suggested behaviour could be seen in 
the way in which donations from Labour Party’s Southern Africa Solidarity Fund were 
dispensed to the more moderate nationalist representatives. The points set out in the 
1969 circular were the guiding policy behind interactions with representatives of the 
African nationalist movement from this time and throughout much of the remaining 
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independence struggle. These guidelines behind policy on Rhodesia illustrate the 
extent to which the Labour Party’s parliamentary socialism coincided with the civil 
service push for a pragmatic approach in responding to the Rhodesia issue. 
 
These policy prescriptions for how British representatives, Governmental or civil 
service, were to interact with representatives of the liberation struggle corroborate 
the points drawn from specific examples of interaction discussed above. The Labour 
Party and nationalist movement representatives maintained a polite, formal 
relationship, throughout the period from UDI to formal independence, with occasional 
more antagonistic interactions. Where direct conversations took place, they often 
involved a core range of topics: sanctions; the practicalities of how a transition to 
independence would function; the latest developments with regards to settlement 
negotiations and so on. Typically, a nationalist representative would raise concerns or 
pose questions on a topic, only for the Labour Government representative(s) to, as far 
as possible, avoid dealing in specific terms with the issue raised, and politely reiterate 
the Party line. 
 
This pattern of interaction gives an insight into the influence of pragmatism on Labour 
Party policy on Rhodesia. As stated in the circular, cited above, setting out guidelines 
for interaction, it was important for Britain not to completely ignore African 
nationalists, lest Communist influence gain more traction. Equally important, though 
not cited in the circular, were pressures from the UN and, in particular, the 
Commonwealth, for Britain to be seen to be making efforts to bring about a 
satisfactory solution to the Rhodesia situation.378 Equally, the strength of African 
nationalist requests would have been politically difficult to implement in Britain, as 
the Labour Party had no intention of military intervention, and was carefully trying to 
maintain Britain’s trading relationship with South Africa. So Labour walked a 
precarious line between various pressures that dictated the nature of interactions 
with the nationalist movement. On the other side of these interactions, it can be seen 
that the nationalist movement, too, was guided by pragmatism when dealing with the 
Labour Party, which was viewed as the key power broker when in Government. The 
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nationalist movement leadership was perpetually trying to persuade Labour to alter 
their policy on Rhodesia, and take a more actively pro-African nationalist stance in the 
long hunt for a solution. Despite the frustrating lack of progress these interactions 
seemed to garner, the Labour Party whilst in power could conceivably have delivered 
the changes the nationalist movement wanted, and so it was pragmatic to maintain 
civil negotiations. 
 
The chapter will now look at the relationship between advocacy organisations and the 
Labour Party, in responding to the Rhodesia situation. It is also worth noting here that 
this section will draw more heavily on examples of interaction between the AAM in 
particular, and the Labour Party, purely due to the availability of sources. 
 
A letter signed by Barbara Castle, then Secretary of State for Employment, sent to the 
AAM stated: “I give my full support to the efforts being made by the Anti-Apartheid 
Movement to secure by peaceful means a life for each individual free from all 
prejudice on the basis of race or colour”.379 This was, unsurprisingly, discussed by the 
Rhodesia Department prior to being sent to ensure that, in sending the letter, the 
Government was not contradicting itself. The letter was friendly and, at least 
superficially, supportive of the AAM’s work. However, it can be argued that such a 
communication was predominantly a pragmatic move, as the Party was unlikely to 
ever go so far as to alter its stance on Rhodesia in line with the views of the AAM, but 
maintaining friendly interactions could have helped to reduce the animosity felt by 
some advocacy organisations towards the Party. That said, the letter would have 
represented the more genuinely held views of some back-benchers and Ministers who 
were firmly on the left of the Party, such as its author. 
 
This example is illustrative of the issue of collective cabinet responsibility acting as a 
barrier to some cabinet members becoming more fully involved in advocacy 
campaigns on Rhodesia. At one point in the early 1970s Guy Arnold vetoed Barbara 
Castle becoming a board member of the Africa Bureau on the grounds that she had not 
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stood up to the Labour Government’s ‘shambolic’ handling of UDI.380 His analysis was 
not quite correct, as she had threatened Wilson with resignation,381 as had Judith 
Hart382 but these threats were ultimately not acted upon, nor would they have been 
publicly known about at the time. 
 
The AAM were often critical of Labour Party policy. However, the organisation also 
enjoyed broad support among Party members, especially at local and regional level, 
and some of the AAM’s leadership cautioned that this support could be alienated if 
they attacked the Party too openly, again illustrating the pressures towards 
pragmatism exerted by trying to make the best use of limited resources.383 However, 
the AAM stridently made their position clear to the Party on numerous occasions. For 
example: 
The Labour Party should declare that it will withdraw the settlement 
proposals, negotiate only with representatives of all the people of Rhodesia, 
and that an independent Zimbabwe will be established on the basis of one 
man, one vote. At this time, sanctions will be maintained and strengthened 
and the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe for liberation will be 
supported.384 
 
This example demonstrates the AAM taking a strong tone in its dealings with the 
Labour Government in asserting its views and taking issue with the way in which the 
Party was handling the Rhodesia situation. 
 
Quite early on in the Rhodesia situation, the Africa Bureau planned a conference “to 
provide information on the present situation in Rhodesia, to consider the implications 
for Britain of the continuing crisis, and to discuss the policy which should be adopted 
by Britain”.385 Speakers for this event included John Reed of University College 
Rhodesia, Colin Legum of the Observer, George Cunningham who was then the Labour 
Party’s Commonwealth Officer, and Nelson Samkange of ZANU, amongst others. This 
conference was discussed in the previous chapter exploring the methods used by 
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advocacy organisations, as it demonstrated the range of people that advocacy 
organisations tried to involve in events. However, in this context it also illustrates the 
willingness of the Labour Party to let a senior figure attend in order to defend the 
Party’s policy on Rhodesia against possible attacks from the advocacy or nationalist 
contingents. This example demonstrates the Labour Party taking the opportunity to 
engage pragmatically with an advocacy organisation that was challenging its stance on 
Rhodesia. It can also be argued that such a move came about due to CLP activism on 
the Rhodesia issue. The Labour Party showed willingness by sending a representative 
to the event, but it also gained a forum for defending its views amongst some of its 
biggest critics. 
 
The relationship between the Labour Party and advocacy organisations was generally 
characterised by the absence of meaningful interaction. The AAM persistently sent 
letters and petitions, and tried to arrange meetings with Labour Ministers and there is 
little to no evidence of responses to these, let alone of engagement with the AAM’s 
concerns in a productive way. In April and May 1966 the AAM sent a petition to the 
Government and organised a ‘lobby of parliament’ over the potential for talks to turn 
into a sell-out, neither of which received a response.386 This pattern was repeated for 
the duration of the Rhodesia situation with regards to such letters and petitions, 
suggesting that successive British Governments did not take such initiatives very 
seriously, or deem them worthy of substantive engagement. 
 
In 1976, the AAM sent a memo to the Labour Party about the Zimbabawe People’s 
Army (ZIPA). In an example of positive interaction, and of disagreement within the 
Labour Party leadership, they received valuable feedback on what to do with it. 
Michael Foot, then Deputy Leader of the Party, replied to the memo in a letter saying: 
that this paper should be kept out of the hands of the F.O. at this stage. One 
can’t predict Crossland’s reaction, and it would be unfortunate if direct 
control of the ZPA were to be construed as an invasion of 
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe by Marxist Mozambique.387 
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This response demonstrates differences within the Labour Party in opinion on 
Rhodesia, and in dealing with advocacy organisations working on the issue. Typically, 
divisions within the Labour Party over Rhodesia were between the Party grass roots 
and its leadership but, as evidenced here, there were also divisions amongst the 
higher levels. Foot, Hart and Castle were all members of the Labour left MPs group 
and regularly met for dinner around this time. There were also some consistently 
dissenting voices amongst the backbenchers, most notably Andrew Faulds.388 
 
An early day motion tabled in December 1968 called for the Commonwealth leaders, 
at an upcoming meeting, to reaffirm their commitment to NIBMAR.389 This was signed 
by over 80 backbench MPs, and echoed similar calls coming from local and 
constituency Labour Parties around a similar time, such as Thirsk and Malton’s 
resolution asking “the NEC if they think the ‘Fearless’ proposals are in line with policy 
as agreed at the Party conference last month”?390 There were 34 other resolutions 
making a similar point submitted to the NEC from CLPs in December 1968.391 This is 
illustrative of a general difference between the Parliamentary Labour Party and the 
grass roots, whereby the latter was far more willing to express opinions on the 
Rhodesia issue and push for genuine positive developments, despite the typically 
symbolic nature of early day motions. However, the Party grass roots and the trade 
union movement were by no means monolithic entities (as indeed the Labour Party 
leadership was not either), and despite protestations against Government policy at 
times like Fearless, the Trade Union bloc vote often saved Party leadership policy at 
Conference. This is reminiscent of Miliband’s critique of the Labour Party’s 
parliamentary socialism. Using the example of the Challenge to Britain programme, 
presented to the 1953 Conference, he argued: 
As so often before in the history of the Labour Party, the Executive’s 
programme, meagre though it was, served to neutralize the pressure from 
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the Left. At the 1953 Conference, all attempts to strengthen the document 
were defeated with the help of the trade union bloc vote.392 
 
This also captures the complex dynamics within the labour movement over the 
Rhodesia issue, in that there was some dissension against the policies of the Party 
leadership (amongst unions, CLPs and back bench MPs), but more broadly the stance 
of the labour movement was characterised by disengagement, and a passive support 
of Government policy. 
 
Another example reaffirms this idea about differing opinions within the Labour Party, 
and the possibility of more productive interaction with advocacy organisations. The 
AAM sent a letter to various MPs, chosen for their likelihood to be interested in the 
Rhodesia issue, and supportive of the AAM’s aims. The AAM kept a copy of this letter 
and used it record who it was sent to and who responded. The letter asked recipients 
to phone the AAM’s office in order to be included in a press release detailing AAM 
support in Parliament. Of the names ticked, indicating responses, none come as much 
of a surprise. They include: “Andrew Faulds, H. G. Jenkins, Dr. D. L. Kerr, Joan Lestor, 
Mr D. M. S. Steel, Mr. R. Davies”.393 It is important to note that the Labour Party was 
not a monolithic entity on Rhodesia, and there were differing opinions on the subject 
from within its ranks, even at a high level. That said, the letter had been sent out to 
around 30 MPs and only 6 responded, one of whom, David Steel, was a Liberal, and 
also strong support of the African nationalist movement’s cause. It should be noted 
that the Liberals strongly echoed the stance of the Labour Party.394 
 
Another counter-example to the majority of those outlined above comes from a period 
in which Labour was in opposition, close to the end of the Rhodesia situation. In 
response to a proposed ZECC rally, the Labour Party used this organisation as an 
intermediary to send a clear message of support to the African nationalist movement, 
stating: 
The Labour Party strongly supports the efforts of the national liberation 
movement to secure a form of government freely open to all Zimbabweans. 
                                                          
392 Miliband, Parliamentary Socialism: 322. 
393 RH, MSS AAM 1211, Letter from AAM to various MPs, undated. 
394 See for example Hansard, HC Deb, 31/01/1972. 
146 
 
The National Executive Committee believes there should be no 
collaboration by Britain with the Salisbury regime and no recognition in 
any form by a British Government.395 
 
Whilst this is a message of support to the African nationalist movement, rather than 
the ZECC itself, by consciously using the latter as an intermediary, and sending a 
message stating views such as the ZECC had always propagated, the Labour Party was 
implicitly supporting the ZECC’s efforts, which was a marked difference to simply 
ignoring the memos and letters of advocacy organisations as it had done earlier on. It 
is indicative of the Party’s willingness to more freely support the African nationalist 
movement, and therefore the aims of various advocacy organisations, whilst it was in 
opposition. It was also reflective of a leftwards shift within the Labour Party, which 
was mirrored and influenced by a similar shift in union leadership: 
The emergence of ‘a new breed of capable left-wing Labour union 
leaders’…weakened the intolerant and tightly-disciplined power structure… 
that had prevailed in the Labour Party throughout the post-war period to 
the benefit of the right-wing parliamentary leadership.396 
 
The above examples demonstrate that, for the most part, the Labour Party interacted 
very little with advocacy organisations, on an organisational level. However, the Party 
cannot be considered unified in its views, and there are instances of individuals 
interacting more productively with advocacy organisations on the Rhodesia issue. The 
Labour Party as an entity largely ignored the pleas and protests of advocacy 
organisations, evidenced by the lack of replies to letters and petitions sent to it by 
various organisations. When the Party did respond, it was generally to defend its 
position, and dismiss arguments set out challenging its actions on Rhodesia. It is 
worth noting that the Labour Party had a history of proscribing certain organisations 
due to Communist or other extreme influences. In the context of the Cold War, Labour 
sought to maintain as much distance as possible from potentially Soviet-influenced 
African nationalist groups. This explains why its relationship with the AAM was often 
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more positive than with ZANU or ZAPU, as it had a similar aversion to interacting too 
closely with what it saw as Communist-influenced organisations.397 
 
Benn argued that the influence of the civil service threatened the nature of democratic 
government in Britain, because of the influence that senior mandarins had on the 
policy making process. Policies of Conservative and Labour Governments bore a close 
resemblance, despite differences in pre-election manifestos.398 This can certainly be 
seen with the Rhodesia issue, and the influence of the civil service in constraining 
senior Labour Party figures’ actions and interactions around the struggle for 
independence. In guidance notes prior to meetings and conferences where nationalist 
leaders were to be encountered, civil service memos and briefing notes urged caution 
and the support of those nationalists perceived to be more moderate. Benn elucidates 
how civil servants would influence policy by “setting the framework” within which 
questions about policy are put to Ministers. He argues that this made shifting beyond 
the set framework very difficult, and in this sense the scope of policy is constrained.399 
Such an argument can be applied to the handling of the Rhodesia situation, and the 
way in which the Labour Party leadership interacted with representatives of the 
nationalist movement, and with activists in Britain. The Rhodesia ‘framework’ can be 
argued to be one of promoting moderacy where possible, being careful not to assist or 
to be seen to be actively supporting the more extreme elements of the nationalist 
movement, and to seek a settlement with the Smith regime that could be justified as 
conforming to the Six Principles.  
Trade union relationships 
There are limited examples of British trade unions displaying, or at least stating, 
support for the African nationalist movement. The most intricate example of this 
comes from a resolution adopted, without opposition, at the Conference of Trade 
Unionists on Southern Africa, 1969, organised by the AAM. It is worth citing the text of 
this resolution in full: 
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This conference of trade unionists on Southern African, noting with concern 
the increasing oppression and exploitation of the African workers and 
people of South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese Colonies, 
1) applauds and supports the struggle of the African workers and their 
trade unions and liberation movements 
2) condemns the vicious apartheid system and the Unholy Alliance of 
Vorster, Smith and Caetano 
3) deplores the collaboration of powerful forces in Britain with the white 
minority regimes of Southern Africa through trade, investment, diplomatic 
relations, cultural, sporting and other relations 
4) urges H.M.G. to implement the 1962 and 1968 U.N. General Assembly 
resolutions on South Africa 
5) urges the British trade union movement to end collaboration with the 
forces of oppression in Southern Africa, and specifically to 
a) recognise the South African Congress of Trade Unions as the 
representative, non-racial, anti-apartheid trade union body in South Africa 
b) end the investment of trade union funds in South African companies or 
in firms which are indirectly exploiting African workers in Southern Africa 
c) end the emigration of skilled workers to Southern Africa 
d) declare its support for the arms embargo, and take steps to assist 
workers who might be directly affected by it 
e) support the Anti-Apartheid Movement and the Defence and Aid Fund.400 
 
The conference was attended by delegates from: the Amalgamated Union of 
Engineering and Foundry Workers (AUEFM), the NUM (both national and South Wales 
division), the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF), the 
Draughtsmen and Allied Technicians Association (DATA), the Greater London Council 
Staff Association, and several trades councils from across the UK. Interestingly this 
highlights engagement with the Rhodesia issue amongst some of the more traditional 
working class unions, although the NUM represented “the largest section of the black 
community in Britain”.401 This example highlights support for the African nationalist 
movement, and goes so far as to suggest practical measures for implementing this 
sentiment of moral support, to actually benefit the independence struggle, outlined in 
section 5 of the statement. However the examples cited below, indicating the 
frustration the nationalist movement felt towards British trade unions over their 
inaction, suggest that such ideas were never fully acted upon, or translated into votes 
at Labour Party Conference. 
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The following example illustrates the support of the trade union movement for the 
nationalist struggle in practice, but for different reasons shows that this was simply a 
façade placed over underlying disinterest and inaction. “We, the undersigned, take 
this opportunity to send our greetings to Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, Co-
Leaders of the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe, and pledge to do all in our power to help 
bring about genuine independence to the people of Zimbabwe.”402 Whilst this 
demonstrates a positive interaction between the two umbrella organisations, it cannot 
be said to be representative of the overall character of interactions over the 15 year 
period. This particular statement was made relatively late in terms of the struggle for 
independence, judging from its salutation to the Patriotic Front, and whilst it pledges 
support, it is not accompanied by any concrete action reinforcing the validity of this 
statement. As will be seen, for the most part, interactions between the trade union 
movement and the African nationalist movement were characterised by disinterest 
and disengagement on the part of the former, and frustrated attempts to garner 
support by the latter. 
 
AAM Trade Union Committee minutes provide an interesting example of the feeling 
towards British trade unions amongst the African nationalist movement. A meeting in 
June 1978 was addressed by Francis Nehwati, acting on behalf of the PF (ZAPU).  
Nehwati was President of the Municipal Workers Union in Rhodesia, and had been 
involved in the trade union movement there for a number of years. Nehwati thanked 
the AAM and its trade union supporters, but in a plea for solidarity “added that one 
major obstacle to greater support was the attitude of the TUC in following 
Government policy. He would like to see the labour movement in Britain doing more 
to pressurise the Government”.403 This was indicative of the one-sided relationship 
between the nationalist movement and British trade unions; requests for assistance 
met with broad disinterest and a lack of involvement. It also reinforces the argument 
that the TUC, at least until the later 1970s, was willing to follow the Labour Party 
leadership’s stance on Rhodesia, and was not sufficiently engaged with the issue to 
argue otherwise. This is not to say there was monolithic disinterest across all trade 
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unions, but there was little concrete or measurable action taken. At the 1975 TUC 
Congress a motion was moved by the Civil and Public Services Union reaffirming 
opposition to Apartheid and pledging “support for policies designed to produce 
majority rule in South Africa and Rhodesia”.404 The motion was carried without 
debate, illustrating general support for this sentiment on the Rhodesia issue; however, 
the content of the motion was hardly contentious. It should be noted that the STUC 
was far more progressive and vocal on such issues, “refusing to be hidebound by the 
policies of the Labour government or the TUC”,405 due in part to its independence 
from the TUC, greater understanding of nationalist politics, and structure which was 
more aligned with those of trades councils. This serves to highlight differences within 
the labour movement and act as a reminder that there were differences within as well 
as between the groups of organisations discussed. 
 
The following example indicates the frustration the African nationalist movement felt 
with the British trade union movement, in terms of the latter’s lack of activity with 
regard to the independence struggle, given its position in relation to the Labour Party. 
Jason Moyo, a member of ZAPU and the JMC, made the case that: 
In Zimbabwe we make the distinction between the British ruling class and 
the British people and we recognise that the British people are also 
oppressed. However, British organisations do not yet play an effective role 
in support of the Zimbabwe struggle and we will continue to appeal for as 
much assistance as possible.406 
 
The ‘British people’ can be interpreted here to be represented by British workers, 
under the auspices of trade unions and the TUC, and the frustration of the nationalists 
is clear. This lack of interest from trade unions can also be seen in their interactions 
with advocacy organisations, discussed below. 
 
There are numerous examples of positive interaction between the British and 
Rhodesian trade union movements, such as the following memo, detailing a request 
for Rhodesian trade unionists to be allowed on TUC-run training courses in the UK. 
The memo details a visit from J T Maluleke, Secretary of the Southern Rhodesian 
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Trades Union Co-ordinating Committee in the UK (SRTUCCUK) regarding what ex-
Rhodesian trade unionists in the UK could do to help their fellows in Rhodesia, in 
order to “keep the African trade union movement in Rhodesia afloat”,407 and the 
aforementioned request for assistance from the TUC. Whilst such examples are 
interesting, it is unfortunate that the leadership of the trade union movement in 
Rhodesia was overtly trying to maintain an apolitical stance: “Mr Maluleke’s principle 
concern is to…maintain a nucleus of reasonably non-political leadership in being until 
the possibility of normal trade union activity returns”.408  
 
In terms of a relationship with advocacy organisations, the British trade union 
movement was very much the passive participant, rather than the driving force. As 
discussed briefly in Chapter 3, the AAM persistently tried to gain the support of trade 
unions for its work on Rhodesia. The main methods the AAM used in pursuance of this 
aim were the annual conferences on Southern Africa for trade unionists, and by 
advertising in trade union publications. As highlighted in the previous chapter, it is 
doubtful that these efforts had much tangible effect. This is evidenced by the following 
notes from a set of ZECC minutes: 
There was a general discussion around the themes referred to in the report 
from the Working Group. It was agreed that we needed to involve trade 
unions more in the work of ZECC… At the same time it was welcomed that 
AAM Trade Union Committee would be devoting time while meeting on July 
30th to considering ways in which it could mobilise the British Trade Union 
Movement on the issue…it was suggested that there was an important need 
for PF speakers to speak at trade union meetings on Zimbabwe and if 
possible for there to be speakers tours of the sort that were taking place 
more generally, with a strong trade union bias, that there should be a major 
effort to secure a resolution at the TUC and then to stimulate action by 
regional TUCs in the way suggested by the Working Group.409 
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From mid-1979, AAM records demonstrate that earlier efforts had clearly had little 
effect in mobilising trade union support for the Rhodesia issue. This is certainly 
corroborated by the examples explored in the previous chapter. 
 
So the AAM’s campaign to broaden support amongst trade unionists met with limited 
success. During the 15 year period between UDI and formal independence, there were 
many other more direct concerns for trade unionists that would have taken priority 
over such a ‘distant struggle’. This issue was discussed at a TUAG meeting: “it 
appeared Trade Union participation at the demonstration was low and that this was 
partly due to the mobilization among progressive trade unionists on the miners’ 
strike.”410 The demonstration mentioned was a RECC-organised event surrounding 
the Pearce Commission; see Chapter Six for more on this.411 This is a good example of 
the prevalence of more immediate concerns for trade unionists despite the AAM and 
other organisations’ best efforts to raise awareness and concern. Considering political 
wrangling over such bills as In Place of Strife and the aforementioned Industrial 
Relations Act of 1971, it is unsurprising that the struggle for independence in 
Rhodesia was not at the top of trade unionists’ agendas. This relates to the discussion 
in Chapter 2 of fluctuating levels of support in the UK for the Rhodesia issue, and how 
the political climate of the UK affected these changing levels of concern. 
 
It can be argued that the rhetoric espoused by advocacy organisations in campaigning 
on the Rhodesia issue often failed to resonate with and attract the interest of the 
majority of trade unionists, who were more concerned with domestic ‘bread and 
butter’ issues. Benn neatly captures this issue: 
The trouble with liberally-minded middle class people is that they are 
concerned about matters of high principle but it is the immediate injustices 
and practical issues right close at home and under their noses that they 
don’t like to tackle.412 
 
This relates to the problems advocacy organisations working on Rhodesia 
encountered in trying to mobilise the trade union movement in support of their 
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campaigns. Whilst the struggle for independence in a southern African colony was 
perhaps never going to be the highest priority for British workers, advocacy 
organisations would have yielded better results had they couched their cause in the 
language of industrial relations, drawing parallels between workers’ concerns in 
Britain, and the repressive conditions African workers were facing under the Smith 
regime. However, despite the lack of material action on the issue, it is likely that they 
had some success in raising awareness of the Rhodesia issue. 
 
At the October 1966 Labour Party Conference, a resolution was proposed by 
Cambridge CLP expressing regret at the Government’s decision to negotiate with the 
Smith regime. It called for a return to British rule to oversee a swift transition to 
majority rule, and proposed asking the UN to impose mandatory sanctions. On the last 
point, some trade union opposition was registered, led by the ASLEF, on the grounds 
that it could have a detrimental economic impact on British workers. This was 
countered by a representative of Chelsea CLP, a wealthy, middle class area of London, 
who argued that “if we cannot make sacrifices for the people in Africa we are not 
Socialists.”413 This reinforces Benn’s argument cited earlier, and clearly highlights the 
precedence that domestic concerns took for much of the labour movement, which 
often precluded action on Rhodesia. 
 
In response to the proposed resolution, the Labour Party leadership made a closing 
statement which argued that the Government had not agreed to negotiate with the 
Smith regime, and pressed the technicality that there had never been a period of 
direct British rule and that therefore it would not be possible to return to this. 
Furthermore, it argued that pushing for mandatory sanctions would not be realistic 
and that “the British Government has taken the responsible, the realistic and the 
intelligent line that we should apply sanctions in a way which can be effective.”414 The 
outcome of this debate produced an NEC resolution more akin to the policy of the 
Labour Party leadership, in favour of the proposed resolution, supported by the trade 
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union block vote.415 This support can be attributed to the trade unions’ general 
unwillingness to veer too far from the presiding policy of the Labour Party,416 and a 
prevalence of self-interest and concern for domestic issues amongst some elements of 
the labour movement, over more distant concerns. However, at the 1968 Conference 
there was a “crushing 5:1 defeat” of Castle’s prices and incomes policy,417 illustrating 
the beginning of a shift in the commitment of the trade unions to the policy of the 
Labour Party. Minkin writes that Conference defeats of Government policy started to 
become more common and “a schism appeared between the Labour Government and 
the majority of trade unions” as a result of deflationary Government policies and In 
Place of Strife.418 
 
In a letter to Rita Hinden, a founder member of the Fabian Colonial Bureau, then 
editor of Socialist Commentary, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs 
George Thomson outlined the Government’s stance on Rhodesia. This was clearly in 
reply to a letter from Hinden, but this initial correspondence could not be located. 
Thomson stated that she had recognised the core of the problem, as the Government 
saw it, when she talked about “our having responsibilities, but without the power on 
the ground”, and went on to suggest that he had been trying to make this point more 
widely understood. The letter concluded with George Thomson affirming his belief in 
the Labour Government’s present policy as the only viable option.419 This letter is 
indicative of greater interest in Rhodesia on the part of a labour movement 
publication than was often apparent amongst the trade unions. However, the interest 
in the Rhodesia issue by Socialist Commentary generally adhered to the broader 
fluctuations in interest as discussed in Chapter 2. This is unsurprising, since the 
publication had a vested interest in attracting readership, and had to tailor its stories 
accordingly. The response from Thomson indicates a familiar limited discussion of 
Labour Party policy, whilst essentially restating the Party’s commitment to its present 
actions. 
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In a letter to Vic Feather, the General Secretary of the TUC, the Labour Party accepted 
a recent TUC Congress resolution, and offered brief comment on the Rhodesia 
situation. The resolution and accompanying response followed the announcement of 
the findings of the Pearce Commission, and essentially stated a commitment to 
involving African nationalist representatives in any future negotiations.420 Being in 
opposition clearly saw the Labour Party respond more warmly and convincingly to 
such proposals from other organisations than it did when in power. This letter, and 
the resolution it was responding to, were indicative of the TUC taking greater interest 
in the Rhodesia issue. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the issue of the Labour Party leadership and the trade 
union movement and their handling of and responses to the Rhodesia issue drawing 
on previously unutilised sources. By marrying up official sources, such as Conference 
reports and PLP minutes (not that Rhodesia is mentioned much in the latter) with 
organisational sources such as AAM papers, a new perspective on Labour and 
Rhodesia has been established. It is clear from the examples above that Labour, much 
as it had done in communication with the African nationalist movement, never drifted 
from the party line in responding to comments from the movement, being heavily 
influenced by its parliamentary socialism and the conservative policies of the civil 
service. The actions of the Party leadership struck a careful balance between seeking a 
settlement, trying to maintain unity within the Party, and keeping the trade unions on 
side. However, as the trade union movement was not very engaged with the Rhodesia 
issue, with domestic events taking priority, the Party was not obligated to listen very 
closely when elements of the trade union movement were unhappy with its stance or 
actions on Rhodesia. 
 
The Labour Party’s willingness to disregard the opinions of the trade union movement 
was clear. Barbara Castle details Wilson’s eagerness to reach agreement with Smith, 
and demonstrates the lengths he was willing to go to do this, despite a “resolution just 
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passed at Party conference demanding NIBMAR”.421 She states that Wilson “was being 
drawn into more and more concessions to keep Smith interested”.422 This was felt 
deeply amongst the labour movement, not only over the Rhodesia issue, but also more 
broadly, and resulted in calls for change in internal Party democracy during the early 
1970s. The Campaign for Labour Party Democracy (CLPD) was established on the 
Labour left in 1973 in response to dissatisfaction with the actions of the Party 
leadership and a perceived need for radical intra-party reform.423 Whilst the CLPD 
focused solely on issues of intra-party democracy, to avoid the distraction of 
disagreements over policy, the establishment of this organisation was illustrative of 
dissatisfaction with the Party leadership’s treatment of the broader Party. The 
relationship between the trade union movement and the Labour Party leadership over 
Rhodesia reflected at times this broader climate of dissatisfaction. 
 
From exploring the relationships of the Labour Party and the trade union movement 
with advocacy organisations and the African nationalist movement, it becomes 
apparent that there were some key parallels. The Labour Party leadership, with the 
exception of some dissenting voices such as Barbara Castle and Judith Hart, hedged its 
bets in its actions over the Rhodesia issue. It maintained pragmatic relationships with 
the African nationalist movement and advocacy organisations, whilst simultaneously 
pushing for a settlement even at times when concessions were offered to the Smith 
regime that would have been unthinkable to those on the left in Britain who were 
supportive of the nationalist struggle. In responding to questions and demands from 
these groups, the Labour Party leadership was always careful not to commit itself to 
any line of action that contradicted its cautious policy on Rhodesia. However, it also 
recognised that it was beneficial to maintain civil relationships with representatives of 
these groups, to minimise dissent against its policies, when these were more 
controversial, for example at the time of the Fearless negotiations. It can be seen that 
the Rhodesia issue cut across left/right divisions within the Labour Party. Ministers 
such as Andrew Faulds, who was on the right of the Party, as well as CLPs in more 
middle class, less traditionally Labour-supporting areas such as Chelsea and Halstead 
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and District were actively engaged with Rhodesia and supportive of advocacy activity 
on the issue. That said, Ministers on the Labour left such as Hart and Castle did tend to 
be more sympathetic and engaged with the issue. 
 
The trade union movement, for the majority of the 15 years between UDI and 
independence, was broadly disengaged with the Rhodesia issue and this shaped its 
relationships with the African nationalist movement and advocacy organisations. 
Whilst there were some revolts against Labour Party leadership policies on Rhodesia, 
most notably the defeat of Government policy at the 1968 Conference424 for the most 
part trade unions did not display an active interest in the issue, and were content to 
support official policy. Minkin gives an example from the mid-1960s, in which “the 
Government’s critics on Vietnam and Rhodesia failed to secure the passage of strongly 
worded resolutions at the 1967 Conference”.425 However, this started to shift in the 
mid to late 1970s, as there was a move back to the left within the labour movement,426 
and a greater interest in the Rhodesia issue could be seen amongst the broader left. 
PLP minutes noted “the need to recapture the loyalty of the working class; and 
intellectuals who had drifted away from the Party because of our policies on 
Rhodesia”.427 As well as highlighting dissatisfaction with the policies of the Party 
leadership, this also illustrates the key demographic who were most exercised over 
the Rhodesia issued, as perceived by the PLP. 
 
After the failure of the Pearce Commission to produce a settlement, and the emergent 
consensus that any future negotiations would be required to involve the African 
nationalist movement, it can be argued that the Labour Party really took the lead over 
the Conservatives in terms of perceptions of Rhodesia policy, which created an easier 
environment for the trade union movement to be more engaged with the issue. 
 
Ultimately, this chapter has demonstrated that Rhodesia was not a simple leadership 
versus grass roots issue; it was far more complicated than that. Whilst to some extent 
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the issue did cut across left/right distinctions, at least within successive Labour 
cabinets and shadow cabinets, it tended to be those on the left who were 
uncomfortable with, or actively rebellious against, potential Rhodesia compromises. 
Rhodesia also became a personal issue, and despite his desire to achieve a settlement, 
at times ostensibly at any cost, it provoked a more emotional response from Wilson 
when he was in proximity to the struggle and the realities of life for the African 
population under the Smith regime. 
 
It is these complex divisions, influences and allegiances that the official accounts of 
Rhodesia into Zimbabwe ignore, prioritising simply the formal negotiations and 
policymaking at national and international levels. By drawing on a broader archival 
base, this chapter has illustrated a far greater level of detail and disagreement than 
existing accounts capture. 
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Chapter 5 – Radicalism as strategy? The anti-British 
rhetoric of the African nationalist movement 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to draw the attention of the thesis more sharply to the 
activities of the African nationalist movement, and the international activities of the 
main nationalist organisations during the period of the independence struggle. As set 
out in the initial literature review, with the exception of Day’s very early book on the 
subject, this area has not really been explored in existing accounts of the nationalist 
struggle. In stark contrast to Britain, literature looking at the African nationalist 
movement tends to focus largely on issues of grass roots involvement, guerrilla tactics 
and divisions within the movement, specifically between the main nationalist 
organisations. This chapter seeks to redress the balance by considering the African 
nationalist representatives based in the UK, and their relationship with the parent 
organisations based in Rhodesia or neighbouring countries.  
 
As discussed in the literature review in Chapter 1, and referred to in other chapters, 
the nationalist movement suffered from factionalism. The thesis is mainly concerned 
with the two largest nationalist organisations, but there were others besides, and 
many attempts at unity and further splits over the 15 year period. The question this 
chapter seeks to address is whether there was a further division in the African 
nationalist movement between nationalists based at home and their representatives 
in the UK? This core research question feeds into further questions surrounding the 
implications of such a division in terms of the relations of the African nationalist 
movement with the Labour Party leadership, and questions about the strategy of the 
nationalist movement. It will be argued that the nationalist movement was deeply 
sceptical that settlement negotiations would produce positive results, and in 
eschewing these negotiations, there was a tendency to conflate Britain and the Smith 
regime, and represent them as a unified enemy. This idea will be explored in the 
course of the chapter. 
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The chapter begins with an overview of specific literature, in order to highlight how 
the how the main research question fits in, and what is missing from existing 
accounts. Some of this literature has been discussed in the introductory chapter, but it 
will be explored here in more specific detail. Following this, the main body of the 
chapter will draw on archival material in considering the main and then subsidiary 
research questions, outlined above. Thereafter, there will be a discussion of the 
possible explanations for differences in the nationalist movement identified in the 
analysis section. This discussion will draw briefly on some ideas of nationalism; as 
such a concern was clearly central in the independence struggle. By drawing on such 
ideas, it is possible to gain extra insight into conceptions of national identity that 
played a role in the independence struggle. It also aids a consideration of how this 
might have affected any differences or similarities between nationalists based at home 
in Rhodesia and the regional bases, and those in the UK. 
 
This chapter will draw predominantly on archival material from The National 
Archives. This source will be particularly useful here, since there are many documents 
detailing meetings between British representatives and the African nationalist 
movement in both Rhodesia and the UK, letters between these two groups, along with 
many copies of ZANU and ZAPU documents, such as press releases and newspapers. 
Looking at documents such as nationalist newspapers raises the important issue of 
who such documents were originally produced for. This issue will be covered in the 
section later in the chapter drawing on conceptions of national identity to explore the 
strategy of the nationalist movement and potential differences of opinion between 
different groups of nationalist representatives. 
The issue of factionalism in existing literature 
The main nationalist groups were, from an early stage of the struggle, banned from 
operating within Rhodesia. This illustrates the vital importance of the international 
dimension in order to build a full picture of this period of history. The purpose of this 
literature review is to briefly discuss the few texts that have attempted to address this 
issue. The most important work on this subject, in terms of focus, is by Day. 
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Unfortunately, this was published in 1967 and therefore only focuses on a period of 
nationalist activities overseas, up to 1966. He systematically considers relations with 
Britain, international institutions, and regional contacts, including nationalist 
headquarters overseas. The book charts various visits of nationalist leaders, but is 
largely descriptive and lacks detail or analysis. Equally the time period under 
consideration is very limited. The main conclusion to be drawn from this study is that 
the nationalists were constantly interacting with people outside Rhodesia, much of 
which was directed at the British and notably seemed to achieve very little. Day 
concluded that the most important outcome of this period of international activities 
was gaining military support and training.428 One further point that Day made, more 
specifically on the topic of this chapter, was that “since 1965 PCC/ZAPU and ZANU 
have both had London offices, each attacking the other while advocating the same 
policies on Rhodesia. The nationalist organization in England has not changed, but has 
been duplicated.”429 This study forms the backdrop to research the key question of 
this chapter, by hinting at dynamics within and between the nationalist presence in 
the UK. 
 
In a more detailed article on the international dynamics of the nationalist movement, 
Reed sets forward the argument that challenging state sovereignty is the cornerstone 
of any liberation movement’s activities. Therefore, in order to survive, such 
movements must seek assistance and to a degree operate beyond the boundaries of 
the state that they are seeking to challenge.430 In this regard it was inevitable that 
ZANU and ZAPU would look outwards for support. It is stated that initially ZAPU had 
greater recognition and support from overseas, as it was the older organisation.431 
However, this began to change as frustration mounted with Nkomo’s early insistence 
on a nonviolent strategy. Added to this, Dabengwa suggests that a key turning point 
was when ZAPU lost its important strategic contact with FRELIMO of Mozambique. 
This vital contact was taken over by ZANU and provided a sizeable influx of recruits to 
                                                          
428 Day, International Nationalism. 
429 Day, International Nationalism: 43. 
430 W. C. Reed, ‘International Politics and National Liberation: ZANU and the Politics of Contested Sovereignty in 
Zimbabwe’ African Studies Review 36: 2 (1993) pp. 31-59. 
431 Ibid: 37. 
162 
 
the ranks of its guerrilla army.432 In this scenario it can be seen that international 
actors were an important component in the shifting fortunes of the nationalist groups. 
 
A significant external influence on the nationalist organisations and their associated 
guerrilla armies in the second half of the 1970s was the organisation known as the 
Front-line States. It originally involved Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia and 
Tanzania and arose formally in 1976 to assist with the situation in Rhodesia.433 Reed 
discusses how the Front-line States tried to formulate a unified policy for negotiations 
with the Rhodesian Government. This group was very important in eventually 
steering the nationalists to the negotiating table at Lancaster House, as they 
threatened to withdraw support from them, support that was strategically necessary 
for the continuation of the nationalist struggle in Rhodesia.434 
 
In response to ZANU-PF’s attempts to claim that they were their own liberators, 
Moore offers a damning critique of this blatant attempt to rewrite history. He argues 
that “the myth of self-liberation” belies a host of external support, from church groups, 
neighbouring states, to the Chinese and the Soviets.435 International support was 
essential to the survival of the nationalist movement, and the eventual success of the 
guerrilla war. These brief summaries of existing literature on the international 
dimension of the African nationalist movement highlight why this topic is important, 
but do not begin to address the issue of how nationalists based at home related to 
their representatives overseas, and it is to this issue that the chapter will now turn. 
Another Fault Line? 
Clearly the different groups of nationalists had different purposes and activities to 
carry out: Day writes that “much of the nationalists’ activity in London is aimed at 
those who have access to or can harry government Ministers” whilst those based at 
home were more preoccupied with orchestrating the guerrilla war.436 Did these 
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different foci affect nationalists’ perceptions of the situation and their strategy for 
achieving their aims? 
 
Following a meeting with Judith Hart in London, Herbert Chitepo, who shortly after 
returned to Rhodesia to become acting president of ZANU, sent a letter further 
commenting on points raised during the meeting. This letter is interesting as it 
demonstrates a willingness of Chitepo, if not ZANU in its entirety, to seek genuine 
collaboration with Britain in resolving the Rhodesian crisis. It is a very polite missive, 
with Chitepo thanking Judith Hart for giving up her “precious time” to meet with him, 
and making the case for increased cooperation: “If there was a readiness to co-operate 
with us, in even only this limited objective [defeating UDI], surely ways and means 
could be found in consultation with Government or various sections of organised 
British opinion.”437 He makes suggestions as to such cooperation, such as getting 
African support for strengthening the sanctions regime, and effectively distributing 
British aid to mitigate any ill-effects amongst unintended recipients. This is illustrative 
of a desire to cooperate with Britain, and persists in the polite style of communication 
discussed at length in the previous chapter. 
 
However, in a letter regarding a meeting between a member of staff at the Lusaka-
based British High Commission and Herbert Chitepo, the nationalist’s transition to a 
more extreme position following his return to Rhodesia from Britain is set out. The 
letter states that “in late February when he [Chitepo] left here [Britain] he was 
suspicious, difficult to convince of our bona fides [letter author’s emphasis] but still 
open to conviction and anxious to understand our motives and intentions.” This 
already hints at a change in his attitude, but the letter concludes: 
Possibly because of ZANU’s recent militant activities in Rhodesia and the 
new aura this has created for the ZANU leaders, Chitepo has turned in the 
last three months from a bland and not especially militant (though 
convinced) African bourgeois intellectual, without marked political ability, 
into a thin-faced, somewhat intense Che Guevara nationalist, surrounded by 
the ritual number of suspicious strong-arm men.438 
 
                                                          
437 TNA, DO 207 237, Letter from H. Chitepo to Judith Hart, 20/04/1966. 
438 TNA, DO 207 237, Letter from W. B. L. Monson, of Lusaka High Commission to R. L. B. Cormack, Private Secretary to 
Minister of State, 03/06/1966. 
164 
 
Whilst this does not explicitly discuss differences between nationalists based in the 
UK and those based in Rhodesia or the regional bases, it suggests that being in 
Rhodesia had a radicalising effect. 
 
In a meeting between the Minister of State, Judith Hart, and ZANU representatives 
(including Herbert Chitepo, Henry Hamadziripi and Washington Malianga) held in 
Lusaka, there is a notable difference in tone and behaviour of the African nationalist 
delegation from examples of similar meetings held in the UK. “Mr Washington 
Malianga broke in excitedly with a demand that the Minister withdraw the word 
“terrorist” as applied to ZANU’s activities. His demand was taken up by his colleagues 
including Mr Chitepo and a rowdy scene ensued…The rowdy argument continued for 
about half an hour.”439 However there was a notable difference between his colleagues 
and Chitepo, only recently returned from the UK, when it is stated that he alone 
“always spoke calmly, courteously and rationally to the Minister”.440 It is important to 
note that this account is probably exaggerated by civil service attitudes towards the 
nationalists, for example with the use of pejoratives such as ‘rowdy’. However, it is 
still a useful point of comparison. It is indicative of two important differences: the first 
between Chitepo and his colleagues, and the second between Chitepo’s response to 
Judith Hart and civil servants. The first of these differences can most convincingly be 
attributed to a divide between leadership and rank and file nationalists. In his meeting 
with civil servants at the Lusaka-based British High Commission it was argued that he 
had become more radicalised and this later encounter suggests nothing of the sort, 
suggesting that the differences in behaviour are more accurately attributable to a 
leadership tactic. The second difference reinforces this argument, since it suggests 
that nationalist leaders varied their tactics and style of interaction according to who 
they were meeting with. 
 
In a contrasting example to the ‘rowdy’ meeting discussed above, Nelson Samkange, 
ZAPU’s UK representative at the time, sent a letter in August 1966 to Herbert Bowden 
who had recently taken the position of Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs. 
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This letter represents the overwhelmingly polite tone that coloured most of the 
examples discussed in the previous chapter. Samkange congratulated Bowden on his 
appointment, and stated that he was looking forward to a happy working relationship. 
He requested a meeting “any day and at any time that is convenient to you”.441 The 
formal politeness of this correspondence was starkly different to the attitude of 
Chitepo’s colleagues in the meeting discussed above. Similarly, in a meeting between 
the Secretary of State and a ZANU delegation held in London, this polite tone was 
replicated. The record began by stating that “Mr Shamuyarira recalled with pleasure 
the meeting he had had with the Secretary of State in…1964”.442 More in depth 
discussions followed, interspersed with such friendly assurances by ZANU, such as 
“they were much relieved by the Secretary of State’s assurances and noted his 
commitment to majority rule”.443 The nationalist delegation did press issues such as 
sanctions and problems with this policy, but the record of the meeting is regularly 
populated by such polite and friendly statements as illustrated here. This was 
dramatically different to the approach of the ZANU delegation who met with Judith 
Hart in Lusaka 17 months earlier. 
 
In the December 1966 edition of Zimbabwe News, a ZANU newspaper published in 
Zambia, the editorial outlined current opinions on the independence struggle. It 
argued that Wilson had in the past made mistakes in his handling of Rhodesia, and 
that he should try to avoid repeating any of these mistakes. Sanctions, it suggested, 
were not working effectively enough to bring about any sort of meaningful political 
change, and that in light of South Africa’s decision to aid the Smith regime, “the 
famous no-force-under-any-circumstances parrot cry must be abandoned”.444 The 
editorial in this publication one year later accused the British of collusion with the 
Smith regime: “The British Government is leaving no stone unturned in its efforts to 
find excuses to continue its support of minority white rule in Zimbabwe.” Whilst the 
first editorial was quite mildly phrased, despite making forceful requests with regards 
to desired changes in British policy, the second editorial made bolder claims about 
                                                          
441 TNA, DO 207 238, Letter from Nelson Samkange to Herbert Bowden, 11/08/1966. 
442 TNA, FCO 36 14, Record of a meeting between Secretary of State and a ZANU delegation, 09/10/1967 
443 Ibid. 
444 LHASC, Box 146, Southern Rhodesia Documents 1963-68, Zimbabwe News, Vol. 1 No 11, December 1966. 
166 
 
where British loyalties lay. The British High Commission in Lusaka sent a copy of this 
later edition to the Rhodesia Department accompanied by a letter that hinted at an 
answer to the central research question of this chapter, stating that: 
you may be interested in the tone and content of the editorial, which abuses 
the Secretary of State personally, and the apparently more sincere and 
friendly attitudes of the ZANU Delegation who met the Secretary of State at 
the Commonwealth Office on 9 October. It is hard to believe that the record 
of that meeting and the enclosed editorial both relate to the same 
organisation. 445 
 
In the January 1968 edition of Zimbabwe Review, ZAPU argued that the Smith regime 
has been sending out spies to surrounding independent countries where the exiled 
nationalists were operating, or in which they had bases. These spies who “are either 
Rhodesian or South African citizens, all hold British passports given them by the 
British embassies or directly from London”. This bold claim was highlighted by the 
British High Commissioner in Lusaka in a letter to the Rhodesia Department in which 
he asserted that   the article highlighted the difference between local nationalists and 
their more moderate counterparts in Britain.446 This is suggestive that there was a 
difference between nationalists based at home, and their representatives overseas, as 
sources explored above have also suggested.  
 
In a letter from Ndabaningi Sithole, then President of ZANU, to Harold Wilson in 
March 1968 we see the vitriolic anti-British sentiment so often espoused by the 
African nationalist movement in Rhodesia. The opening sentence set the tone for what 
was to follow: “We are compelled by both duty and responsibility to call your 
attention to our utter disgust and contempt at your inept and incompetent handling of 
the Rhodesian crisis.” The letter repeatedly referred to the Smith Government as “your 
illegal regime”, asserting full British responsibility for Smith’s actions. The letter 
posited that the British Government was wilfully allowing the Smith regime to 
continue, and stated that “we are not deceived by your Pontius-Pilate-like 
remonstrations”. As if these accusations were not forceful enough, the letter 
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concluded “that your attempts to entrench your illegal regime with the hope that it 
might by default acquire international recognition and internal permanence, will 
certainly fail”.447 This suggests a growing sense of frustration experienced by the 
nationalist movement at what it saw as the lack of concrete action the British 
Government was taking to undermine the Smith regime, and Wilson’s energetic 
pursuit of negotiations which the nationalists saw as illegitimate. 
 
Following the hanging of three Africans in March 1968, ZAPU’s Lusaka and Dar es 
Salaam-based Zimbabwe Review published an article entitled ‘Wilson’s Bloody Head’. 
The article used particularly emotive language in arguing where ZAPU believed the 
blame lay for this: 
We maintain most tenaciously that as the British Government is solely 
responsible for Rhodesia, it is ipso facto responsible for these dastardly and 
bloody acts. We put the whole blame squarely and unshakeably on Harold 
Wilson’s head. Never will this man be able to wash this blood from his 
head.448 
 
The strength of this article is entirely understandable given the recent and violent loss 
of three fellow nationalists. What is significant about it is that blame was placed solely 
on Britain, and on Harold Wilson as a figurehead. The strength of the imagery used is 
also notable; it could not represent more of a contrast to earlier examples of meetings 
between nationalists and Labour Ministers in Britain. This reinforces the point made 
in the previous paragraph regarding increasing nationalist frustration at how slowly 
the situation was progressing. 
 
In October 1968, Mr T Ziyambi, a ZANU representative based in London, wrote to 
Harold Wilson. His letter was subsequently discussed by the Rhodesia Department: 
This is a clever letter which defines the position of the African nationalists 
in particular it draws attention to HMG’s willingness to drop the NIBMAR 
pledge, while remaining firm on the non-use of force…It poses the question 
whether HMG are really prepared to give independence to the minority and 
ends by saying there cannot be peace in Rhodesia, unless it is in the hands 
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of the majority, which might come about through a constitutional 
conference.449 
 
This letter is in stark contrast to the one discussed above from Sithole. It takes a far 
more measured tone, and does not make accusations about the British controlling or 
being directly responsible for the Smith regime. Its line of argument is one of 
reasoning, using the Wilson Government’s own terminology. The letters from Sithole 
and Ziyambi were ostensibly written for the same purpose, which can be broadly 
defined as the furtherance of the African nationalist movement. However, the 
execution of the letters in terms of style and content is completely different. Both are 
from ZANU, and are written within 7 months of each other, the only difference being 
the authors and their respective locations at the time of writing. 
 
In a telegram to the Rhodesia Department from the British High Commission in 
Lusaka, a passage of a ZAPU statement on proposed talks between Wilson and Smith 
was cited:  
we have made it quite clear that neither Wilson nor Smith nor their 
governments represent the African people in whatever they do discuss, 
therefore any purported agreement resulting from the forthcoming 
meeting is bound to be futile and will be doomed to failure. To achieve our 
liberation we shall continue the armed struggle regardless.450 
 
During the same month, the editorial of Zimbabwe Review discussed ‘The Conspiracy’ 
represented by the Fearless talks. It took a strong anti-British tone from the outset by 
referring to Ian Smith as Harold Wilson’s ‘agent’. The talks were, according to the 
editorial, an opportunity for Smith and Wilson to devise “ways and means of 
entrenching white domination permanently in southern Africa”.451 These two 
examples differ from all those documenting communications from British-based 
nationalists; they are not seeking dialogue with the British or to persuade them of the 
nationalist perspective on the talks, it is a simple condemnation of the talks designed 
to encourage the perpetuation and strengthening of the armed struggle as the only 
viable option. 
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Following a visit to Salisbury, George Thomson had a meeting with ZANU’s London 
representative, Ziyambi.452 In the course of the meeting, frequent reference was made 
to a document entitled ‘ZANU’s view of the Fearless proposals’.453 Both this document 
and the meeting demonstrated a very different response to the Fearless negotiations 
than was shown by the telegram and publication produced by nationalists based at 
home, discussed above. ‘ZANU’s views on the Fearless proposals’, whilst making it 
abundantly clear that they were considered unacceptable, examined different 
technical points of the proposals explaining why each one was insufficient. The 
meeting followed a very similar line, and whilst Ziyambi made clear his 
disappointment in the Labour Government, this was not accompanied by any of the 
starkly anti-British sentiments expressed in earlier documents on the Fearless 
proposals produced in Rhodesia or the surrounding nationalist bases. 
 
In response to negotiations between the Conservative Government and the Smith 
regime, prior to the Pearce Commission, ZAPU sent a telegram to then Foreign 
Secretary Alec Douglas Home in September 1971. This was from the main ZAPU base 
in Zambia, and took a very strong anti-British tone. Once again, the struggle was 
framed in such a way as to present Britain as the enemy against which the nationalist 
movement was fighting. It stated: 
We are at war against the British Government and its mercenary settlers in 
Zimbabwe. The talks between these two white men are the same as those 
between Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini, whose consequences fill the 
pages of history with tears... It is a known fact that Britain created the 
present situation in Zimbabwe and is determined to strengthen the 
mercenary minority.454 
 
The strength of the sentiment expressed here regarding Britain’s intentions in holding 
the talks is reminiscent of the aggressive tone which nationalists based at home took 
in meetings in Rhodesia cited above, and of other publications produced by Rhodesia-
based nationalists.455 The idea that Britain was responsible for the Rhodesia crisis 
was, from the perspective of the nationalists, a useful tool in creating a common and 
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distant enemy, which could facilitate their longer-term nation building project, after 
the resolution of the independence struggle. Equally, the claims about Britain desiring 
to perpetuate the status quo, and the emotive comparisons, can be understood in the 
same way. It is also illustrative of the radical tone of communications that nationalists 
based in Rhodesia seemed to perpetually employ. 
 
In a meeting with Joan Lestor, then Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, Enos Malandu of ZAPU enquired about the Labour Party’s 
stance on the ANC, since they were currently engaged in talks with the Smith regime 
with which ZAPU wholeheartedly did not agree. He stated that ZAPU were at that 
point more afraid of the ANC than they were of Mr Smith due to the talks the ANC had 
been holding with the Rhodesian Front. Other issues raised during the course of the 
meeting were the attitude of the Labour Government towards liberation movements 
and the application of sanctions. In each instance Joan Lestor provided an answer to 
the question, all of which seem to be accepted without further questioning by the 
ZAPU representatives.456 She stated that the Labour Party had not been avoiding 
ZAPU, that the Government accepted the ANC as representatives of a portion of 
Zimbabwean opinion but had no intention to give them “a mandate to negotiate”. She 
“confirmed that Britain supplied arms to South Africa for use in Rhodesia”, and finally 
stated that the current Government had tried to strengthen sanctions.457 This example 
showed ZAPU being particularly placid and accepting of Labour’s responses to their 
concerns. There was none of the vitriol that nationalists based in Rhodesia espoused 
in their interactions with representatives of British Government, or in nationalist 
publications produced in Rhodesia. 
 
The Anglo-American proposals also provide numerous contrasting examples of 
conflicting attitudes of African nationalist representatives. This attempt at settlement 
came about because Smith’s appeal for help in resolving the conflict prompted the 
British to draw up an offer of a transition to majority rule in 18-24 months, 
announced in parliament on 22 March 1976. Windrich states that: 
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The timing of the British Government’s proposals was directly related to 
the diplomatic exchanges which had been proceeding among the 
Americans, the Zambians and the South Africans in the aftermath of the 
Angolan civil war and also to the developments which had been taking 
place in southern Africa itself.458 
 
Kissinger then pledged support for the British initiative, and warned outside powers 
from intervening in Africa. 
 
By January 1978, when various diplomatic discussions were being held surrounding 
the Anglo-American proposals, Joseph Dube of the Patriotic Front put out a press 
release condemning the proposals and referring to them as neo-colonialist. He wrote 
that the British government, “especially the Labour administration, has continuously 
played a dirty role in our situation”. It goes on to argue that the Labour Government 
expressed racial sentiments and had adopted an attitude of “my Brother wrong or 
right”, in relation to the white population of Rhodesia. Dube concluded that Britain 
and America must understand that “the real conflict in Zimbabwe is a war situation 
and can only be resolved by those directly involved in the war – that is, the British 
Government and its agent-settlers on one hand and the Patriotic Front on the 
other”.459 This not only eschewed any belief in the prospect of the settlement 
negotiations to produce an acceptable settlement, but also, once again, conflated 
Britain and the Smith regime and represented them as the same central enemy. This 
press release differed dramatically from some later activities of the African nationalist 
movement in responding the Anglo-American proposals. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, 1976 saw the formation of the Patriotic Front between 
ZANU and ZAPU, which led to some joint interactions with the British. In the same 
month as the above press release, Joshua Nkomo met with David Owen to discuss the 
Anglo-American proposals and ZAPU’s position and role within the discussions. The 
record of this meeting is illustrative of a completely different approach to that 
outlined in the press release above. The record of the meeting suggests that Nkomo 
“was quite receptive to the idea” of putting out a press release on the proceedings of 
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the talks to give confidence to all parties involved, and the world, that progress was 
being made. It also shows Nkomo being receptive to Owen’s suggestions that he might 
be able to hold talks with Smith. This saw Nkomo fully cooperating with the British in 
trying to bring about a settlement.460 This example contrasts with the majority of 
those discussed so far in this chapter, as it shows a nationalist leader based at home, 
holding positive and collaborative discussions with the British, rather than espousing 
the negative statements generally expressed by nationalist representatives based in 
Rhodesia or in regional bases. The reasons behind this ostensible anomaly will be 
explored after examination of further examples from the period of the Anglo-
American proposal. 
 
In February 1978, discussions were being conducted between the Smith regime, 
Muzorewa, Sithole and Chief Chirau, which led eventually to the internal settlement. 
In response to these talks, the Patriotic Front released a press statement condemning 
them as a sell-out to the African population, and arguing that agreement had been 
reached with the “connivance and assistance of the British and American 
imperialists.”461 This was quite a contrast to the collaboration demonstrated above by 
Nkomo. It was also at odds with a Patriotic Front statement released a few days later 
that, as well as condemning the internal agreement, pledged support for further talks 
based on the Anglo-American proposals.462 These press releases do not give a clear 
picture of the Patriotic Front’s position in relation to its opinions of Britain or the 
Anglo-American negotiations; only that the internal settlement was regarded an 
unacceptable sell-out. The following example is more in line with the Nkomo 
discussion mentioned above, and provides a clearer picture of nationalist actions in 
terms of the settlement talks. 
 
A discussion was held, strictly confidential at the time, between the Patriotic Front, 
David Owen, then the Commonwealth Secretary, and Cyrus Vance, the US Secretary of 
State.463 This example was comparable to the above encounter between Owen and 
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Nkomo, as it illustrates nationalist representatives working collaboratively with 
Britain, and America in this instance, in pursuit of a settlement, despite the meeting 
taking place in Dar es Salaam with Nkomo and Mugabe. The attendance of the two 
nationalist leaders together showed both how seriously the meeting was being taking 
by the nationalist movement elite, and the willingness of the PF to collaborate when it 
felt that a settlement was potentially within reach. Whilst the notes of the meeting are 
very brief, and essentially only précis the points made by the PF, they indicate Mugabe 
and Nkomo making suggestions as to their requirements for the Anglo-American 
proposals to work, and promising “they would attend an all parties meeting ‘at any 
time’. Indeed, the possibility of a date in May was discussed”.464 This differs from 
earlier meetings held in Rhodesia or surrounding countries between Britain and 
nationalist representatives, at which there was usually a prevailing tone of animosity, 
wariness and reluctance to cooperate. It reflected a hope that the Anglo-American 
settlement talks might bring about genuine and positive change. 
Conclusion 
The sources analysed in this chapter generally demonstrate a difference between 
nationalists operating from home; Rhodesia or the regional bases, and those based in 
Britain. This difference is one of both tone and content of communication. Nationalist 
representatives based at home, in direct dealings with Britain and in publications 
discussing the independence struggle, generally referred to Britain as colluding with 
Smith and the Rhodesian Front regime, seeking to perpetuate white dominance in 
Rhodesia, whilst adopting a very aggressive and accusatory tone. In stark contrast, 
nationalist representatives based in the UK were far more moderate in approach. 
They tended to discuss developments in the situation, rather than condemning 
Britain’s actions as imperialist conspiracies, and generally spoke to British 
Government representatives in an overly polite tone as discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
 
There are two possible explanations for this difference in nationalist communications 
with and about Britain. The first is that there was a genuine difference in the 
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extremity and nature of beliefs between those based at home and those based in the 
UK; that those nationalists who were closer to the armed struggle itself became more 
radicalised in their views and that this manifested itself in the way in which they 
talked with and about representatives of the British Government. The other possible 
explanation is that this difference was a leadership tactic; that nationalist leaders saw 
that these two approaches were necessary for furthering the aims of the struggle in 
different contexts. This would explain the situation discussed earlier in the chapter 
with Chitepo, whereby he was typically liberal whilst based in the UK, and seemed to 
become more radical almost immediately upon his return to Rhodesia. It would also 
explain the ostensible discrepancies in the way in which nationalists approached the 
Anglo-American proposals; with some radical and some moderate communications 
that did not appear to fit the initial pattern discussed in the rest of the chapter. 
 
A letter from the Rhodesia Department on the behaviour of Herbert Chitepo helps to 
shed some light on this debate. It stated that “a joint ZANU/ZAPU military command 
was set up recently which has been quite active inside Rhodesia, but Chitepo is no 
doubt forced to show a very militant face in order to claim more revolutionary zeal 
than the other factions.”465 Presumably this assertion drew on earlier observations of, 
for example, Chitepo’s transition into “a thin-faced, somewhat intense Che Guevara 
nationalist, surrounded by the ritual number of suspicious strong-arm men”466 and it 
implied that cultivating this persona assisted nationalist leaders in maintaining a 
following. This argument suggests that vitriolic anti-British sentiments expressed by 
nationalists based at home were indeed employed as a leadership tactic. However, 
rather than being employed to present the cause as a fight against a remote enemy in 
order to mobilise Rhodesian Africans, this letter suggests that it was more about 
power struggles within and between different factions of nationalist organisations. 
Most likely, such rhetoric was employed for both reasons; it aided the nationalist 
cause as a whole but also helped to galvanise individual reputations when required. 
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In an article on the internal settlement, Mufuka argued that there was always distrust 
of the British amongst the nationalists: 
Despite denials on the part of the British Government, Rhodesian 
nationalists have all along suspected that Mr Smith has been advised, 
abetted and supported by the British Government since the Declaration of 
Independence in 1965. The ZAPU leader, Mr Nkomo, speaking of the 
elections, suggested that the whole exercise had been carried out with the 
'collusion' of Britain.467 
 
This suggests that the rhetoric of nationalists based at home was closer to the true 
opinions of nationalist leaders, and that the polite, more moderate, interactions with 
nationalist representatives in Britain reflected perhaps the influence of being based in 
the periphery, in terms of the independence struggle. In this argument, nationalists 
were naturally sceptical of the British, but when interacting with Government 
representatives more regularly, and also being closer to pro-African nationalist 
campaigns from advocacy organisations and the labour movement, this scepticism 
and anti-British sentiment softened. Conversely, it could also be evidence of a 
conscious leadership tactic, based on a belief that these kinds of interactions with the 
British administration would yield more fruitful results. Along similar lines, Mugabe is 
quoted as having said, “I never trusted the British. Never, at all. I did not think they 
meant well towards us. In the final analysis, I do not think they wanted the liberation 
movement, and especially the one I led, ZANU, to be the victor”.468 This, again, is 
indicative that the anti-British sentiment espoused by the core of the nationalist 
movement was indeed founded on genuine mistrust. 
 
Combined with the ideas expressed in the Rhodesia Department letter cited above, it 
can be argued that the most likely explanation behind the ostensible divide in the 
nationalist movement was somewhere between the two possible explanations 
discussed. The differences between the movement in Rhodesia and Britain reflected a 
pragmatic leadership tactic, pursued to maximise the outcome of various interactions 
the nationalists had, but distrust and hostility towards the British was the genuine 
position of the majority of the nationalist movement. Such a tactic can be considered 
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to have been guided by pragmatism in the sense that it may have been far more 
appealing and enjoyable to speak and interact with the British in a manor that 
reflected the nationalist’s true perception of them, but the belief that they were 
important power brokers in the situation and that a more diplomatic approach would 
be more productive constrained the language, tone and arguments used in such 
encounters. In one sense then the Rhodesia Department analysis was correct; the 
differences in opinion represented a tactical move by nationalist leaders, seeking both 
to gain traction in leadership or factional struggles and to gain further support for the 
nationalist struggle generally, but Chitepo’s “more radical face” was probably closer to 
his genuine beliefs, rather than the other way around. 
 
This argument is reinforced by the following example of polite communication from 
nationalists based in Rhodesia. In a 1972 message from ZAPU, the Labour Party was 
thanked for its help. Even the salutation is suggestive of how different this message is, 
in terms of both content and style, beginning “Distinguished Comrade”! The letter 
continues: 
We wish to express our great appreciation and admiration for the 
sympathy which the Labour Party is demonstrating by assisting the 
oppressed peoples of southern Africa generally, and those of Zimbabwe in 
particular. For many years now, ZAPU has watched the evolution of the 
Labour Party policies towards those troubled parts of Africa with keen 
interest and we feel confident that your party will continue to play an 
important role towards the eventual solution of the problems of Zimbabwe 
and of southern Africa as a whole.469 
 
It requires no in depth textual analysis to point out that the tone and content of this 
message was remarkably different to, for example, “Wilson’s Bloody Head”. It is 
notable that the message then proceeded to ask for assistance from the Labour Party. 
Given the origin of the message, and its intended aim, this example reinforces the 
argument that nationalists shaped their communications with and about Britain 
according to need, and that the different styles of communication can therefore be 
considered a pragmatic leadership tactic. 
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The chapter will now briefly discuss some theoretical ideas of nationalism, with a 
view to exploring the potential differences within the nationalist movement and the 
suggested explanation for why this was the case. Kellas argues that nationalism 
legitimises the state, rouses amongst citizens “an emotional attachment towards it” 
and is closely linked to democracy.470 In avoiding normative assumptions about 
nationalism, Özkirimli posits that nationalism “constantly shapes our consciousness 
and…determines our collective identity”.471 He goes on to argue that it affects all areas 
of life including behaviour and the way in which people speak. This definition could be 
critiqued for its breadth, however it provides a succinct introduction into the 
importance of nationalism and issues of identity. 
 
The doyen of theoretical studies of nationalism, Benedict Anderson, investigated this 
topic with the aim of exploring why cultural factors rouse such deep nationalist 
sentiment and sacrifice. The term “imagined communities” refers to the core of the 
theory that argues that the political community is imagined as “inherently limited and 
sovereign”. ‘Imagined’ refers to the reality that the perceived and experienced bond 
between members of a political community can only ever be imagined beyond one’s 
direct friends and family; there will be many members of the community that will 
never meet but there is still a sense of recognition and an intangible bond. Closely 
related to this is the community; an enduring sense of fraternity and comradeship 
despite inequality or hardship.472 Finally, Eriksen, in an attempt to draw together 
primordialist (attributes nationalist sentiment to human nature) and constructivist 
(attributes nationalist sentiment to historical, cultural and economic factors) 
approaches to the study of nationalism, also discusses the role of shared memory and 
shared history in creating and fostering national identity.473 
 
Certainly the legacy and history of the liberation struggle plays a role in contemporary 
Zimbabawean politics and conceptions of national identity474 but there is reason to 
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believe that ideas about nationalism also played a role in shaping the independence 
struggle itself. Both explanations for the difference in approach of home and UK based 
nationalists can be fleshed out with reference to theories of nationalism. Each of these 
will be discussed briefly here. Some attention should be given to the question ‘why 
nationalism’? A liberation struggle, by its very nature, centres on issues of 
nationalism, identity and statehood, and particularly where colonialism is involved 
there is a need to recreate both the nation and the state to a new blueprint. In the case 
of Rhodesia, whilst white settlers saw themselves as Rhodesian in national identity, 
the African nationalist movement perceived, or purportedly perceived, an extension of 
British colonialism, which was the conceptual object against which they were 
struggling. It was not simply a matter of race or class or any other singular 
characteristic; the struggle centred on nationalism. This is where the terms Rhodesia 
and Zimbabwe come into the arena: the nationalist movement preferred the latter, 
which reflected a particular conception of the new state towards which they were 
aiming. In this sense, nationalism seems the perfect theoretical framework through 
which to explore nationalist tactics, since it was such a central issue in the Rhodesia 
crisis. 
 
The theoretical ideas about nationalism, outlined briefly above, can be used to 
elucidate both potential explanations of the observed difference in the nationalist 
movement between those based at home and their representatives in the UK. Whilst 
the evidence explored earlier suggests that the second explanation; the difference as a 
leadership tactic, is more persuasive, it is worth briefly exploring the first explanation 
through the lens of nationalism. Synthesising the theoretical ideas of nationalism 
outlined above, it is clear that identity is central to the concept, and that a sense of 
shared identity based around cultural connections and shared history confers a sense 
of community, and of bonds with others within that community, even if people are 
unknown on a personal level.  
 
Considering these factors as playing a role in national identity helps in understanding 
why differences emerged between nationalists based at home and their 
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representatives in the UK. Nationalists in Rhodesia, or the regional bases, were far 
more intimately involved in the independence struggle as it was unfolding. Many 
nationalist leaders were arrested and imprisoned for parts of the war, and these 
experiences were a stark contrast to the life of their counterparts in London. Eriksen’s 
idea of a shared history and shared memory shaping national identity suggests that 
nationalist representatives overseas might have a weaker bond to the ‘imagined 
community’ of a new Zimbabwe that those at home were fervently espousing, and that 
this could be attributed to different experiences and a different history, albeit in this 
context immediate, shaping ideas about national identity. It could be argued that these 
different experiences led ultimately to divergent ideas about how to achieve 
independence, and a different perception of Britain’s role within the struggle, with 
nationalists based in London seeing Britain as less of an external enemy, and more of a 
partner in the struggle against the Smith regime, but one less founded on strong ideas 
of nationalism than their contemporaries in Africa. 
 
The second explanation of the difference is that it was simply a leadership tactic, 
designed to seek the best possible results from the intended audience of each 
communication. In this scenario, theoretical notions of nationalism really flourish. As 
highlighted throughout the chapter, nationalists based at home frequently espoused 
ardent anti-British sentiments, painting Britain and successive Governments as the 
puppet-masters of the Rhodesia crisis, intentionally keeping a right-wing white 
regime in power. Such sentiments, which appear to be a closer approximation of how 
African nationalists really viewed the situation, expressed both directly to 
representatives of the British political establishment and through various publications 
and press releases, paint a clear picture of Zimbabwean national identity as different 
to British colonialism and white rule. It can be argued that whether or not such 
communications were really representative of the views of the nationalist leaders, 
they were primarily designed to foster a sense of shared identity as a tool for 
maintaining support for the struggle, but also to assist with post-independence 
nation-building.  
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This line of thinking indicates that nationalist leaders may have been intentionally 
trying to shape the way in which much of the population both experienced the 
nationalist struggle at the time, and then how they recalled it after independence. If 
publicity at home had taken a similar tone in response to Britain as nationalists based 
there adopted, it would have made the struggle a murkier issue, with a more blurred 
picture of ‘us’ and ‘them’. This is not to downplay the fact that the Smith regime was 
seen and represented in a similarly negative light, but this argument helps to elucidate 
why nationalists were a seemingly divided front with regards to Britain. It can be 
argued that the nationalist movement felt that their representatives would get the 
most benefit from being in Britain if they maintained a dialogue with the Government, 
but this was never the way in which the independence struggle was represented to 
the majority of people at home. 
 
This chapter has explored potential differences in approach and political belief 
between nationalists based at home and their representatives in Britain. Through 
exploring various archival sources, such as records of meetings between British and 
African nationalist movement representatives and nationalist publications, it became 
apparent that there was indeed a difference. Nationalists based in Rhodesia seemed to 
adopt a forcefully anti-British stance, and conflate successive British Governments 
and the Rhodesian Front, whilst nationalist representatives in Britain took an 
ostensibly liberal stance, holding polite negotiations with British representatives, 
sometimes bordering on the obsequious. However, this dichotomy was not always the 
case. Some examples that did not conform to this trend were also discussed, 
illustrating that this divide was not clear-cut. 
 
Given that nationalists based at home behaved similarly to their British envoys when 
settlement proposals they felt could lead to a resolution became available, it seems 
that the most likely explanation behind the ostensible difference in views and 
approach was that it was a leadership tactic, designed to simultaneously maximise 
support for the nationalist struggle within Rhodesia and build a strong sense of 
Zimbabwean nationalism as different from the colonial past, and get the most from 
having a nationalist presence in Britain and direct access to key political figures. This 
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ties into conceptions of nationalism as playing an important part of the independence 
struggle, both in terms of mobilising support for the war effort at the time, and with a 
view to nation-building after independence had been won. 
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Chapter 6 – Case Study: The Pearce Commission   
 
“It should not be necessary to remind Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Ian Smith that for two Scots 
to sit down in the African capital city of Harari (Salisbury) in the 1970s, to try to solve an 
African problem without Africans, is like playing Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. It can 
never succeed.” 
Eshmael Mlambo475 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter differs to the four previous substantive chapters in that it will address all 
of the main research questions set out in the introduction, and covered respectively in 
chapters 1-4, but with a specific focus on the Pearce Commission as a case study. It 
will consider how campaigning on the Rhodesia issue correlated to key events, the 
methods used by advocacy organisations in responding to the events of the Pearce 
Commission, how all the parties involved interacted with each other and finally the 
differences in nationalist movement responses to the events of these settlement 
proposals between those based in Rhodesia and those based in the UK. The purpose of 
this chapter is twofold. First it will allow for more detailed analysis of certain issues 
considered in the previous chapters, because of the narrowed focus. Second it offers 
an opportunity to draw the arguments of the previous chapters together into a more 
coherent story of what was going on at one important time during the 15 years of the 
Rhodesia crisis. 
 
The main body of the chapter is structured chronologically, beginning with the UK 
general election in 1970, and concluding a few months after the publication of the 
official report of the Pearce Commission. A chronological approach was chosen to 
allow for coherent analysis of events as they unfolded at the time, and to understand 
how certain events coincided with key developments in the settlement negotiations 
and subsequent test of acceptability. Whilst a brief overview of the events of the 
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Pearce Commission will be provided separately, prior to the main analysis section of 
the chapter, this approach also allows for historical narrative to be woven into the 
denser analysis of archival sources. 
 
It is worth briefly addressing the question of why the Pearce Commission was selected 
as the subject for a case study, particularly given that this was not a period during 
which the Labour Party was in power. Since the purpose of the case study was to draw 
the previous strands of analysis together with a narrowly focused sub-topic or period 
within the broader focus of the thesis, it had to be a topic which provided sufficient 
archival material. The Pearce Commission was suitable in these terms, but the volume 
of sources around this particular issue is in itself instructive. It suggests that the 
organisations involved simply had more to say and were more active on this issue 
than in response to earlier attempts at settlement. In contrast to the Tiger and 
Fearless talks before it, the Pearce Commission represented a more concrete and 
detailed plan to resolve the Rhodesia crisis, and as such garnered a more 
comprehensive response from the various interested parties. This is particularly 
evident in regard to the labour movement as it became far more vocal on the Rhodesia 
issue at this time than it had been at any point previously, in response to a tangible 
threat of a sell-out. This made the Commission the obvious candidate to develop a 
case study chapter around. 
 
The chapter will begin with a brief overview of the Pearce Commission; what it was 
and how it played out, before moving on to a brief literature review, followed by the 
main analysis section. The overview contextualises the later analysis section, so that 
when discussion becomes focused on very specific events, the reader may have in 
mind the broader picture of what was going on, and how the specific fits into the 
general. The chapter will draw on a broad range of archival sources from all archives 
visited during the research for this project. This scope of sources reflects the intended 
scope of the chapter in drawing together ideas from the rest of the thesis in order to 
amplify and unify themes introduced in earlier chapters. 
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The Pearce Commission 
Prior to the June 1970 general election, the Conservative Party had committed itself to 
one more attempt at talks to try to resolve the Rhodesia crisis.476 Around a similar 
time they also changed their stance on the sanctions regime, saying that it had 
noticeably had an impact on the Rhodesian economy, and that sanctions would 
therefore stay in place pending negotiations. The Labour Party was sceptical about 
Tory efforts at talks, especially since by preparing to negotiate with the regime, they 
had effectively accepted the 1969 constitution as a basis for these negotiations, which 
was completely at odds with the 6 principles that successive Governments had 
purported to work towards.477 The 1969 constitution had been ushered in after the 
rejection of the Fearless proposals as an attempt to quell dissent amongst the ranks of 
the Rhodesian Front, and Smith famously boasted that it would “sound the death knell 
of majority rule in Rhodesia”.478 As such, there was great concern amongst advocacy 
organisations and much of the political left in Britain that it would not be possible to 
negotiate any acceptable terms of settlement from such a starting point. The 
scepticism of the Labour Party on this issue was most clearly illustrated at the 1971 
conference. A resolution put forward by Knutsford CLP and seconded by the NUM that 
called on the PLP to ensure that “no deals which do not recognise the Six Principles 
are made with the rebel regime” was then supported, but deemed “not strong enough” 
by Denis Healey representing the NEC.479 This illustrates the Party’s opposition to 
these attempts at settlement, but also their willingness to indulge in much strong pro-
independence rhetoric whilst in opposition. 
 
The Conservative Party faced objections to the resumption of talks at both UN and 
Commonwealth meetings. They also raised tensions through their decision to resume 
the sale of arms to South Africa. This issue was inextricably linked to what was 
happening in Rhodesia, since South Africa was overtly assisting the Smith regime in 
their fight against the nationalist guerrilla armies. However, international opposition 
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and Party quarrels eventually gave way to negotiations.480 Lord Goodman visited 
Salisbury in secret in April 1971, and returned for a “second, more public visit, in June 
when he was met by African school children and students protesting against racial 
discrimination. He earned the suspicion of the Africans by making no contact with 
them on this or subsequent visits”.481 Despite difficulties and scepticism about the 
nature of the terms of settlement that were being discussed, agreement was 
eventually signed on 24 November, 1971. There was a wave of activity during the 
following month from advocacy organisations in Britain, and African nationalists in 
Rhodesia, in response to the agreement having been signed. Despite this early display 
of concern about the proposals, their implementation was contingent upon them 
meeting the fifth principle; they had to be “acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a 
whole”.482 
 
The mechanism decided upon for employing this ‘test of acceptability’ was a 
commission, which was to be led by Lord Pearce. The terms of reference of the 
eponymous Pearce Commission stated that it was necessary for the commissioners to: 
satisfy themselves that the proposals for a settlement…have been fully and 
properly explained to the population of Rhodesia; to ascertain by direct 
contact with all sections of the population whether the people of Rhodesia 
as a whole regard these proposals as acceptable as a basis for 
independence; and to report…accordingly.483 
 
The Commission consisted of a Chairman (Lord Pearce), three vice Chairmen and 20 
commissioners. On the demographic of these commissioners, the final report stated 
that 
To enable us to carry out the investigation we felt that we needed 
Commissioners who had experience of rural and urban Africans, who had 
shown their capacity for handling people and crowds, who would be able to 
operate independently and who were capable of forming a balanced and 
impartial assessment of what they heard and saw. There were persons 
serving under the Foreign and Commonwealth Office whose previous 
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service had shown that they had such qualifications and could be made 
quickly available. But it seemed better to get a substantial proportion who 
had pursued other walks of life.484 
 
Despite this proclamation of a desired mix of backgrounds amongst the 
Commissioners, most were ex-colonial civil service personnel and some were still in 
the civil service. All had extensive overseas experience, often working as district 
commissioners in various British colonies in Africa. Perhaps to satisfy the stated 
criteria of diversity, most of the Commissioners also had experience outside of the 
civil service, in private industry, the UN, educational institutions and even London 
Zoo.485 This demographic concerned the Rhodesian Front who feared that these 
people inherently hated the Europeans in southern Africa, and that their verdict 
would reflect this prejudice.486 It also concerned the African nationalist movement for 
opposite reasons, who feared that the Commission would simply rubber-stamp the 
proposals without genuinely investigating African opinion. The quote from Eshmael 
Mlambo of the ANC at the head of the chapter speaks to precisely this concern. 
 
The Commissioners carried out the test of acceptability from January to March 1972. 
They had decided to explain the proposals to the Rhodesian people themselves, as 
well as distributing copies of the proposals in a simplified form, translated into Shona 
and Sindebele,487 rather than leave it to the Smith Government or others. On this 
point, the final report noted that “The dividing line between exposition and advocacy 
is thin, but immensely important”.488 White chronicles the crumbling of the 
Commissioners’ early intentions to implement scientific sampling methods once they 
were in the field, quickly realising that the political reality trumped any attempts at 
rigid sampling.489 She goes on to elucidate the methods that the Commission 
eventually employed: 
During the commission’s visit, ‘vote’ became the operative shorthand for 
the many kinds of responses the commission would receive: written 
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submissions, oral answers, shouts or a show of hands at public meetings – 
groups of twenty or more – were all described in the vocabulary of the 
ballot, which tended to obscure how much of the commission’s work went 
on in public.490 
 
It can be argued that these initial attempts at a more scientific approach to conducting 
the enquiry, including for example an opinion poll, were symptomatic of the level of 
planning and detailed thought that went into what was a very difficult exercise to 
carry out. That such methods inevitably crumbled in the field indicates a naivety of the 
original plans. However, the attempts to plan the Commission to such a level of 
granularity in the first instance demonstrates how seriously the task was taken by 
those responsible for it, and a desire to seek and represent the actual opinions of the 
population of Rhodesia. 
 
The Labour Party, in response to fears that the Pearce Commission would not truly 
reflect the opinions of the population as a whole, decided to send a delegation of NEC 
representatives (Denis Healey, Joe Gormley, Joan Lestor and Tom McNally) to 
Rhodesia to observe.491 In a letter to the Conservative Party, explaining this request, it 
was stated that the NEC representatives “wish to…visit Salisbury and another urban 
centre (probably Bulawayo) and also to have the opportunity of observing the 
Commission’s work in the tribal trust areas”.492 Douglas-Home was tentatively willing 
to grant this request, until it was effectively banned by Ian Smith because of the 
“resolutions supporting terrorist movements which were passed at the Labour Party 
Conferences in 1970 and 1972”.493 
 
There was also a great deal of concern amongst the African population in Rhodesia 
and amongst the Labour Party, the broader left and advocacy organisations in Britain 
that the Pearce Commission would simply rubber stamp the implementation of the 
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settlement proposals.494 However, such doubts were assuaged when the commission 
returned with a resounding ‘no’. The official report of the Pearce Commission was 
published on 23rd May 1972. It represented a turning point of sorts in the Rhodesia 
crisis, since for the first time the African population had been given a voice, and used 
it to clearly reject the proposals developed by Britain and the Smith regime. It 
signified that any future negotiations, if they were to have any real credibility, would 
have to involve African representation.  
 
Whilst previous chapters have focused exclusively on ZANU and ZAPU, this one will 
differ in that a case study on the Pearce Commission cannot in good conscience ignore 
the ANC. White highlights its formation and composition, which supports this point: 
The ANC, Muzorewa told the commission in January, had only been formed 
in December 1971 ‘as a spontaneous grass roots reaction to the 
announcement of the terms of the Anglo-Rhodesian proposals.’ Yet it was 
common knowledge that the ANC was an invention of the banned political 
parties. In his autobiography, Muzorewa described how the ANC had been 
created by a joint ZAPU and ZANU committee. He had been selected as a 
‘neutral leader’, and was promised the full support of the two leaders still in 
detention, the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole and Joshua Nkomo. The ANC’s 
executive committee would be equally divided between the two parties.495 
 
This indicates the importance of the ANC’s inclusion in considering the events of the 
Pearce Commission, since it was a vehicle through which the banned nationalist 
parties could participate in the political process unfolding, and for the first time have a 
voice in negotiations around settlement proposals. 
 
As White argues, there is little secondary scholarship focusing directly on the Pearce 
Commission and where it is discussed, it is “the stuff of memoirs rather than of 
historical enquiry…because the Pearce Commission fits so neatly into the grand 
narrative of Rhodesia into Zimbabwe”.496 She characterises the Commission, not as a 
key turning point, but as a ‘stepping stone’ to further developments. However, this 
argument can be countered with the observation that the Pearce Commission and the 
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proposals it was designed to test, represented the last bilateral attempt at negotiation 
in the mode of Tiger and Fearless. The Pearce Commission is also covered in the so-
called ‘grand narrative’ accounts of Rhodesia to Zimbabwe discussed briefly in the 
thesis introduction, but these accounts offer little beyond the formal progress of 
events.497 
 
What the existing literature on the Pearce Commission does not do, is explore grass 
roots opinion on the proposals and the test of acceptability in Britain, or consider 
communication between representatives of African nationalist opinion in Rhodesia 
with the British political establishment. Quite often when this attempt at settlement is 
discussed in existing studies, the focus is very much on the test of acceptability itself, 
whilst the build-up to this point is largely obscured. In reality, the period during which 
the commissioners were in Rhodesia, gathering opinion on the proposals, was only 
three months, out of a broader timeline of closer to three years. 
Beyond the ‘grand narrative’? 
This section of the chapter will begin notionally with the British general election of 
June 1970, since it was the Conservative Party’s election victory that set in motion the 
events leading up to the Pearce Commission. Whilst Heath made it clear quite quickly 
after the election that he intended to reopen negotiations with Rhodesia if possible,498 
it was believed highly unlikely that “these moves will go further than preliminary 
soundings”.499 
 
In the Labour Party International Department’s ‘Background Brief on the Situation in 
Rhodesia’ the point was made that the Party’s policy had remained static since June 
1970. The document also set out what this policy was, perhaps most importantly 
asserting that the Party “rejected the Conservative claim that any meaningful talks 
with the rebel regime were possible.”500 It stated that since the Smith Government 
rejected the Fearless proposals in 1968, the Labour Party felt that no settlement 
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would be possible without jeopardising the Six Principles, although it noted that the 
Conservative Party has never acknowledged the last of these Principles (“It would be 
necessary to ensure that, regardless of race, there was no oppression of the majority 
by the minority, or of the minority by the majority”).501 This summary of Labour Party 
policy is indicative of the Party’s willingness to pronounce very clearly on the 
Rhodesia issue whilst in opposition, particularly in light of media and advocacy 
attention on the Conservative Party’s attempts at settlement, in contrast to its 
pragmatic stance when in power.  
 
At the 1970 Labour Party Conference, an Eton and Slough CLP resolution (217) stated 
that: 
This conference reaffirms its belief that there should be no independence 
before majority rule in Southern Rhodesia and urges the Labour 
Government to disregard any deal made between the Conservative 
Government and the illegal regime in Salisbury that does not fully respect 
the principle of majority rule.502 
 
However, the annual report had just one brief paragraph on the Rhodesia education 
fund, which suggests that this resolution was never discussed at Conference.503 It is 
interesting that, whilst there was clearly some concern amongst the broader labour 
movement over what would emerge from Heath’s talks with the Smith regime, 1970 
was still remarkably quiet on the Rhodesia issue, and it was not until talks really 
began that more action from advocacy organisations and the labour movement 
became apparent. This is indicative of the pattern outlined in Chapter 2 about action 
on Rhodesia conforming very closely to events. Whilst there was some concern about 
what would happen with Rhodesia following the 1970 general election, it was only 
when concrete action was taken that organisations began to respond more vigorously. 
 
The Africa Bureau was quick to respond to the fear that a settlement might arise from 
renewed talks between the Conservative Government and the Smith regime. In line 
with this, the organisation issued a press release in January 1971 to state that 
“Britain’s best interest will be damaged by any settlement of the Rhodesia question 
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based upon a compromise designed to relieve the Government of embarrassment.” 504 
This is a very moderate stance to argue when faced with a potential sell out and is 
indicative of a pragmatic influence on the rhetoric used to argue against such an 
eventuality - that it would be counter to “Britain’s best interest” before any mention of 
the implications for the African population. It went on to argue that despite the 
persistence of the Rhodesia issue, this was not sufficient grounds to shirk 
responsibility for the situation there, and that any settlement reached must be in line 
with the Six Principles. 
 
As negotiations began between the Smith and the Heath Governments, 
representatives of ZANU and ZAPU were quick off the mark to condemn any attempts 
at a sell-out and negotiations that did not involve them. Uncharacteristically, they sent 
a joint memorandum to the British Government, outlining their thoughts on the new 
round of talks. It is essentially a cautionary note, which stated that the nationalist 
organisations had heard of the negotiations through media reports. They suggested 
that if any ‘solution’ was arrived at that did not uphold the principles of self-
determination and majority rule, ZANU and ZAPU would “level the blame on the 
British Government and the British people.”505 It also points out that from previous 
rounds of talks, it should have become apparent that the Smith regime could not be 
considered as an “honest broker in any meaningful negotiations to settle the Rhodesia 
crisis”. This communication from representatives of the African nationalist movement 
was interesting in a number of ways. It did not quite reflect the tone of typical 
communications from either nationalist representatives based in London or those 
based at home; it is somewhere between the two. In particular, its condemnation of 
the British people is unusual, as typically African nationalists had been at pains to 
convey that they did not see the British people and the Government as the same thing; 
rather they viewed the British people as also being oppressed.506 The comments 
outlined here, printed in an edition of Zimbabwe News, seem to find a middle ground 
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between the typical positions of African nationalists based at home and their 
representatives in London, discussed in the previous chapter. The initial comments 
cited are reminiscent of the frequent anti-British sentiments that were expressed by 
nationalists based in Rhodesia and neighbouring countries, but the later comments 
picking holes in the content of the proposals are more akin to the arguments set out 
by nationalist representatives in Britain. This example reinforces the arguments made 
in Chapter 5 that perceived differences between the groups of nationalists were in fact 
indicative of a leadership tactic, designed to maximise returns from each exchange 
they engaged in. 
 
ZANU representatives based at home issued typically strongly-worded statements on 
the new round of settlement proposals, saying that “the intention of the British 
Government in the current talks in Salisbury is to handover the basic rights of the five 
million people to a fascist settler government”.507 They highlighted three factors that 
underpinned this conclusion: that majority rule had been diluted to “government of 
the so-called ‘civilised and responsible’”; there had been no African representation at 
the talks so far; and, at that point, no sign of the proposals being put to the people. 
Finally, the proposals made provision for local councils to have more power on the 
grounds that this would provide more power for the African population when in 
reality local councils were subject to central Government control. The purpose of such 
statements were clearly to rouse popular opinion against the proposals and bolster 
support for the nationalist movement. 
 
At the 1971 TUC Congress, motions on the Rhodesia issue and southern Africa were 
passed, indicating a greater labour movement interest and engagement with these 
issues due to greater awareness that the renewed talks had generated. The motion, 
moved by the Musician’s Union and seconded by the Chemical Workers’ Union, stated 
that Congress “deplores the Government’s intention to resume talks with the illegal 
regime in Rhodesia” and that: 
Congress calls upon the General Council to press positive measures to 
strengthen trade union opposition to these regimes including…Giving full 
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support, moral and material, to the Liberation movements in Southern 
Africa; giving full support to efforts to obtain the release of political 
prisoners…and breaking of trade union relations with white-only trade 
unions.508 
 
This motion was carried without debate or amendments, and illustrates a far greater 
engagement with the Rhodesia issue, and overt declaration of support for the African 
nationalist movement than can be seen earlier with the labour movement. However, 
the lack of debate or comment from the platform does not suggest huge grassroots 
concern for the issue. 
 
Given the agitation of various advocacy groups and the broader labour movement 
over the 1971 proposals and the planned test of acceptability, it is no surprise that the 
Labour Party conference of this year gave time to the Rhodesia issue. A resolution, 
moved by Knutsford CLP, “urges the Parliamentary Labour Party to do all in its power 
to ensure that sanctions are being vigorously enforced, and that no deals which do not 
recognise the Six Principles are made with the rebel regime”.509 It also made the point 
that the Rhodesia issue should not be allowed to drift off the agenda before it was 
resolved. Lawrence Daly of the NUM was called on to second this resolution, and in so 
doing was more explicit about the relevance of the talks than the resolution itself. He 
stated that it was almost certain that “any settlement or deal made between the 
present Tory Government and the Smith regime will be a betrayal of the 5 million 
African Rhodesians and will be a further prop to the repressive rule of the white 
minority in that country”.510 This sentiment was then reinforced by Healey, in the 
capacity of NEC representative, who informed conference that the NEC wished for the 
resolution to be carried, with the caveat that it could be stronger. The resolution was 
carried by conference, unsurprisingly, as it contained nothing controversial on the 
subject and the outcome of the settlement negotiations were not, this time, the 
responsibility of the Labour Party leadership. This example does indicate the labour 
movement interacting positively with the Labour Party over the Rhodesia issue, 
however it is not dramatically different to earlier examples in which the movement 
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rallied behind the Party; it is only the sentiment being expressed that differs here. The 
TUC independently echoed the sentiments expressed at the Labour Party conference 
in a statement issued later in 1971 which argued that the settlement proposals to be 
tested by the Pearce Commission did not provide a “basis for the development of a 
democratic state”.511 This is certainly indicative of a more genuine dovetailing of 
opinion on the Rhodesia issue than had been seen previously. 
 
The Southern Africa Research Office512 established a new publication on Rhodesia 
designed to “provide a more detailed analysis of Rhodesian affairs than is available 
through the existing media”.513 Its founder Michael Christie, who also authored 
‘Rhodesia: Proposals for a Sell-Out’, a pamphlet condemning Lord Goodman’s 
settlement proposals,514 wrote to the AAM enclosing the first edition and suggesting 
an exchange with AA News, their regular publication. The first edition of the new 
Rhodesian Review discussed the guerrilla war and the initiation of settlement 
negotiations as well as the trials and imprisonments of African nationalists.515 It is 
significant that, despite advocacy organisations making use of media coverage of 
events in Rhodesia to increase support for their campaigns, as discussed in Chapter 3, 
it was clearly perceived that there was still a need for further and more detailed 
coverage of events in Rhodesia. The initiation of this new publication, the on-going AA 
News, and various research outputs of the Africa Bureau all serve to illustrate this 
point. Whilst organisations generally cooperated very effectively in campaigning on 
the Rhodesia issue, this is one area in which there was a duplication of efforts and 
potential competition between different organisations working on the same issue. 
This can be attributed to the constraints of pragmatism in that such publications 
setting out greater detail on the Rhodesian situation than the mainstream media 
published was uncontentious and unlikely to alienate any existing support of the 
advocacy campaign, but may attract new supporters. It was a less contentious method 
than channelling funds into material aid for the nationalist organisations. 
                                                          
511 TUCL, Marjorie Nicholson papers, 39 968.2 2, TUC statement on Rhodesia, 01/12/1971. 
512 A small publishing outfit established to publish material relating to issues around politics and decolonisation in 
southern Africa. 
513 RH, MSS AAM 1211, Letter from Michael Christie of Southern Africa Research Office to AAM, 15/11/1971. 
514 RH, RHO C94 R 250, M. Christie, Rhodesia: Proposals for a Sell-Out, Southern African Research Office, February 1972. 
515 RH, MSS AAM 1211, Rhodesian Review 1:1, November 1972. 
195 
 
 
The church had long played a role in the activity of advocacy organisations 
campaigning on southern African issues,516 but this latest round of settlement 
proposals prompted more significant action from this sector than had been seen 
previously. Prior to the formation of the Justice for Rhodesia campaign in December 
1971, which will be discussed shortly, the CIIR’s Southern Africa Group led some 
campaigning activities specifically addressing the new settlement proposals. Minutes 
from early November demonstrate the group’s attempt to publish a letter in The Times 
“setting out the conditions on which a settlement could be deemed possible”,517 for 
which they tried to obtain some signatures of prominent figures “including liberal 
Tories such as Lord Butler and Lord Boyle”, all of whom refused. This tactic was 
discussed in the meeting, with the opinion expressed that it might have been a naïve 
strategy, but it had been pursued because it was believed that such signatories would 
improve the chances of publication and the clout of the letter. The conventional 
strategy outlined in such a situation was described as asking “well known academics, 
Church leaders and labour peers”.518 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, a key theme in the methods used by the AAM in 
campaigning on Rhodesia was trying to involve the labour movement, which met with 
mixed success. At a TUAG meeting in late November “discussion centred on the 
particular role trade unionists could play in opposing the probable sell-out on 
Rhodesia.”519 The tactics discussed in order to achieve this reflect the methods 
outlined in Chapter 3; using a meeting of the TUC General Council to encourage trade 
unionists to take a strong line on Rhodesia, and ensuring the TUC played an active role 
in discouraging emigration to Rhodesia. The fact that the AAM was still discussing 
such tactics illustrates the TUC’s lack of engagement with the Rhodesia issue prior to 
the Pearce Commission. 
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The Africa Bureau issued a press release once the content of the settlement proposals 
had become clear. It condemned the proposals as translating to “no majority rule in 
the lifetime of the present white Rhodesians”.520 The statement also articulated 
concerns relating to the proposed test of acceptability on several points, stating that it 
was no substitute for a universal vote, it was unlikely that the African population 
would be able to speak freely, the nationalist organisations had not been allowed TV 
or radio time, and that detainees should be released to be allowed to campaign on the 
issue. They also discussed the issue of the constitution upon which the settlement 
proposals were based, arguing that it did not effectively provide for a timely transition 
to majority rule. The statement concluded by reaffirming its stance that the proposals 
were unacceptable. The Bureau made it clear that it believed Britain should have 
waited a further couple of years before another attempt at settlement, to allow 
sanctions and the downturn in South Africa’s economy to put further pressure on the 
Smith Government, making them more amenable to genuine change.521 
 
The Africa Bureau planned to oppose the proposals “by all practical means including 
support for action by the United Nations and African actions designed to secure their 
rights and justice”.522 The notable exception to their “practical means” being material 
aid for the nationalist movement or no campaign. However, this statement was sent to 
the press and to all Africa Bureau members, which gives an indication of the how 
seriously the organisation was viewing the 1971 proposals, since generally press 
releases were only sent to the press. This highlights that there was a real fear amongst 
those organisations and individuals in Britain who were engaged with the Rhodesia 
issue that the 1971 proposals and planned test of acceptability could really lead to 
Rhodesian independence under unacceptable conditions of white settler dominance, 
but demonstrates the extent to which a pragmatic approach to campaigning and a 
limited repertoire of contention prevailed. 
 
At the end of November 1971, the AAM organised a protest meeting called ‘Fight the 
Sell-Out’ to discuss the situation and inform interested members of the public about 
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the possible ramifications of the current settlement negotiations. The speakers at this 
meeting represented the Labour Party, the broader labour movement, the AAM itself 
and individuals with direct links to Rhodesia, such as Byron Hove, a “former student 
leader at University College Rhodesia” who had been detained by the Smith regime 
before escaping to Britain. The AAM also secured broad-ranging support for the 
meeting from other organisations, such as the Africa Bureau, the NUS, the CPGB, the 
Labour and Liberal Parties, the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation and the United 
Nations Association.523 
 
As well as those mentioned above, Judith Todd524 spoke at the AAM protest meeting. 
She set out some key problems with the settlement, but also made some suggestions 
as to what could be done to protest against any potential agreement based on the 
proposals: 
It is up to you who care about what the British Government is allowing to 
happen to the people of Rhodesia to do what you think is best to register 
your protest. You may use the Churches, the Trade Unions, your MPs, 
political groups – anything you can think of. But tonight I appeal especially 
to the Press of this land…What you can do for us is to insist that 
representatives of the media of this country accompany the Commission 
wherever they go. By so doing, you may shame the Commission into 
admitting that they have been asked to do, in six weeks, what no impartial 
Commission could do in one year.525 
 
This brief section of the speech neatly captures a summation of the typical methods 
advocacy organisations employed in campaigning on the Rhodesia issue. Trying to 
involve the labour movement, lobbying government and MPs, making use of existing 
social networks (exemplified here by churches) and involving the media were the 
main methods seen in Chapter 3, and fall into a fairly typical repertoire of contention. 
None of these familiar methods strayed into territory that could be perceived as too 
extreme, and therefore alienate any potential supporters of the campaign. However, 
Todd’s final suggestion was more innovative, and illustrative of the idea discussed at 
length in Chapter 2, about protesting tailoring itself to particular events. 
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December 1971 was a key month in terms of activity surrounding the settlement 
proposals. Several organisations were established at this time specifically to protest 
against the possibility of a sell-out following the test of acceptability, which was due to 
begin the following month. The African nationalist movement in Rhodesia saw the 
establishment of the ANC, to mobilise support for a ‘no’ to the commissioners, and in 
Britain two new advocacy groups, or committees, were set up to lobby the 
Conservative Government and ensure that the test of acceptability was not merely a 
rubber stamp for a sell-out. Again it is illuminating that organisations, limited by their 
pragmatic approach to the issue, chose to lobby the British Government rather than to 
work directly with the no campaign in Rhodesia. 
 
The Pearce proposals were discussed at a Parliamentary Labour Party meeting in 
December 1971, prior to the commissioners arriving in Rhodesia. Alex Lyon suggested 
that, in an upcoming debate on Rhodesia, the Labour Party should “show the country 
just how worm-rotten” the Conservative Party’s settlement proposals were.526 Joan 
Lestor stated that the labour movement was still concerned with the Rhodesia issue, 
and the Party needed to be clear about its position if the Pearce proposals went 
through and there was dissatisfaction amongst the British left. She also asked “What 
would be the responsibilities shouldered by a future Labour Government?”527 This 
suggested a greater degree of concern for the views of the broader labour movement 
than was evident amongst the Labour Party leadership over the Rhodesia issue. It can 
be argued that this concern, and the likelihood of a labour movement swell of 
discontent were Pearce to have turned out differently, indicates the importance of this 
series of events in the Rhodesia crisis. Had the Commission returned with different 
findings, the Rhodesia issue could have been far more explosive and controversial in 
the early- to mid-1970s than it turned out to be. 
 
On the same day, the TUC General Council made a statement on Rhodesia. Whilst 
expressing concern over the implications of the settlement proposals, this was far 
milder in tone than earlier statements by, for example, the Africa Bureau or the 
                                                          
526 LHASC, PLP Minutes, 01/12/1971. 
527 Ibid. 
199 
 
Labour Party Conference. The statement discussed the proposed new electoral 
system, land allocation, racial divisions in industry, and praised trade unions as 
holding the potential to counter the current system. It also stated that: 
The British people are entitled to expect that a colony which demands 
independence should be prepared to break with practices which hinder the 
progress of the majority of its citizens, should respect civil liberty, and 
should show willingness to offer equal opportunity to men and women of 
all races, socially and otherwise.528 
 
Whilst the statement discussed the situation of the African majority, it never explicitly 
mentioned the nationalist movement, nor did it use any of the strong language that 
other similar statements drew on, such as ‘condemning’ the proposals. However, it 
was indicative of a greater interest in the Rhodesia issue by the labour movement 
than was seen with earlier rounds of settlement talks. 
 
In mid-December at a TUC International Committee meeting, the Rhodesia issue was 
discussed. The meeting began with one member of the Council arguing that the 
December 1st statement, discussed above, did not go far enough: “He suggested that 
strong representations should be made to Government that independence to Rhodesia 
should not be granted without a definite arrangement for majority rule”.529  Other 
members of the Committee felt that the earlier statement was sufficient, and argued 
that “Congress policy did not go so far as to suggest majority rule before 
independence was granted”. The latter voice won the debate, with the International 
Committee accepting the December 1st statement, on the basis that it “referred to the 
need for a radical change in approach to the constitutional and social problems of 
Rhodesia” and called for “the creation of a democratic, non-discriminatory and non-
racial society, which alone could justify the claim to independence”. This example 
demonstrated the tensions within one element of the labour movement over the 
appropriate strategy to use in relation to the Rhodesia issue, and also shows that, 
although there was at this time greater interest in the issue, a more moderate 
approach was still preferred over becoming a more radical voice, along the lines of 
most advocacy organisations working on Rhodesia. Domestic political concerns at this 
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time almost certainly were more pressing to the majority of trade unionists than 
foreign policy, with a focus on industrial relations legislation and a wave of union 
strike action.530 The precedence of such concerns over Rhodesia amongst a large 
portion of the labour movement helps to explain the cause of its disengagement with 
this issue, which prevailed until the late 1970s. However, it should be noted that there 
were, throughout the period, some elements of the labour movement who were 
willing and able to go against Party policy. These were often members of the new 
university-educated left, such as those involved in advocacy work, and CLPs in areas 
that were less affected by issues such as economic instability and immigration, who 
had more freedom to focus on causes further from home such as development and 
decolonisation. 
 
This divide in the labour movement, between those who were engaged with the 
Rhodesia issue, and those for whom other issues took precedence is further illustrated 
by the National Organisation of Labour Students (NOLS), who wrote to the Labour 
Party informing them of an emergency resolution passed at their annual conference. It 
stated that any attempt to solve the Rhodesian crisis except by majority rule, 
accompanied by universal education and the repeal of discriminatory laws, would be 
unacceptable, and therefore condemned the Conservative proposals for settlement.531 
They received a reply stating that the NEC “fully supports your condemnation of the 
Government’s Rhodesia Settlement.”532 It restated the NEC’s opposition to the 
proposals, including specific points on issues such as the length of time for which 
majority rule would be postponed. The reply reassured the NOLS that “both the NEC 
and the Parliamentary leadership will oppose this settlement by all means possible 
and ensure that African opinion clearly sees that we do not condone the Government’s 
action.”533 This exchange demonstrated a component of the labour movement 
engaging with the Rhodesia issue in such a way that was comparable in tone and 
method to much of the advocacy campaigning. This can be attributed to the 
generational and occupational difference of this element of the labour movement, to 
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many of the examples explored in this thesis. As a student organisation, there was 
inevitably less of a preoccupation with bread and butter domestic concerns, and 
greater freedom to explore socialist ideals of assisting a faraway struggle. 
 
The ANC’s formation was officially announced on the 16th December 1972. White 
argues that, whilst Muzorewa at the time marketed the formation of the ANC as a 
spontaneous grass roots response to the settlement proposals, “it was common 
knowledge that the ANC was an invention of the banned political parties”.534 An initial 
meeting took place between Alec Douglas-Home and ex-detainees representing 
nationalist opinion, part of the former’s programme of consulting with a wide range of 
Rhodesian opinion on the settlement proposals. This group, comprising Edson Sithole, 
Michael Mawema and Cephas Msipa, decided to continue to work together afterwards 
“to form a body to work for and lead opposition to the Proposals”.535 Bishop 
Muzorewa was “a clear choice for leadership of this body…because he had not been 
involved in the previous splits in the nationalist movement, nor would he immediately 
attract a government banning order on the ANC”.536 Following the detention of Josiah 
Chinamaso of ZAPU, it was sometimes argued that ZANU came to dominate the 
ANC.537 
 
Also in this month, the Justice for Rhodesia campaign was established, in response to 
fear of a settlement as a result of the negotiations. As discussed briefly in the 
introduction, the campaign’s chairman, Joseph Camilleri wrote to Harold Wilson to 
publicise the new organisation and its purpose, which he stated was to “oppose the 
settlement, to call for the continuation and intensification of sanctions and to insist on 
the right of African self-determination.”538 The letter concluded by stating how 
important the campaign’s organisers believed it was to obtain support from the 
Labour and Liberal Parties to help prevent any sell-out. It also gave a more detailed 
statement about the Justice for Rhodesia campaign, which as well as outlining the 
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present settlement proposals and what it felt would be a better alternative, namely 
the intensification of sanctions, contained a section detailing what the campaign 
argued could be practically done about the situation. In cementing the importance of 
the cause, and in line with the organisation’s demography, the document cited 
Archbishop Dwyer of Birmingham: “If a settlement is made with Rhodesia without 
injustice being righted, at least do not let us pretend that it has.”539 It also made 
suggestions such as holding vigils, forming local groups, participating in protests held 
by other organisations, getting media coverage and lobbying Parliament. Such ideas 
were characteristic of the campaigning strategies discussed in detail in Chapter 3; it is 
clear that this organisation operated within a clearly defined repertoire of contention, 
despite being newly formed in relation to the specific instance of these settlement 
negotiations. It is also indicative of the importance the issue was attributed due to the 
possible settlement. 
 
At its inception, the Justice for Rhodesia campaign also wrote to Vic Feather of the 
TUC to try to establish some labour movement support for the campaign. The letter 
was tailored specifically to encourage the participation of the TUC, stating that “this is 
a matter of direct concern to the Trade Union movement generally and to you 
personally, since what is at stake is the future of so many millions of workers, in 
Rhodesia.”540 The letter included a list of people involved in the campaign; mainly 
representatives of various different churches or church organisations, but also 
representatives of the Africa Bureau, the AAM, the Defence and Aid Fund and the 
Observer, along with the general campaign documents that were also sent to Harold 
Wilson and discussed above. This letter draws together and illustrates two key points 
that have been discussed in previous chapters. First, it shows the willingness of 
advocacy organisations to cooperate effectively in seeking a solution to the Rhodesia 
crisis. Second, it reinforces the argument made in Chapter 3 that one of the key 
methods that some advocacy organisations (particularly the AAM) utilised was to 
work to expand support for the cause amongst the labour movement, especially trade 
unionists.  
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Later in the month, the AAM instigated the formation of its own internal organisation 
to respond to the settlement talks and the possibility of a sell-out. As discussed in 
Chapter 2 as an illustration of advocacy activity coalescing around particular events in 
the Rhodesia timeline, the RECC was formed. This initial meeting of the organisation 
made arrangements for a demonstration to be held in February of the following year. 
It appointed a working party to facilitate the organisation of this event which included 
representatives of the AAM, the Communist Party (which the AAM had been reticent 
to work with earlier on for fear of appearing too radical), the Labour Party and the 
labour movement.541 The range of people involved in the new organisation and its 
inaugural event very much conformed to the methods used by advocacy organisations 
discussed in Chapter 3, with the exception of the inclusion of the Communist Party. 
This shift in an earlier, albeit informal, policy of the AAM indicated the seriousness of 
the situation as perceived at the time, prompting a willingness to diversify to 
strengthen the campaign. It was also indicative of more productive interaction 
between the Labour Party, advocacy organisations and the broader labour movement 
than it was possible to detect throughout much of the period under consideration, 
again strengthening the idea that this most recent round of settlement talks were 
being taken very seriously by all parties. It also reinforces the argument made above 
regarding the Labour Party’s shift towards espousing more radical rhetoric, 
reminiscent of, for example, the AAM, now that they were not in government. 
 
The January edition of Zimbabwe News carried an entertaining satirical skit about the 
Pearce Commission on its cover page: 
‘I am afraid, Smithy, home-boy, the game’s up. The settlement is done for. 
Those blacks don’t look as if they’ll back down.’ 
‘But, my dear Alec, you’ll have to find another trick to keep your kith-and-
kin in charge here.’542 
 
The article went on to discuss the Commission more fully, arguing that the African 
population was doing well at conveying an overwhelming ‘no’ to the proposals, but 
warning that there was always more to be done. The ANC was congratulated for 
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leading the campaign against the proposals, but the text quickly proceeded to argue 
that “there must be no revisionism…The armed struggle will still have to be fought out 
to the finish.” This suggests that whilst the ANC was respected by ZANU for its role in 
defeating the Pearce proposals, there was a mistrust of the organisation from quite an 
early stage about what they might go on to advocate afterwards. It was seen as useful 
by ZANU for the purposes for which it was established; protesting against the 
proposals, but once these had been defeated there was a clear belief in the importance 
of a return to armed struggle. 
 
In a press release in early January 1972 the RECC set out an advert for the protest 
march it was organising for the following month. This was circulated at the time that 
Bishop Muzorewa confirmed his availability to speak at the march. It concluded by 
mentioning another, smaller demonstration, planned for January 10th. This 
demonstration was held at Heathrow Airport and coincided with the departure of the 
Pearce Commission for Rhodesia.543 The content of this press release highlighted two 
key arguments made in earlier chapters. First, it demonstrated an advocacy 
organisation harnessing the press, in terms of raising awareness but also in referring 
to ‘big names’ that would resonate with the British public in order to attract greater 
interest in their campaign. Second it demonstrates the correlation between events and 
actions on Rhodesia, and the extent to which advocacy organisations not only 
responded to key events, but also made use of them in order to shape their actions 
and campaigns on Rhodesia. Another example of this was the demonstration the RECC 
held in Whitehall, to coincide with a House of Commons debate on Rhodesia: 
Sixty people stood for one hour with placards and banners in Whitehall – at 
the entrance to Downing Street – and a letter finally calling for the 
withdrawal of the settlement proposals, the maintenance and 
strengthening of sanctions, and that in future negotiations for a settlement 
in Rhodesia be conducted with representatives of the African majority and 
other democratic forces in the country, was signed and delivered.544 
 
Donal McGregor of the London Co-operative Society Political Committee wrote to the 
Labour Party to inform them of a resolution passed at their AGM regarding Rhodesia: 
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This meeting…noting the repressive measures taken by Smith’s illegal 
regime in Rhodesia and the clear evidence of the opposition by the African 
people against the Home-Smith proposals calls upon the Labour, Co-
operative and Trade Union movement to actively campaign against these 
proposals and to insist on the continuance and strengthening of the United 
Nations sanctions against this inhuman, illegal and racialist regime of terror 
against people who want only elementary human rights.545 
 
This demonstrated greater interest in the Rhodesia issue amongst elements of the 
labour movement, in response to the threat of a sell-out. It also reinforces the 
argument made in Chapter 5, about the nature of interactions between the Labour 
Party and the broader movement, as this letter received exactly the same response as 
the National Organisation of Labour Students, discussed above. 
 
Towards the end of January 1972, the AAM sent a comprehensive letter to Harold 
Wilson with the aim of enlisting support for the RECC demonstration, planned for the 
following month. On the progress of the Pearce Commission, the letter stated that: 
It is becoming clearer each day that despite the repressive actions of the 
Smith regime, despite the denial of access to the media, the deaths and the 
detentions, Africans are saying no to the settlement proposals – a reply 
clearly unforeseen by Smith or indeed Sir Alec Douglas Home.546 
 
They argued that, whilst the policy was not without its flaws, sanctions should be 
strengthened to try and bring about genuine change in Rhodesia. By going down this 
route, instead of the Pearce Commission, Britain would at least be demonstrating 
“moral support” for Rhodesian Africans. The AAM called a meeting of representatives 
of a broad range of organisations to seek to mobilise the “large and growing body of 
British public opinion which is concerned to oppose”547 the Pearce Commission and 
the settlement proposals. 
 
The above was an example of both the methods the AAM used in trying to further its 
cause, and of the interactions it had with the Labour Party leadership. First, it 
indicated a willingness to interact with other organisations sympathetic to the same 
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cause, to reach a broader spectrum of people. The language used in this letter also 
suggested a strong interest in, and concern with, the Rhodesia issue amongst the 
British public. This was evidently conveyed to try to convince the Labour Party that it 
would be in its interests to support the AAM in this campaign. The reply the AAM 
received from Tom McNally, in his capacity as International Secretary and on behalf of 
Wilson, stated that the NEC and the PLP have “taken a very firm line on the present 
workings of the Pearce Commission”.548 The letter also referenced “private 
discussions” the NEC had with Bishop Muzorewa, and made the point that Labour 
would fight in parliament any settlement that did not meet the Six Principles. It 
concluded by saying that the Party was currently considering its policy on Rhodesia 
and would clarify this following the return of the Pearce Commission. This letter was 
characteristic in its lack of a direct answer to the original letter from the AAM. Citing 
talks with Bishop Muzorewa was a way of legitimising the moral fibre of the Party’s 
Rhodesia policy without ever clarifying what this policy actually was. It should be 
noted that although Muzorewa would later be dismissed as an unrepresentative 
mouthpiece, at this point he was regarded as an important figure by the British 
Government. 
 
On February 13th 1972, a march and rally was held in Trafalgar Square, organised by 
the RECC, referred to as the ‘Fight the Sell-Out in Rhodesia demonstration’, attended 
by around 8000 people.549 One of the speakers at this event was Bishop Muzorewa, 
indicating productive interaction between the nationalist movement and advocacy 
organisations over this issue, albeit under the auspices of the ANC rather than the 
more radical ZANU or ZAPU. In his address he made it clear how vehemently the 
African population of Rhodesia opposed the proposals, and that the Smith 
Government’s claim that an African ‘No’ was because of intimidation was completely 
false. He also spoke briefly about the ANC, saying that it: 
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Is the only body in Rhodesia that has any right to speak for the vast 
majority of the population of Rhodesia. It was formed two months ago as 
the result of a spontaneous grass roots feeling among millions of Africans 
who are determined that history shall not record that the Africans of 
Rhodesia accepted the betrayal of their birthright.550 
 
It is illuminating that he did not mention ZANU or ZAPU, except by allusion to other 
older African organisations that pre-date the Rhodesian Front, and therefore had 
some kind of automatic legitimacy conferred by age. 
 
Further comments made by Muzorewa were reminiscent of the argument set out in 
Chapter 5, regarding anti-British sentiment expressed by nationalists being a tactical 
move designed to maximise support for the cause. In his speech he stated that “it is 
sad indeed to think that the British people and their government could allow the 
betrayal of so many innocent people whose only failing seems to be their faith in the 
fairness and decency of the British people”.551 Then in his autobiography, speaking 
about this very event, he wrote that: 
I pondered one of the contradictions of our liberation struggle. At home I 
battle against white people largely of British extraction who are die–hard 
racists. … Here in the centre of London I found myself surrounded by white 
people who were loudly condemning the racism of the Smith regime.552 
 
This ostensible contradiction in his opinion of the British people further reinforces the 
argument set out in Chapter 5. In the context of trying to win support for the 
nationalist cause, and mobilise support against the settlement proposals and any 
potential sell-out he referred to the British people as allowing this betrayal to happen, 
and conflated them with the British Government, which in other contexts were very 
carefully differentiated between. However, in speaking about this event in a more 
personal way, he acknowledges support for the liberation struggle amongst the 
British people present at this event. 
 
In a fascinating article on Rhodesia House, and its history as a kind of extended 
metaphor for relations between Britain and Rhodesia during the crisis, Brownell talks 
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about its powerful symbolic role for all sides of the debate, particularly as a protest 
venue.553 This was illustrated at the RECC march, which took in Rhodesia House on its 
route,554 and drew on the symbolism of the contested space that it represented. A 
statement was read out, when the march reached the building, that effectively 
condemned the actions of the British Government in granting Rhodesia self-governing 
status, and in trying to sell out to the white regime through the mechanism of the test 
of acceptability. It ended with the raising of a Zimbabwean flag dedicated to the ideals 
of democracy, freedom and the fight against racism.555  
 
Minutes from a regular meeting of the RECC committee give a clear impression of the 
issues with which the organisation was concerned at this time, and the methods it was 
using to campaign against the Pearce Commission and possibility of a sell-out. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, through exploring the methods used by different advocacy 
organisations through the lens of resource mobilisation theory, it became clear that 
each organisation had a range of concerns outside its specific remit or campaign 
objectives. This was shown in these minutes by a lengthy discussion about finances, as 
the RECC found itself in the fortunate position of having a funding surplus. Different 
suggestions were made as to what should be done with this: using it for campaigning 
in Britain, assisting the ANC financially or using it to hold another fundraising event to 
raise money for the defence costs of people who had been arrested at the 
demonstration in Trafalgar Square the previous month. That the first of these options 
was chosen serves as a vivid indication of the constraints pragmatism placed on the 
actions of the advocacy organisations, and illustrates the cause of African nationalist 
frustration with British campaigning on the issue, not that the surplus was a 
significant sum.556 
 
The RECC also discussed campaigning very specifically tailored to the programme of 
the Pearce Commission; a clear example of the argument set out in Chapter 2, only 
focused on a very specific period of time. The organisation had found out the 
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headquarters of the Pearce Commission whilst it was in London, and the dates of the 
London hearings. It was decided that for each of these days, a vigil would be held 
outside the headquarters, with a different organisation taking responsibility for 
organising cover for a different day. Various slogans were suggested for this period, 
succinctly stating some shocking facts about the situation in Rhodesia to try and 
mobilise support amongst the general public, such as “31 people killed, between 2-
3000 arrested during ‘test of acceptability’”.557 This document illustrated some 
important points made in earlier chapters about the way in which advocacy 
organisations responded to the Rhodesia situation. First, it demonstrates that there 
was a high level of cooperation between different organisations working for the same 
ends. Second, it shows the way in which organisations responded to and used 
particular events to mobilise broader support for their campaigns. This is 
demonstrated by the way in which vigils were organised to display phrases from 
current news reports on Rhodesia to use as visual sound bites at such events, to 
attract interest in the subject.  
 
Around this time ‘Report on the activities of the Justice for Rhodesia campaign’ was 
published. The Justice for Rhodesia campaign helped to mobilise opposition to the 
settlement through the “wide distribution” of a leaflet on the subject, and it held a 
public meeting in January 1972 addressed by “Bishop Huddleston, Lord Caradon, 
Bishop Butler, Eshmael Mlambo of the African National Council and Jeremy Thorpe 
MP.”558 This was reminiscent of the various methods used by advocacy organisations 
outlined in Chapter 3, conforming to accepted methods of contention. The range of 
speakers at the meeting was a typical configuration deployed at such events. 
 
The campaign report provided a clear depiction of the way in which advocacy activity 
coalesced around particular events and changes in the situation. It is worth citing the 
report to illustrate this: 
Since the riots and shootings in January and the reports coming out of 
Rhodesia that have made it increasingly clear that the Africans have 
overwhelmingly and decisively rejected the settlement, and that the Pearce 
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Commission cannot report otherwise, the campaign has been concerned 
mainly with its strategy for after the publication of the report, when the 
Government will find it necessary to decide future policy on Rhodesia.559 
 
Further to the general fluctuations in the levels of interest in the Rhodesia issue, 
discussed in the first substantive chapter, this example shows how specific advocacy 
organisation activities and tactics were tailored closely to developments in the 
situation. In line with this trend, the Justice for Rhodesia campaign produced another 
leaflet to be distributed through trade unions, church groups and so on, to convey 
their position prior to the release of the Commission report. 
 
As discussed earlier in the thesis, outside of London and sporadic local actions, the 
only other notable regional hub of advocacy activity on Rhodesia was in Birmingham, 
particularly with the Birmingham Committee for Justice in Rhodesia. This can be 
attributed to the prominence of race as a political issue in both London and 
Birmingham due to the cumulative effects of post-war immigration,560 and perhaps 
also the links between Birmingham University and University College Rhodesia. The 
Birmingham groups operated in a similar way to much of the other advocacy activity 
that was discussed in Chapter 3 and in the current chapter, as illustrated in the 
minutes of their ‘trade union liaison group’. The discussion centred on the importance 
of getting the message about what was happening in Rhodesia out to “the working 
class movement working in Birmingham factories”.561 Also discussed was concern 
that many Birmingham businesses had interests in Rhodesia and were therefore keen 
to see a settlement with the Smith Government as soon as possible. Trying to mobilise 
support amongst workers was therefore seen as an important method of countering 
this tacit support for the Pearce Commission and the possibility of settlement. 
 
In late April the RECC wrote to the TUC in the hopes of setting up a meeting between 
them and ANC representatives in London. It stated that the ANC were hoping to 
discuss with the TUC “issues concerning the future of Rhodesia, and in particular the 
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question of British workers emigrating to Rhodesia”.562 The meeting then took place 
in early May. On the subject of strengthening economic pressure on Smith, which the 
ANC had expressed belief in as the way to bring about genuine change and force him 
back to the negotiating table, it was suggested that the ANC should get other African 
countries to help lobby the US and France to honour the sanctions regime.563 On the 
subject of British emigration to Rhodesia, the TUC stated that they had passed a 
resolution a year earlier trying to deter people from emigrating to South Africa and 
that “this action could probably quite easily be extended to Rhodesia”, although it was 
also pointed out that “the TUC has no real power over workers’ decisions on such 
matters”. This meeting is perplexing in the sense that it shows the TUC making an 
effort to meet with representatives of the African nationalist movement and discuss 
possibilities of what they could do to assist the cause. But equally it illustrates the 
TUC’s earlier disinterest or apathy over Rhodesia, in that it could easily have taken 
action on the emigration issue several years earlier, and indeed it still did not commit 
definitely to acting on this point. As discussed earlier, this very same suggestion was 
put to the TUC in November of the previous year by the AAM; evidently to no avail. 
This is further evidence of the propensity of the advocacy movement and its 
university-educated new left members to phrase its pleas for support to the labour 
movement in such a way that failed to resonate with the more traditional working-
class concerns, particularly at a time of industrial unrest and high immigration. At this 
time, the TUC still tended to support the policies of the Labour Party leadership, and 
whilst there were small pockets of support for the ideals of the AAM, this failed 
translate into a substantial challenge to the presiding view.  This disengagement with 
the Rhodesia issue by a majority of the labour movement frustrated representatives of 
the African nationalist movement, despite trying to draw parallels between 
themselves and ‘the people’ of Britain.564 
 
Also in early May, the AAM, together with the NUS met with representatives of the 
ANC. This meeting arose from a “Zimbabwe meeting of European NUSes in London” 
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earlier in the year, after which Bishop Muzorewa requested a further meeting with the 
British NUS.565 At the second meeting, the ANC emphasised the need for continued 
strengthening of sanctions, and “the NUSUK representatives were requested to 
pressurize the British Government not to weaken or remove sanctions and other 
European NUSes on the need to pressurize their own Governments.” The ANC 
delegation expressed concern that the British Government might recognise the Smith 
Government and remove sanctions, or offer de facto recognition and weaken 
sanctions gradually, either of which would have been disastrous to the African 
nationalist cause. Towards the end of the meeting the AAM and the NUSUK both 
declared their commitment to increasing their circulation of detailed information, as 
an important mechanism for maintaining awareness of the Rhodesia issue. 
 
The record of this meeting shows the ANC interacting productively with 
representative organisations from the labour and advocacy movements, and making 
use of existing networks through which to further their aims. That said, the NUS 
cannot be said to be a conventional part of the labour movement, and was therefore 
clearly more aligned to the university-educated new left that populated many of the 
advocacy organisations. This also explains why the ANC had more positive 
interactions with the NUS than with the more traditional blue-collar unions. This 
example illustrates more positive and beneficial cooperation between organisations 
than was often seen in Chapter 4, because of the seriousness with which each group 
was taking the possibility of a sell-out as a result of the Pearce Commission. This was 
captured by the final sentence of the meeting record, which reads: “All three 
organisations agreed to keep in regular contact in order to prevent a sell-out and to 
increase support for the struggle of the Zimbabwe people.”  
 
At the end of April, Bishop Muzorewa wrote to Judith Hart, essentially to lay the 
groundwork for a meeting between ANC and Labour Party representatives, when the 
ANC visited the UK the following month, “to discuss what we believe will be 
constructive alternatives to the present situation”.566 He highlighted that the majority 
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African population was eager to participate in the solution to the Rhodesia crisis, 
demonstrated by their support for the difficult economic reality that international 
sanctions inflicted, a fact he trusted the Pearce Commission to report. This illustrated 
the shift in opinion on the Pearce Commission, amongst African nationalist 
representatives, advocacy organisations and the labour movement, from one of 
scepticism about the Commission’s ability and willingness to be impartial and 
thorough, to one of trust in the work of the Commission as it gradually became 
apparent that an overwhelming ‘no’ was being reported. 
 
A delegation of the ANC had travelled to London to present their views to the British 
Government and the British public regarding the settlement proposals. In a press 
conference prior to the delegation’s departure, Rev. Canaan Banana, Vice Chairman of 
the ANC, stated that they had made clear their rejection of the proposals directly to 
Alec Douglas Home. They had also set out their reasons for disagreeing with the 
proposals: “the way they were negotiated, the absence of any guarantee of majority 
rule and the fact that they were based on the illegal 1969 constitution.”567 It goes on to 
press for the continuation of sanctions and the convening of a constitutional 
conference inclusive of African representation. The tone of this speech was very much 
in line with that of the majority of communications discussed in Chapter 5 between 
nationalist representatives based in Britain and representatives of the British 
Government.  
 
Just prior to the official publication of the Pearce Commission Report, the RECC wrote 
to its members and affiliated organisations to outline its position and organise further 
discussions regarding the situation in Rhodesia, and to propose future action. The 
latter argued that if, as the press was then predicting, the verdict was a ‘no’, then the 
RECC should intensify its campaign for “the maintenance and strengthening of 
sanctions” and the inclusion of African representation in any future negotiations.568 It 
also called for vigilance on any breaking of sanctions and: 
                                                          
567 RH, MSS AAM 1211, ‘Press conference for ANC delegation prior to their return to Rhodesia, statement by rev Canaan 
Banana, vice chairman’, 11/05/1972. 
568 RH, MSS Afr. S. Box 264, File 3, RECC letter to members, 19/05/1972. 
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Campaign more intensively against emigration to Rhodesia and against 
emigration to Rhodesia and against visits by sports teams and entertainers 
(e.g. it is reported in the Rhodesia Herald of 6 may that Cilla Black is to 
undertake a tour of Rhodesia and South Africa in Sept/Oct this year).569 
 
This was illustrative of the determination that many advocacy groups exhibited 
during this period, that even though the Pearce Commission was expected to return a 
‘no’, which is what they had campaigned so intensively for over the previous six 
months, they were already planning the next stage in the campaign. 
 
The May edition of the AAM Members’ Newsletter set out its position on advocacy 
actions in the post-Pearce period, depending on the final outcome of the Commission. 
It too called for the continuation and strengthening of sanctions, as argued for by the 
RECC and the ANC, because: 
it is the effect of sanctions which brought Smith to the negotiating table and 
while they have not brought the downfall of the Smith regime they have 
been an encouraging sign to the African people of Rhodesia of the support 
their cause commands in the world at large.570 
 
Furthermore, the AAM pointed out that the main reason that sanctions had thus far 
failed to produce a decisive settlement in Rhodesia was because of Portuguese and 
South African intransigence in complying with the sanctions regime, and that this 
issue should therefore be a focus for the campaign going forward. 
 
In late May, the Labour Party NEC released a statement about the final report of the 
Pearce Commission. It congratulated the Commission for having conducted its 
investigation impartially and thoroughly, and stated that the NEC accepted the final 
conclusions outlined in the report. The NEC made clear that they believed future 
negotiations, if they included the representatives of the African population and were 
based on the 5 Principles, could produce an acceptable independence settlement. The 
“NEC reaffirms its belief that independence should not be granted, or sanctions lifted, 
until a settlement is negotiated that is acceptable to the majority of the people of 
Rhodesia as a whole.”571 This statement was characteristic of the Labour Party’s 
                                                          
569 Ibid. 
570 MRC, MSS 280 31 1, AAM Members’ Newsletter, ‘Rhodesian Crisis – the struggle continues’, 19/05/1972. 
571 MRC, MSS 292D 968 2 2, ‘Resolution on the Pearce Report adopted by National Executive Committee’, 24/05/1972. 
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handling of the Rhodesia situation throughout the period explored in this chapter. It 
very confidently asserted the Party’s position, and warned the Conservative 
Government to adhere to the 5 Principles and, following the Pearce Commission, the 
newly accepted idea of African inclusion.  
 
Following the publication of the Pearce Report in June 1972, the TUC outlined their 
views of the Commission and the British Government’s handling of the settlement 
proposals, stating that: 
In industry the racial divisions are matters of practice and not of law. 
Therefore the TUC believe that in industry the way should be opened for 
progress towards a non-racial society by means of discussion, agreement, 
and consent; but the proposed agreement made no reference to such 
possibilities.572 
 
This argument differed from those set out by advocacy organisations and the Labour 
Party in support of a ‘no’ to the Pearce Commission, in that it offered a suggestion as 
to what could or should be done instead, beyond simply the intensification of the 
sanctions regime. It illustrated the TUC engaging with the issue, and with the 
Rhodesian labour movement, to a far greater extent than it had done earlier on in the 
Rhodesia crisis, prompted by the threat of independence granted on the basis of the 
1971 proposals. That said the TUC still, in June 1972, had not acted on the issue of 
emigration, as it had earlier indicated to the AAM and the ANC that it may. It still listed 
sending “a circular to all unions asking them to discourage emigration to Rhodesia” as 
a possible course of action, if necessary, indicating that whilst they were more 
engaged with the Rhodesian labour movement, fundamental concern for the situation 
had not changed significantly.573 
Legacy of the Pearce Commission 
A 1973 press statement outlined the new objectives of the Justice for Rhodesia 
campaign, now that the immediate drama of the Pearce Commission had passed. It 
offers a useful insight into the legacy of this episode in the Rhodesia crisis, stating that 
the new aims of the campaign were: 
                                                          
572 MRC, MSS 292D 968 2 2, ‘Report on the Pearce Commission’, 21/06/1972. 
573 Ibid. 
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1 To ensure that Britain fulfils its constitutional, moral and historical 
obligations towards the people of Rhodesia; 
2 To persuade Britain to exert its authority in Rhodesia in recognition of 
the findings of the Pearce Commission; so that 
a) the illegal regime is replaced by a popularly elected government; 
b) there can be no cause or opportunity for outside powers, and 
particularly South Africa, to usurp Britain’s authority.574 
 
It further stated that the campaign would focus on securing the withdrawal of the 
settlement proposals, policing sanctions, securing the release of political prisoners 
and ensuring future negotiations were inclusive. This summation of the new focus of 
the organisation conveys a clear picture of the legacy of the Pearce Commission. First, 
and perhaps most importantly, was the fact that the Conservative Party left the 
proposals on the table, as it were, in the hope that they might still form the basis of 
agreement, as unlikely as this was given that it would have depended on a miraculous 
sea-change in African opinion. It also highlighted the perceived importance of 
maintaining pressure on the British Government over the issue of future negotiations 
being inclusive of African opinion. 
 
Another important legacy of the Pearce Commission and all that it entailed was the 
persistence of the ANC. Despite claims early on that the organisation existed solely to 
see the 1971 settlement proposals defeated and would disband when this happened, 
“when the Pearce enquiry was nearly over there had been another push from below 
for the ANC to become a permanent political party.”575 The ANC initially found this 
difficult because they could not let churches and other organisations, such as trade 
unions, officially join, because if the ANC was then legally banned, these organisations 
would have been put in a difficult position. Despite these initial difficulties the 
organisation persisted, going through several different phases, but eventually carrying 
Bishop Muzorewa, and what had then become the United African National Council 
(UANC), to a much-condemned electoral ‘victory’ in 1979. 
 
Finally, it can be argued that the Pearce Commission helped to crystallise African 
nationalist opinions on the future of Rhodesia, and the potential paths to majority 
                                                          
574 RH, MSS AAM 1205, Justice for Rhodesia campaign press statement, 1973.  
575 MRC, MSS 292D 968 2 2, ‘Report on the Pearce Commission’, 21/06/1972. 
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rule. In the official report of the Pearce Commission, an ANC representative was 
recorded as having said that “if Rhodesian Africans were to be misgoverned by an 
independent Rhodesia without Britain’s blessing, that would be better than being 
misgoverned with it.”576 This conveys the strength of feeling amongst the African 
nationalist movement which, had the Commission reported a ‘yes’, would have been 
viewed as a ‘great betrayal’ of the African population of Rhodesia. It also highlights the 
importance, following the Pearce Commission, of African involvement in any attempts 
at or discussions regarding settlement. 
 
There is some scope in this case study for a comparison between the operation of 
social movements in Rhodesia and Britain over the settlement proposals and the 
Pearce Commission. Earlier in the chapter it was highlighted that December 1971 was 
a particularly busy month with regards to the progress of the potential settlement, 
seeing the formation of three new, important organisations, all of which were tailored 
specifically to campaigning against the proposals, albeit in different ways. In this 
sense, the formation of the ANC was comparable to the formation of the RECC and the 
Justice for Rhodesia campaign, in terms of social movement organisation tactics. This 
section will briefly compare the trajectories of these organisations. 
 
As party theorist Angelo Panebianco argues, how “the cards are dealt out and the 
outcomes of the different rounds played out in the formative phases of an 
organisation, continue in many ways to condition the life of the organisation even 
decades after its formation”.577 Such an argument speaks to the reasoning behind the 
formation of the new organisations in both Britain and Rhodesia. In both contexts it 
was acknowledged that in order to successfully contest the proposals, an organisation 
with no history, no prior ‘conditioning’, was required. Equally this argument speaks to 
the trajectory of the ANC following the defeat of the Home-Smith proposals. 
Muzorewa was selected to be leader because he was an unformed figure as far as 
public perception was concerned and could be moulded to new, specific aims; he was 
a neutral mouthpiece for a particular project. In the sense that he represented the 
                                                          
576 Ibid 
577 Cited in Russell Building New Labour: 11. 
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designs of the Smith regime in the internal settlement and on into the 1979 election, it 
can be argued that he, and the organisation he represented, continued to be simply a 
mouthpiece, because of that organisation’s conditioning. 
 
For ease of comparison, this brief discussion will focus solely on the RECC and the 
ANC, although there is scope for the Justice for Rhodesia campaign to be included 
here. One key area of similarity is that both organisations were established by 
participants in, or at least adherents of, existing organisations. This suggests that 
there is some inherent campaigning value in having single issue organisations, since in 
both instances there were already other groups working on similar, although broader, 
issues. Admittedly in Rhodesia the context was different as neither ZANU nor ZAPU 
could have mobilised within the country to the extent that the ANC did because of 
legal restrictions. However this is not to say that the ANC did not benefit from being a 
single issue organisation, as it was able to communicate its cause with exact clarity; a 
‘no’ to the Pearce Commission, a rejection of the settlement proposals. 
 
Another observable benefit to having formed new organisations specifically to 
campaign against the Pearce Commission was that neither had any prior history of 
entanglement with other issues, ideas or causes, even though obtaining a rejection of 
the settlement proposals was itself part of a broader cause. ZANU and ZAPU both had 
mixed records of interaction with the African population578 which may have 
obfuscated the campaign against Pearce, had it been spearheaded by them. Equally 
the AAM and the Africa Bureau had both done lots of work on other issues, outside of 
Rhodesia completely, but the RECC was absolutely singular and clear in its focus. 
These benefits of the establishment of these new, single-issue, organisations were 
demonstrated by their successes. The ANC was tremendously effective in quickly 
publicising the settlement proposals and their implications, and therefore in 
mobilising support for a ‘no’ to the Commission. Equally, the RECC was successful in 
organising a large demonstration against the Pearce Commission in under two 
months, and by extension raising awareness amongst the British public of the issues 
at stake in the newest attempt at settlement. 
                                                          
578 Bhebe and Ranger, Soldiers. 
219 
 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the settlement proposals negotiated between the Heath and 
Smith Governments in 1970-71, and put to the people of Rhodesia in a test of 
acceptability led by the Pearce Commission in early 1972. It was an important event in 
the timeline of the Rhodesia crisis, as it was the first time that the African population 
had been involved in any part of the settlement proposal process, thus setting a 
precedent for any future talks. Admittedly the Pearce Commission was not seen as an 
acceptable method by the majority of the African population, who made it clear that a 
referendum on the basis of one man one vote would have been fairer, in lieu of full 
representation at all stages of the talks. Nonetheless, these negotiations and the test of 
acceptability fundamentally changed what was possible and acceptable in any future 
talks, and for the first time provided a non-violent forum for the African population to 
express their views. 
 
Through exploring more closely a key event in the Rhodesia timeline, and considering 
each of the main research questions simultaneously, a clearer picture emerges of how 
various groups and organisations responded to the way in which the situation was 
playing out diplomatically, and how these actions were connected, if indeed they were 
connected. The research question addressed in Chapter 2 considered whether or not 
there was a connection between events in Rhodesia, the political climate of the UK, 
and levels of support for the African nationalist movement amongst organisations in 
Britain. Further to the conclusions drawn in that chapter, exploring the Pearce 
Commission illustrated how actions by UK based advocacy organisations and the 
labour movement not only fluctuated according to events over months and years, but 
made use of the intricacies of things like settlement negotiations to tailor protest 
events, for example holding a vigil outside the offices of the Pearce Commission whilst 
the commissioners were based in London. 
 
This chapter also reinforced the argument set out in Chapter 3 regarding the methods 
that advocacy organisations used in campaigning in support of the African nationalist 
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movement, in that it demonstrated them continuing to involve the labour movement 
in their campaigns where possible, and work with the Labour Party, more 
cooperatively than in some earlier examples since the Party was in opposition for the 
period explored in this chapter. Some comparison was also drawn between the 
formation of new organisations to contest the settlement proposals in both Britain 
and Rhodesia, illustrating the employment of similar methods despite the 
dramatically different political and legal contexts in which each social movement was 
operating. 
 
During the Pearce Commission, and the period leading up to the Commission, more 
productive collaboration was visible between the labour movement, advocacy 
organisations and the Labour Party than other periods in the Rhodesia crisis. A large 
factor in this was Labour being in opposition, meaning that it was more at liberty to 
explicitly express support for some of the statements and resolutions put forward by 
advocacy organisations, without this necessitating subsequent action. This had a 
resulting impact on the TUC, meaning it no longer had to debate whether it should 
support Labour Party policy on Rhodesia, or align more closely with advocacy 
organisations on the issue, as it had had to do in earlier periods. This period also 
represented a reprieve from nationalist organisation frustration with British 
organisations and the labour movement, and the ANC worked productively with these 
in the organisation of public meetings and protests. 
 
Due to the formation of the ANC, this case study chapter did not explore the 
arguments of Chapter 5, beyond a couple of early examples of ZANU or ZAPU 
communication on the settlement proposals. Despite this, the examples available 
indicated that nationalist leaders and representatives continued to vary the form of 
their interactions and communication on the Pearce proposals in line with the 
argument set out in the previous chapter; that such instances were guided by 
leadership tactics designed to maximise the outcome from each communication. 
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Conclusion 
Introduction 
The thesis has considered how the Rhodesia crisis played out from UDI until 
internationally accepted independence amongst the grass roots in Britain, and the 
African nationalists’ international efforts as part of the independence struggle. 
Throughout the thesis existing literature has been built on by considering the role of 
advocacy organisations and the British labour movement in campaigning in support of 
majority rule in Rhodesia, as well as looking at the African nationalist movement’s 
relationship with these organisations and successive British governments. This 
project broke down into four main research questions considering, respectively: how 
interest in the Rhodesia issue fluctuated over the 15 year period under consideration; 
the methods used by advocacy organisations in campaigning on the issue and the 
limits placed on campaigning by an adherence to pragmatism; the relationship 
between the Labour Party leadership and the broader labour movement over 
Rhodesia; and finally the differences in rhetoric espoused by nationalists based in 
Rhodesia, and those lobbying in the UK.  
Empirical contributions of the thesis 
The primary contribution to knowledge this thesis makes is a historiographical one. In 
existing literature, Britain’s role in and handling of the Rhodesia issue has been looked at 
exclusively through an official lens, primarily utilising sources housed in The National 
Archives, such as Cabinet and Foreign Office papers. Equally, existing literature on the 
independence struggle has largely ignored the international activities of the nationalist 
organisations, and their discussions with the British Government. By marrying up official 
sources with organisational sources, and considering the actions of the main nationalist 
organisations in Britain and with the British, this thesis has moved away from the elite 
focused accounts of the unfolding of the Rhodesia crisis, and highlighted the actions of 
advocacy organisations and the labour movement in responding to the crisis, particularly 
considering the role of pragmatism in shaping these responses. Looking beyond the official 
sources gives an insight into popular conceptions of the Rhodesia issue in Britain, as well as a 
more detailed understanding of successive British Governments’ stance by considering their 
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interactions with the nationalist movement, and those organisations in Britain who were 
supportive of the nationalist cause. Some scholars have argued that Labour’s stance on 
Rhodesia was essentially indistinguishable from that of the Conservative Party,579 but its 
interactions with the nationalist movement and advocacy organisations highlight a level of 
engagement with the core of the struggle that simply was not present in the Conservative 
Party. However, the thesis also demonstrated that for much of the period, the Labour Party 
leadership, too, was constrained by its parliamentary socialism and pursued a pragmatic 
‘official mind’ policy of seeking an expedited resolution to the Rhodesia crisis. This would 
have come at the expense of the nationalist movement, advocacy organisations and the values 
of much of the left wing of the broader Labour Party. This fear of a willingness to sell out 
caused frustration amongst the nationalist movement, who nevertheless continued to lobby 
Labour Party ministers, as they were seen as gatekeepers of the struggle when in power, and 
still more likely to listen to them when in opposition. 
Interest in the Rhodesia issue was not sustained over the 15 year period from UDI to 
independence. Advocacy organisations and the trade union movement responded 
instead at times when the dynamics of the situation were changing, or threatened to 
change, such as settlement negotiations and repressive actions by the Smith regime. 
Rhodesia jostled for space with many other issues, particularly British domestic 
economic problems, immigration, as well as comparable overseas issues such as 
Vietnam. Despite emphasising the importance of gaining the support of the labour 
movement, advocacy organisations generally failed to achieve this aim, with domestic 
‘bread and butter’ issues, particularly industrial legislation, taking precedence. This 
failure to obtain its active support reflects a broader disinterest in the Rhodesia issue 
from the labour movement for much of the period. At the outset of the crisis, the TUC 
aligned itself to the policy of the Labour Party leadership, and this attitude of 
disengagement and adherence to the views of the Party prevailed amongst much of 
the labour movement. This only began to change in the late 1970s when the there was 
a leftwards shift in the NEC and union leadership. This disengagement on the part of 
the labour movement was a source of frustration to the nationalist movement, who 
continued to look upon the ‘British people’ more favourably than successive 
governments, but felt that there was not enough productive action on the issue. 
                                                          
579 See for example Windrich, Rhodesian Independence;  
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Despite its perception of the Labour leadership, however, ZANU and ZAPU both 
maintained very polite relations through their representatives in Britain. This was in 
stark contrast to the nationalist movement’s strong anti-British rhetoric espoused in 
Rhodesia. The thesis argues that this difference in rhetoric and approach to the British 
was simply a pragmatic leadership tactic, aimed at maximising nationalist sentiment 
and support for the struggle at home, whilst maintaining positive relationships with 
the people who were perceived to be the key power brokers: successive British 
governments. 
 
The common theme emerging from all of the research questions is that, in the absence 
of an easy or obvious solution to the Rhodesia, a pragmatic approach prevailed over 
commitment to fundamental views. Advocacy organisations, as well as concerned with 
campaigning, had to consider their own survival. A good example of this was the 
reticence of advocacy organisations to give material aid the nationalist movement for 
fear of alienating key political supporters of the cause as a result of supporting 
‘terrorist’ groups. The nationalist movement altered its rhetoric and communication 
styles according to its audience and aims, ensuring it could still get an audience with 
Labour MPs , whilst publishing articles at home entitled ‘Wilson’s Bloody Head’. The 
Labour Party leadership for its part tried to minimise dissent to and dissatisfaction 
with its policies, whilst pursuing a politically cautious path, the trajectory of which has 
been discussed in greater detail in other studies.580 
 
Following on from this thesis, there is certainly scope for future research utilising an 
oral history approach, as this would complement the archive sources uncovered in 
this study. Oral history would also feed into regional and local studies, drawing on, for 
example, trades councils and local organisational records in order to demonstrate the 
regionally diverse constituencies. Equally, social movement theory could be applied to 
other historical instances of advocacy campaigning, such as CND and the Vietnam 
War, in order to bring greater understanding of the methods used by such 
                                                          
580 See particularly C. Watts, ‘The Rhodesian Crisis in British and International Politics, 1964-1965’ (PhD thesis, University 
of Birmingham, 2006). 
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movements, and interaction between advocacy campaigns and broader society across 
different campaigns.  
Conclusion 
By exploring the relationship between the African nationalist movement, advocacy 
organisations and the British labour movement in the struggle for independence in 
Rhodesia, this thesis has begun to establish a dialogue between literature considering 
the guerrilla war in Rhodesia, and that focusing on the elite-level diplomatic unfolding 
of the situation. Two bodies of secondary literature have been drawn on, as well as a 
novel set of archive sources that have not previously been utilised in studies of the 
Rhodesia crisis, which has allowed the thesis to draw together the stories of the 
African nationalist movement and its activities in Britain, advocacy organisations 
campaigning on Rhodesia, with a more multi-layered picture of the British Labour 
Party and its part in the Rhodesia crisis. The Rhodesia crisis did not unfold exclusively 
in the bush, nor exclusively on board HMS Fearless; it was far more complex and 
multi-layered than that, an idea that this thesis has begun to capture.  
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